Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.020
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The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows:
Within ten years:
(1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action.
(2) For an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, or of any territory or possession of the United States outside the boundaries thereof, or of any extraterritorial court of the United States, unless the period is extended under RCW 6.17.020 or a similar provision in another jurisdiction.
(3) Of the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered for an action to collect past due child support that has accrued under an order entered after July 23, 1989, by any of the above-named courts or that has accrued under an administrative order as defined in RCW 74.20A.020(6), which is issued after July 23, 1989.
[ 2002 c 261 s 2; 1994 c 189 s 2; 1989 c 360 s 1; 1984 c 76 s 1; 1980 c 105 s 1; Code 1881 s 26; 1877 p 7 s 26; 1854 p 363 s 2; RRS s 156.]
Notes:
Application—1980 c 105: "This act shall apply to all judgments which have not expired before June 12, 1980." [ 1980 c 105 s 7.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 145
cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1952–2026 · leading case: Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle
Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle (1976)
“The 10-year period in RCW 4.16.020, 4 the successor to Rem. Rev.”
Nickell v. SOUTHVIEW HOMEOWNERS ASS'N (2012)
“2d at 757 (citing RCW 4.16.020). 10 “A claimant can satisfy the open and notorious element by showing either (1) that the title owner had actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory period or (2) that the claimant used the land such that any reasonable person would…”
Gorman v. City of Woodinville (2012)
“¶17 In this state the doctrine of adverse possession is primarily covered by three statutes of limitation: RCW 4.16.020, RCW 7.28.070, and RCW 7.28.”
Orion Corporation v. State (1987)
“Orion's action, filed in 1982, comes within the federal 3-year limitation, as well as the 6-year and 10-year alternatives.”
Lilly v. Lynch (1997)
“2d at 857 ; RCW 4.16.020. Both parties agree that Lilly has demonstrated conditions (2), (3) and (4).”
Acord v. Pettit (2013)
“2d 6 (1989); RCW 4.16.020. The Acords can also “tack” the possession of a predecessor in interest to establish the use required for adverse possession.”
Darlington Ofuasia Et Al., Appellants, v. Dana William Smurr Et Al., Respondents (2017)
“at 50 ; RCW 4.16.020(1). A claimant can satisfy the open and notorious element by showing either that the title owner had actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory period or that the claimant, or predecessor- *144 in-interest, used the land such that any…”
Roy v. Cunningham (1986)
“RCW 4.16.020; Chaplin , at 857. The hostility/claim of right element requires only that the claimant "treat the land as his own as against the world throughout the statutory period".”
State v. Morgan (2001)
“The Legislature added the extension provision to RCW 4.16.020 in 1994. Laws of 1994, ch. 189, § 2.”
Chaplin v. Sanders (1984)
“RCW 4.16.020. Hostility, as defined by this court, "does not import enmity or ill-will, but rather imports that *858 the claimant is in possession as owner, in contradistinction to holding in recognition of or subordination to the true owner.”
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985)
“We note that RCW 4.16.020(1) creates a right of adverse possession 10 years after initial possession.”
Lingvall v. Bartmess (1999)
“777 (1904), with RCW 4.16.020. If the essential factual findings are not in dispute, whether use is adverse or permissive is purely a question of law.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.020(1) — 16 cases
Darlington Ofuasia Et Al., Appellants, v. Dana William Smurr Et Al., Respondents (2017)
“at 50 ; RCW 4.16.020(1). A claimant can satisfy the open and notorious element by showing either that the title owner had actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory period or that the claimant, or predecessor- *144 in-interest, used the land such that any…”
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985)
“We note that RCW 4.16.020(1) creates a right of adverse possession 10 years after initial possession.”
In re Kelly (2012)
Nickell v. SOUTHVIEW HOMEOWNERS ASS'N (2012)
“2d at 757 (citing RCW 4.16.020). 10 “A claimant can satisfy the open and notorious element by showing either (1) that the title owner had actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory period or (2) that the claimant used the land such that any reasonable person would…”
Teel v. STADING (2010)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.020(2) — 17 cases
Bjurstrom v. Campbell (1980)
Stokes v. Polley (2001)
Stokes v. Polley (2001)
TCAP CORP. v. Gervin (2008)
TCAP Corp. v. Gervin (2008)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.020(3) — 4 cases
In re the Marriage of Waters (2002)
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