Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011 (2026)
Definitions
✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) A person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person that holds the securities:
(i) As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(b) A corporation twenty percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person that holds the securities:
(i) As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) A person that operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; or
(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law.
(3) "Claim," except as used in "claim for relief," means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person that has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person that is liable on a claim.
(7) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(8) "Insider" includes:
(a) If the debtor is an individual:
(i) A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) A general partner in a partnership described in (a)(ii) of this subsection; or
(iv) A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(b) If the debtor is a corporation:
(i) A director of the debtor;
(ii) An officer of the debtor;
(iii) A person in control of the debtor;
(iv) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) A general partner in a partnership described in (b)(iv) of this subsection; or
(vi) A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(c) If the debtor is a partnership:
(i) A general partner in the debtor;
(ii) A relative of a general partner in, or a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(iii) Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) A general partner in a partnership described in (c)(iii) of this subsection; or
(v) A person in control of the debtor;
(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(e) A managing agent of the debtor.
(9) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(10) "Organization" means a person other than an individual.
(11) "Person" means an individual, estate, partnership, association, trust, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal or commercial entity.
(12) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(13) "Reasonably equivalent value" includes, without limitation, a transfer or an obligation that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have sold the property or services to, or purchased the property or services from, the transferee in an arm's length transaction at market rates.
(14) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(15) "Relative" means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(16) "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(a) To execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(b) To attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
(17) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(18) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
Notes:
Effective date—1987 c 444: "This act shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1987 c 444 s 16.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1991–2025 · leading case: Arrowsmith v. Lemberg Law, LLC (In re Health Diagnostics Lab'y, Inc.), 571 B.R. 182 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
Arrowsmith v. Lemberg Law, LLC (In re Health Diagnostics Lab'y, Inc.), 571 B.R. 182 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017). “§§ 544 (b), 550, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.40.011 , et seq., Okla.”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 135 Wash. 2d 894 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Clayton v. Wilson, 227 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2010). “deration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) The transfer…”
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
Clayton v. Wilson, 168 Wash. 2d 57 (Wash. 2010). “” RCW 19.40.011(7)(i)(A), (11). Clayton, 145 Wn.”
Thompson v. Hanson, 174 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “" RCW 19.40.011(2). Foreclosure, or sale of an asset for no net profit, means the asset was fully encumbered and therefore not an "asset" for purpose of the UFTA.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “081, [5] may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor.”
Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1997). “" RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer," the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer" appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
Freitag v. McGhie, 133 Wash. 2d 816 (Wash. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer,” the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer” appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(1) — 2 cases
Canal Station Condo. Assn, Resp. v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, Et Ano. (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Canal Station Condo. Assn, Resp. v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, Et Ano. (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(12) — 5 cases
Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1997). “" RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer," the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer" appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Freitag v. McGhie, 133 Wash. 2d 816 (Wash. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer,” the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer” appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 135 Wash. 2d 894 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(13) — 1 case
Jackson Mika, App. v. Jbc Ent. Holdings, Resps. (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(18) — 1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen (W.D. Wash. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(2) — 1 case
Thompson v. Hanson, 174 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “" RCW 19.40.011(2). Foreclosure, or sale of an asset for no net profit, means the asset was fully encumbered and therefore not an "asset" for purpose of the UFTA.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(2)(a) — 1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen (W.D. Wash. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(2)(i) — 7 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “081, [5] may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. L.L.C. v. Stredwick, 120 Wash. App. 52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
John Haughney, (humcor, Inc) V Meridian Place Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(3) — 7 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 135 Wash. 2d 894 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1991).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(4) — 3 cases
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
Ozone Int'l LLC v. Wheatsheaf Grp. US Inc (W.D. Wash. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(6) — 2 cases
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(7) — 3 cases
Canal Station North Condo. Ass'n v. Ballard Leary Phase II, LP, 322 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Canal Station Condo. Assn, Resp. v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, Et Ano. (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Canal Station Condo. Assn, Resp. v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, Et Ano. (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(7)(i)(A) — 2 cases
Clayton v. Wilson, 227 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2010). “deration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) The transfer…”
Clayton v. Wilson, 168 Wash. 2d 57 (Wash. 2010). “” RCW 19.40.011(7)(i)(A), (11). Clayton, 145 Wn.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(7)(ii)(C) — 1 case
Powell v. Sphere Drake Ins. P.L.C., 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(7)(ii)(c) — 1 case
Powell v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(8) — 9 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 135 Wash. 2d 894 (Wash. 1998). “RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “081, [5] may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor.”
John Haughney, (humcor, Inc) V Meridian Place Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011(9) — 1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen (W.D. Wash. 2024).
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