Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) This chapter replaces the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions and shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions, except that this chapter does not apply to:

(a) Judicial review of:

(i) Land use decisions made by bodies that are not part of a local jurisdiction;

(ii) Land use decisions of a local jurisdiction that are subject to review by a quasi-judicial body created by state law, such as the shorelines hearings board or the growth management hearings board;

(b) Judicial review of applications for a writ of mandamus or prohibition; or

(c) Claims provided by any law for monetary damages or compensation. If one or more claims for damages or compensation are set forth in the same complaint with a land use petition brought under this chapter, the claims are not subject to the procedures and standards, including deadlines, provided in this chapter for review of the petition. The judge who hears the land use petition may, if appropriate, preside at a trial for damages or compensation.

(2) The superior court civil rules govern procedural matters under this chapter to the extent that the rules are consistent with this chapter.

[ 2010 1st sp.s. c 7 s 38; 2003 c 393 s 17; 1995 c 347 s 704.]

Notes:

Effective date—2010 1st sp.s. c 26; 2010 1st sp.s. c 7: See note following RCW 43.03.027.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 196 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1997–2026 · leading case: Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 52 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2002).

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Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 52 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 8× “[40] In enacting LUPA in 1995, the Legislature replaced the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions as stated in RCW 36.70C.030 [41] and determined that *7 LUPA "shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions," with certain specific exceptions.”

James v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 9× “RCW 36.70C.030. ¶ 38 Although this statute is a complete refutation to the majority's claim that all actions arising from a "land use decision" as defined in RCW 36.”

James v. Kitsap Cnty., 154 Wash. 2d 574 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 9× “RCW 36.70C.030. ¶37 Although this statute is a complete refutation to the majority’s claim that all actions arising from a “land use decision” as defined in RCW 36.”

Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 146 Wash. 2d 904 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 6× “40 In enacting LUPA in 1995, the Legislature replaced the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions as stated in RCW 36.70C.030 41 and determined that LUPA “shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions,” with certain specific exceptions.”

Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 54 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 5× “RCW 36.70C.030. 10 A “land use decision” is defined as a final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination, including those with authority to hear appeals, on .”

Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 423 P.3d 223 (Wash. 2018). · cites it 4× “RCW 36.70C.030. The central issue in this case is (1) whether that administrative exhaustion rule applies to all tort claims that arise during the land use decision-making process.”

Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wash. 2d 300 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 5× “4 RCW 36.70C.030(1). Thus, LUPA applies only to actions that fall within the statutory definition of a land use decision.”

Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 3× “Thus, defects in land use determinations that could have resulted in decisions that were void ab initio under pre-LUPA cases fall within LUPA, with its express 21-day limitation period.”

Asche v. Bloomquist, 133 P.3d 475 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “RCW 36.70C.030. Land use decisions are defined in the statute to be a “final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination” on: (a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required…”

Asche v. Bloomquist, 133 P.3d 475 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “Land use decisions are defined in the statute to be a "final determination by a local jurisdiction's body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination" on: (a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required by law before…”

Knight v. City of Yelm, 267 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 4× “17 RCW is reviewable under LUPA, chapter 36.70C RCW. RCW 58.17.180.”

Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 296 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 2× “¶39 An inverse condemnation action seeks constitutionally mandated “compensation” for governmental takings. Wash.”

Show all 196 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(1) — 88 cases

Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 52 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2002). “[40] In enacting LUPA in 1995, the Legislature replaced the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions as stated in RCW 36.70C.030 [41] and determined that *7 LUPA "shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions," with certain specific exceptions.”

James v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.030. ¶ 38 Although this statute is a complete refutation to the majority's claim that all actions arising from a "land use decision" as defined in RCW 36.”

James v. Kitsap Cnty., 154 Wash. 2d 574 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.030. ¶37 Although this statute is a complete refutation to the majority’s claim that all actions arising from a “land use decision” as defined in RCW 36.”

Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 146 Wash. 2d 904 (Wash. 2002). “40 In enacting LUPA in 1995, the Legislature replaced the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions as stated in RCW 36.70C.030 41 and determined that LUPA “shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions,” with certain specific exceptions.”

Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “Thus, defects in land use determinations that could have resulted in decisions that were void ab initio under pre-LUPA cases fall within LUPA, with its express 21-day limitation period.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(1)(a)(ii) — 20 cases

Caswell v. Pierce Cnty., 992 P.2d 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).

Woods v. Kittitas Cnty., 162 Wash. 2d 597 (Wash. 2007).

Woods v. Kittitas Cnty., 174 P.3d 25 (Wash. 2007).

Harrington v. Spokane Cnty., 114 P.3d 1233 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

King Cnty. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(1)(b) — 1 case

Stafne v. Snohomish Cnty., 234 P.3d 225 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(1)(c) — 23 cases

Post v. City of Tacoma, 217 P.3d 1179 (Wash. 2009).

Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 296 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2013). “¶39 An inverse condemnation action seeks constitutionally mandated “compensation” for governmental takings. Wash.”

Asche v. Bloomquist, 133 P.3d 475 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “RCW 36.70C.030. Land use decisions are defined in the statute to be a “final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination” on: (a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required…”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(2) — 7 cases

Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 126 Wash. App. 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Kitsap Cnty., 965 P.2d 636 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(c) — 1 case

Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy (Wash. 2013).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(l)(a) — 1 case

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(l)(a)(ii) — 10 cases

Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 54 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2002). “RCW 36.70C.030. 10 A “land use decision” is defined as a final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination, including those with authority to hear appeals, on .”

Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan Cnty., 4 P.3d 123 (Wash. 2000).

Spokane Cnty. v. E. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 309 P.3d 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

King Cnty. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 138 Wash. 2d 161 (Wash. 1999).

Kittitas Cnty. v. Kittitas Cnty. Conservation Coalition, 308 P.3d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(l)(b) — 2 cases

Larsen v. Town of Colton, 973 P.2d 1066 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).

Pac. Rock Env't Enhancement Grp. v. Clark Cnty., 964 P.2d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(l)(c) — 10 cases

Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wash. 2d 300 (Wash. 2009). “4 RCW 36.70C.030(1). Thus, LUPA applies only to actions that fall within the statutory definition of a land use decision.”

Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 423 P.3d 223 (Wash. 2018). “RCW 36.70C.030. The central issue in this case is (1) whether that administrative exhaustion rule applies to all tort claims that arise during the land use decision-making process.”

Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap Cnty., 352 P.3d 807 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King Cnty., 315 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2013).

Post v. City of Tacoma, 165 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030(l)(e) — 1 case

Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2007).

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