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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 19Chapter 19.40

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011 (2025)

Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1991–2025 31citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 31 opinions since 1991, 7 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (8) (9 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 19.40.011 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“§§ 544 (b), 550, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.40.011 , et seq., Okla.”
Later courts cite it for
“may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” · 4 citing courts
2
cites § 19.40.011 4×subsections: (2)(i) (3) (8) (12)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
The case’s holding
Successor liability may be imposed when a transfer of assets is made for the fraudulent purpose of hindering creditors, regardless of whether adequate consideration was provided.
Later courts cite it for
“adequate consideration for a transfer of assets between a buying and selling corporation is an important element when determining whether to impose successor liability.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENEagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 19.40.011 3×subsections: (2)(i) (8) (12)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
The case’s holding
Successor liability may be imposed when an asset transfer is made for the fraudulent purpose of hindering creditors or escaping liability.
Later courts cite it for
“that csl was created for the sole purpose of hindering cmyc's creditors.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 19.40.011 3×subsections: (3) (8) (12)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
5
GREENClayton v. Wilson, 227 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2010).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (7)(i)(A)cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“deration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) The transfer…”
6
GREENDouglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 19.40.011 3×subsections: (3) (4) (6)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Later courts cite it for
“actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENDouglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 19.40.011 3×subsections: (3) (4) (6)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
8
GREENClayton v. Wilson, 168 Wash. 2d 57 (2010).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (7)(i)(A)cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“” RCW 19.40.011(7)(i)(A), (11). Clayton, 145 Wn.”
The case’s holding
A marital community is liable for a spouse's intentional torts committed while managing community business or for the community's benefit.
Later courts cite it for
“laframboise's approach to community liability remains good law.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENThompson v. Hanson, 174 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (2)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“" RCW 19.40.011(2). Foreclosure, or sale of an asset for no net profit, means the asset was fully encumbered and therefore not an "asset" for purpose of the UFTA.”
The case’s holding
A creditor may recover from a transferee for a constructively fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act without proving actual intent to defraud.
Later courts cite it for
“defer to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENAssocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 19.40.011 2×subsections: (2)(i) (8)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“081, [5] may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor.”
11
GREENFreitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (12)cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“" RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer," the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer" appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
The case’s holding
The statute of limitations for a fraudulent transfer claim begins to run only when the claimant discovers or could reasonably have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer.
Later courts cite it for
“if the statute were to begin to run when the transfer was made, without regard as to whether the claimant discovered or could have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer, those successful at concealing a fraudulent transfer would be rewarded.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENFreitag v. McGhie, 133 Wash. 2d 816 (1997).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (12)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“” RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer,” the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer” appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
13
GREENPowell v. Sphere Drake Ins. P.L.C., 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (7)(ii)(C)cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“RCW 19.40.011(7)(ii)(C). Thomson-CSF, S.A.”
Later courts cite it for
“service of process is sufficient only if it satisfies the minimum requirements of due process and the requirements set forth by statute.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENDyer v. Eckols, 808 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App. 1991).
cites § 19.40.011 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“24 §§ 112 to 123 (West 1989); Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 95.-200 to 95.”
Later courts cite it for
“this 'relation back' doctrine is based on the principle that a bequest or gift is nothing more than an offer which can be accepted or rejected.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENMcMaster v. Farmer, 886 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 19.40.011 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“1 RCW 19.40.011 et seq. 2 The statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis provides that "specific terms modify and restrict general terms where both are used in sequence.”
Later courts cite it for
“to make clear that lapse of the statutory periods prescribed by the section bars the right and not merely the remedy.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENPowell v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (7)(ii)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“[9] RCW 19.40.011(7)(ii)(c). [10] 64 F.3d 773 .”
17
GREENFeminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1991).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (3)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“RCW 19.40.011(3), (5). See also Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, former RCW 19.”
18
NEUTRALCanal Station North Condo. Ass'n v. Ballard Leary Phase II, LP, 322 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (7)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“011(1), all or some of Declarant, Continental, DOE AFFILI *303 ATES 1-50 and DOE PRINCIPALS 1-10 are alter egos of one another and/or qualify as “affiliates” of the Declarant, and/or pursuant to RCW 19.40.011(7) qualify as “insiders” of Declarant and one another.”
Later courts cite it for
“we must indulge every presumption in favor of arbitration, whether the issue is construction of an arbitration clause or allegation of waiver, delay, or another defense to arbitrability.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENAssocs. Hous. Fin. L.L.C. v. Stredwick, 120 Wash. App. 52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 19.40.011 1×subsections: (2)(i)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“081, 5 may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor. RCW 19.40.071(a).”
20
NO FLAGBGH Holdings, LLC v. DL Evans Bank, No. 2:18-cv-01408 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2023).
cites § 19.40.011 4×subsections: (2)(i) 2× (3) 2×cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 19.40.011
“” RCW § 19.40.011(2)(i). “Simply put . . . if the debtor transfers assets 15 encumbered by security interests, that transfer is beyond the reach of the statute.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199120082025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1997. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.15Wash.7W.D. Wash.7Tex. App.1Bankr. E.D. Va.1
By subsection
(1)2 cases
Canal Station Condo. Assn v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, No. 69500-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013).
Canal Station Condo. Assn v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, No. 69500-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013).
(2)1 case
Thompson v. Hanson, 174 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).“" RCW 19.40.011(2). Foreclosure, or sale of an asset for no net profit, means the asset was fully encumbered and therefore not an "asset" for purpose of the UFTA.”
(2)(a)1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen, No. 3:23-cv-06142 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2024).
(2)(i)7 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).“” RCW 19.40.011(12). The UFTA defines assets as "property of a debtor, but the term does not include: .”
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1998).“RCW 19.40.011(12). "Asset" means the property of the debtor, but does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).“081, [5] may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor.”
Assocs. Hous. Fin. L.L.C. v. Stredwick, 120 Wash. App. 52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).“081, 5 may avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, or may attach the asset or enjoin further disposition of the asset by the debtor. RCW 19.40.071(a).”
John Haughney, (humcor, Inc) V Meridian Place LLC, No. 47292-9 (Wash. Ct. App. June 28, 2016).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(3)7 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 135 Wash. 2d 894 (1998).“RCW 19.40.011(12). “Asset” means the property of the debtor, but does not include “[pjroperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien[.”
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).“NOTES [1] Ch. 19.40 RCW. [2] The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000.”
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).“The legislature has increased the homestead exemption to $125,000. Past increases to the homestead exemption have been found to be remedial and therefore retroactive.”
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1991).“RCW 19.40.011(3), (5). See also Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, former RCW 19.”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(4)3 cases
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Ozone Int'l LLC v. Wheatsheaf Grp. US Inc, No. 3:19-cv-06155 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2021).
(6)2 cases
Douglas v. Hill, 199 P.3d 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wash. App. 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
(7)3 cases
Canal Station North Condo. Ass'n v. Ballard Leary Phase II, LP, 322 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).“011(1), all or some of Declarant, Continental, DOE AFFILI *303 ATES 1-50 and DOE PRINCIPALS 1-10 are alter egos of one another and/or qualify as “affiliates” of the Declarant, and/or pursuant to RCW 19.40.011(7) qualify as “insiders” of Declarant and one another.”
Canal Station Condo. Assn v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, No. 69500-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013).
Canal Station Condo. Assn v. Ballard Leary Phase Ii, Lp, No. 69500-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013).
(7)(i)(A)2 cases
Clayton v. Wilson, 227 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2010).“deration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) The transfer…”
Clayton v. Wilson, 168 Wash. 2d 57 (2010).“” RCW 19.40.011(7)(i)(A), (11). Clayton, 145 Wn.”
(7)(ii)1 case
Powell v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).“[9] RCW 19.40.011(7)(ii)(c). [10] 64 F.3d 773 .”
(7)(ii)(C)1 case
Powell v. Sphere Drake Ins. P.L.C., 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).“RCW 19.40.011(7)(ii)(C). Thomson-CSF, S.A.”
(8)9 cases
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
Assocs. Hous. Fin. v. Stredwick, 83 P.3d 1032 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
John Haughney, (humcor, Inc) V Meridian Place LLC, No. 47292-9 (Wash. Ct. App. June 28, 2016).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(9)1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen, No. 3:23-cv-06142 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2024).
(12)5 cases
Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1997).“" RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer," the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer" appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
Eagle Pac. Ins. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
Freitag v. McGhie, 133 Wash. 2d 816 (1997).“” RCW 19.40.011(12). This definition of "transfer,” the McGhies assert, must be read into the statute every time the term "transfer” appears, and precludes a finding that the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered or could…”
(13)1 case
Jackson Mika v. Jbc Ent. Holdings, No. 73305-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).
(18)1 case
Vaughn v. Cohen, No. 3:23-cv-06142 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2024).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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