Wash. Rev. Code » Title 4 · Chapter 4.16
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.310 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall accrue, and the applicable statute of limitation shall begin to run only during the period within six years after substantial completion of construction, or during the period within six years after the termination of the services enumerated in RCW 4.16.300, whichever is later. The phrase "substantial completion of construction" shall mean the state of completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its intended use. Any cause of action which has not accrued within six years after such substantial completion of construction, or within six years after such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be barred: PROVIDED, That this limitation shall not be asserted as a defense by any owner, tenant or other person in possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of action accrues. The limitations prescribed in this section apply to all claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 brought in the name or for the benefit of the state which are made or commenced after June 11, 1986.
If a written notice is filed under RCW 64.50.020 within the time prescribed for the filing of an action under this chapter, the period of time during which the filing of an action is barred under RCW 64.50.020 plus sixty days shall not be a part of the period limited for the commencement of an action, nor for the application of this section.
[ 2002 c 323 s 9; 1986 c 305 s 702; 1967 c 75 s 2.]

Notes:

Preamble—Report to legislature—Applicability—Severability—1986 c 305: See notes following RCW 4.16.160.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 86 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: 1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship v. Vertecs Corp., 146 P.3d 423 (Wash. 2006).
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1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship v. Vertecs Corp., 146 P.3d 423 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 13× “ANALYSIS ¶ 8 In addressing whether a statute of limitations has run on an action arising out of construction or repair of an improvement on real property, both the relevant statute of limitations and the statute of repose set out in RCW 4.”
1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wash. 2d 566 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 13× “ANALYSIS ¶8 In addressing whether a statute of limitations has run on an action arising out of construction or repair of an improvement on real property, both the relevant statute of limitations and the statute of repose set out in RCW 4.16.310 2 must be considered. RCW 4.”
1519-1525 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. v. Asc, 29 P.3d 1249 (Wash. 2001). · cites it 20× “The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RCW 4.16.310, the builders' limitations statute, on grounds that it denies equal protection of law to various classes who are excluded from asserting the statute as a defense.”
1519-1525 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass'n v. Apt. Sales Corp., 144 Wash. 2d 570 (Wash. 2001). · cites it 20× “— The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RCW 4.16.310, the builders’ limitations statute, on grounds that it denies equal protection of law to various classes who are excluded from asserting the statute as a defense.”
Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 103 Wash. 2d 111 (Wash. 1984). · cites it 51× “Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff's claim was barred by RCW 4.16.310, 1 which limits actions based on construction contracts to those which accrue within 6 years of substantial completion of construction.”
Sch. Bd. v. United States Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325 (Va. 1987). · cites it 14× “") [2] Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 4.16.310 (1967) provides: All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.”
Harmony at Madrona Park Owners Ass'n v. Madison Harmony Dev., Inc., 143 Wash. App. 345 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 13× “1 ¶7 Ledcor contends that RCW 4.16.310 allows a cause of action to accrue only after the latter of two events — substantial completion or termination of services — regardless of when the alleged breach of contract occurred.”
In The Matter Of: Linda Cameron, App v. Atl. Richfield Co., Aka, Resp, 442 P.3d 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 9× ““A statute of repose terminates the right to file a claim after a specified time even if the injury has not yet occurred.”
Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham, 772 P.2d 1018 (Wash. 1989). · cites it 12× “shall be barred: Provided, That this limitation shall not be asserted as a defense by any owner, *567 tenant or other person in possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of action accrues.”
New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212 (Wash. 1984). · cites it 8× “II Next, at issue is whether New Meadows' claim and WWP's cross claim against PNB are barred by RCW 4.16.300-.320. RCW 4.16.”
Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Pub. Facilities Dist. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co., 296 P.3d 821 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 6× “” RCW 4.16.310. A cause of action that accrues no later than substantial completion will not be barred by the statute of repose because it will always accrue before the later of substantial completion or termination of services.”
Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Nw. Ltd., Inc., 719 P.2d 120 (Wash. 1986). · cites it 5× “II The first issue for the court is whether Global's negligence action against the County and Kennedy is barred by the builder limitation statute, RCW 4.16.310. Initially, we must determine if Global's claim falls within the parameters of RCW 4.”
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