Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Proceedings for review under this chapter shall be commenced by filing a land use petition in superior court.
(2) A land use petition is barred, and the court may not grant review, unless the petition is timely filed with the court and timely served on the following persons who shall be parties to the review of the land use petition:
(a) The local jurisdiction, which for purposes of the petition shall be the jurisdiction's corporate entity and not an individual decision maker or department;
(b) Each of the following persons if the person is not the petitioner:
(i) Each person identified by name and address in the local jurisdiction's written decision as an applicant for the permit or approval at issue; and
(ii) Each person identified by name and address in the local jurisdiction's written decision as an owner of the property at issue;
(c) If no person is identified in a written decision as provided in (b) of this subsection, each person identified by name and address as a taxpayer for the property at issue in the records of the county assessor, based upon the description of the property in the application; and
(d) Each person named in the written decision who filed an appeal to a local jurisdiction quasi-judicial decision maker regarding the land use decision at issue, unless the person has abandoned the appeal or the person's claims were dismissed before the quasi-judicial decision was rendered. Persons who later intervened or joined in the appeal are not required to be made parties under this subsection.
(3) The petition is timely if it is filed and served on all parties listed in subsection (2) of this section within 21 days of the issuance of the land use decision.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the date on which a land use decision is issued is:
(a) Three days after a written decision is mailed by the local jurisdiction or, if not mailed, the date on which the local jurisdiction provides notice that a written decision is publicly available;
(b) If the land use decision is made by ordinance or resolution by a legislative body sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the date the body passes the ordinance or resolution; or
(c) If neither (a) nor (b) of this subsection applies, the date the decision is entered into the public record.
(5) Service on the local jurisdiction must be by delivery of a copy of the petition to the office of a person identified by or pursuant to RCW 4.28.080 to receive service of process, or as otherwise designated by the local jurisdiction. Service on the local jurisdiction is effective upon delivery. Service on other parties must be in accordance with the superior court civil rules or by first-class mail to:
(a) The address stated in the written decision of the local jurisdiction for each person made a party under subsection (2)(b) of this section;
(b) The address stated in the records of the county assessor for each person made a party under subsection (2)(c) of this section; and
(c) The address stated in the appeal to the quasi-judicial decision maker for each person made a party under subsection (2)(d) of this section.
(6) Service by mail is effective on the date of mailing and proof of service shall be by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 148
cases (23 in the last 5 years), 1997–2026 · leading case: Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “[1] Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption; and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 126 Wash. App. 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “1 Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(4). The statute designates the exact date a land use decision is “issued,” based on whether the decision is written, made by ordinance or resolution, or in some other fashion.”
Conom v. Snohomish Cnty., 118 P.3d 344 (Wash. 2005). “This case centers on the requirement under LUPA that a party note an initial hearing within seven days of serving a land use petition. RCW 36.70C.080(1) provides: Within seven days after the petition is served on the parties identified in RCW 36.”
Conom v. Snohomish Cnty., 155 Wash. 2d 154 (Wash. 2005). “This case centers on the requirement under LUPA that a party note an initial hearing within seven days of serving a land use petition. RCW 36.70C.080(1) provides: Within seven days after the petition is served on the parties identified in RCW 36.”
Knight v. City of Yelm, 267 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2011). “2d 470 (1999), and other cases that have held that the rule of substantial compliance is inapplicable to LUPA's procedural requirements have addressed a party's failure to comply with the timing and service requirements established in RCW 36.70C.040. That section provides, "A…”
Northshore Investors, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 301 P.3d 1049 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “¶26 Because LUPA contains explicit directives for filing and service, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to RCW 36.70C.040. Overhulse Neigh. Ass’n v.”
James v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005). “The Developers claim the imposition of impact fees is a revenue decision, not a land use decision, subject to a three-year statute of limitations. We find that the imposition of impact fees as a condition on the issuance of a building permit is a "land use decision" subject to…”
Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “3 The county code also requires judicial appeals of a hearing examiner’s decision to commence within the time period provided for appealing the underlying governmental action.”
Overhulse Neighborhood Ass'n v. Thurston Cnty., 972 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “040(2) (emphasis added). RCW 36.70C.040(5) specifies the method for serving a land use petition on a local jurisdiction.”
PIONEER PARK v. Mercer Island, 24 P.3d 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)(d). It is undisputed that the city council was a "local jurisdiction quasi-judicial decision maker regarding the land use decision at issue" for purposes of this statute.”
Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 223 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that their LUPA action could not continue based on equitable tolling of the time limit for an administrative appeal to the hearing examiner. D. LUPA Filing: Access to the Court’s LUPA Jurisdiction 9 and Timeliness ¶29 We separately…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(1) — 7 cases
Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 150 F. App'x 633 (9th Cir. 2005).
Lauer v. Pierce Cnty., 157 Wash. App. 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
Milestone Homes, Inc. v. City of Bonney Lake, 186 P.3d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
City Of Issaquah, V. Westridge-issaquah Ii Lp, 500 P.3d 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
Futurewise v. City Of Ridgefield (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2) — 75 cases
Conom v. Snohomish Cnty., 118 P.3d 344 (Wash. 2005). “This case centers on the requirement under LUPA that a party note an initial hearing within seven days of serving a land use petition. RCW 36.70C.080(1) provides: Within seven days after the petition is served on the parties identified in RCW 36.”
Conom v. Snohomish Cnty., 155 Wash. 2d 154 (Wash. 2005). “This case centers on the requirement under LUPA that a party note an initial hearing within seven days of serving a land use petition. RCW 36.70C.080(1) provides: Within seven days after the petition is served on the parties identified in RCW 36.”
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “[1] Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption; and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 126 Wash. App. 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “1 Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Knight v. City of Yelm, 267 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2011). “2d 470 (1999), and other cases that have held that the rule of substantial compliance is inapplicable to LUPA's procedural requirements have addressed a party's failure to comply with the timing and service requirements established in RCW 36.70C.040. That section provides, "A…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2)(a) — 4 cases
Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 223 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that their LUPA action could not continue based on equitable tolling of the time limit for an administrative appeal to the hearing examiner. D. LUPA Filing: Access to the Court’s LUPA Jurisdiction 9 and Timeliness ¶29 We separately…”
Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 223 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Sylvester v. Pierce Cnty., 201 P.3d 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Mohamad Ezzeddine, V. City Of Burien (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2)(b) — 2 cases
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “[1] Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption; and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Jones v. Town of Hunts Point, 272 P.3d 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2)(b)(i) — 1 case
Chandrruangphen v. City Of Sammamish (Wash. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2)(b)(ii) — 3 cases
Prosser Hill Coalition v. Spokane Cnty., 309 P.3d 1202 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Viking Jv, Llc, V. City Of Puyallup (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
Prosser Hill Coalition v. Cnty. of Spokane (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(2)(d) — 10 cases
PIONEER PARK v. Mercer Island, 24 P.3d 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)(d). It is undisputed that the city council was a "local jurisdiction quasi-judicial decision maker regarding the land use decision at issue" for purposes of this statute.”
Citizens To Preserve Pioneer Park, L.L.C. v. City of Mercer Island, 106 Wash. App. 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
Crosby v. Spokane Cnty., 971 P.2d 32 (Wash. 1999).
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “[1] Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption; and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 126 Wash. App. 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “1 Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(3) — 88 cases
Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “3 The county code also requires judicial appeals of a hearing examiner’s decision to commence within the time period provided for appealing the underlying governmental action.”
James v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005). “The Developers claim the imposition of impact fees is a revenue decision, not a land use decision, subject to a three-year statute of limitations. We find that the imposition of impact fees as a condition on the issuance of a building permit is a "land use decision" subject to…”
Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 54 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2002).
Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 223 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that their LUPA action could not continue based on equitable tolling of the time limit for an administrative appeal to the hearing examiner. D. LUPA Filing: Access to the Court’s LUPA Jurisdiction 9 and Timeliness ¶29 We separately…”
Knight v. City of Yelm, 267 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2011). “2d 470 (1999), and other cases that have held that the rule of substantial compliance is inapplicable to LUPA's procedural requirements have addressed a party's failure to comply with the timing and service requirements established in RCW 36.70C.040. That section provides, "A…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(4) — 16 cases
Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(4). The statute designates the exact date a land use decision is “issued,” based on whether the decision is written, made by ordinance or resolution, or in some other fashion.”
Northshore Investors, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 301 P.3d 1049 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “¶26 Because LUPA contains explicit directives for filing and service, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to RCW 36.70C.040. Overhulse Neigh. Ass’n v.”
Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 54 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2002).
Asche v. Bloomquist, 133 P.3d 475 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Asche v. Bloomquist, 133 P.3d 475 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(4)(a) — 22 cases
Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “3 The county code also requires judicial appeals of a hearing examiner’s decision to commence within the time period provided for appealing the underlying governmental action.”
Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(4). The statute designates the exact date a land use decision is “issued,” based on whether the decision is written, made by ordinance or resolution, or in some other fashion.”
Northshore Investors, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 301 P.3d 1049 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “¶26 Because LUPA contains explicit directives for filing and service, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to RCW 36.70C.040. Overhulse Neigh. Ass’n v.”
Lakeside Indus. v. Thurston Cnty., 83 P.3d 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
Overhulse Neighborhood Ass'n v. Thurston Cnty., 972 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “040(2) (emphasis added). RCW 36.70C.040(5) specifies the method for serving a land use petition on a local jurisdiction.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(4)(b) — 3 cases
King's Way Foursquare Church v. Clallam Cnty., 116 P.3d 1060 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima Cnty. (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(4)(c) — 7 cases
Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(4). The statute designates the exact date a land use decision is “issued,” based on whether the decision is written, made by ordinance or resolution, or in some other fashion.”
Northshore Investors, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 301 P.3d 1049 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “¶26 Because LUPA contains explicit directives for filing and service, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to RCW 36.70C.040. Overhulse Neigh. Ass’n v.”
Vogel v. City of Richland, 161 Wash. App. 770 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
Vogel v. City of Richland, 255 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
Applewood Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Richland, 269 P.3d 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(4)(e) — 1 case
Watch v. Skagit Cnty., 120 P.3d 56 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(4). The statute designates the exact date a land use decision is “issued,” based on whether the decision is written, made by ordinance or resolution, or in some other fashion.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.040(5) — 22 cases
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 108 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “[1] Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption; and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston Cnty., 126 Wash. App. 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “1 Quality Rock argues that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040 based on the failure to name Black Hills Audubon Society (Black Hills) in the caption and (2) denying its motion to amend the caption.”
Witt v. Port of Olympia, 126 Wash. App. 752 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Witt v. Port of Olympia, 109 P.3d 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Overhulse Neighborhood Ass'n v. Thurston Cnty., 972 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “040(2) (emphasis added). RCW 36.70C.040(5) specifies the method for serving a land use petition on a local jurisdiction.”
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