Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.185 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
(2)(a) When the vehicle approaching from the opposite direction within the intersection or so close that it constitutes an immediate hazard is a vulnerable user of a public way, a driver of a motor vehicle found to be in violation of this section must be assessed an additional fine equal to the base penalty assessed under RCW 46.63.110(3). This fine may not be waived, reduced, or suspended, unless the court finds the offender to be indigent, and is not subject to the additional fees and assessments that the base penalty for this violation is subject to under RCW 2.68.040, 3.62.090, and 46.63.110.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "vulnerable user of a public way" has the same meaning as provided in RCW 46.61.5259.
(3) The additional fine imposed under subsection (2) of this section must be deposited into the vulnerable roadway user education account created in RCW 46.61.145.
Notes:
Effective date—2023 c 471: See note following RCW 46.61.5259.
Finding—Intent—Effective date—2019 c 403: See notes following RCW 46.04.071.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1967–2025 · leading case: Ellwein v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001).
Ellwein v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001). “See RCW 46.61.185 (duty to yield imposed upon driver turning left at intersection).”
Poston v. Mathers, 462 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1969). “" [RCW 46.61.185]" Instruction No. 12: "You are instructed that a person is never absolved from exercising reasonable and ordinary care for his own safety, and he cannot thrust all responsibility for his safety upon another, this rule applies at a light controlled intersection,…”
State v. Carty, 620 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). “Is it required that the State prove that defendant acted with criminal intent or with negligence to prove a violation of RCW 46.61.185? 2. Is it required that the State establish that the favored vehicle was proceeding lawfully in order to prove a violation of RCW 46.”
Ellwein v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001). “See RCW 46.61.185 (duty to yield imposed upon driver turning left at intersection).”
Mendelsohn v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). “RCW 46.61.185. The oncoming driver is the favored driver under the circumstances and the primary duty to avoid a collision is upon the disfavored turning driver.”
Doherty v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 921 P.2d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). “Basic traffic rules on right of way provide that "[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn left within an intersection .”
Niven v. MacDonald, 431 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1967). “185), is as follows: "The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto…”
Hammel v. Rife, 682 P.2d 949 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). “RCW 46.61.185; Seattle Traffic Code 11.55.”
Bohnsack v. Kirkham, 432 P.2d 554 (Wash. 1967). “2 The applicable statute is now RCW 46.61.185, recodified by Laws of 1965, 1st Ex.”
Chapman v. Claxton, 497 P.2d 192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972). “as to constitute an immediate hazard” contained in RCW 46.61.185. In our view, the first paragraph of WPI 70.”
State v. Brown, 81 P.3d 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State argues, however, that RCW 46.61.185, 2 which applies to left turns within an intersection, and into an alley, private road, or driveway, does not contain a signal requirement and, because courts applied RCW 46.”
Arendt Speser v. Kelsey & John Doe Mondau (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “In response, Speser claimed she breached duties under two statutes: RCW 46.61.185 and RCW 46.61.190(2). The trial court granted the motion.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.185(1) — 1 case
Robin Stanley v. Sierra Pac. Land & Timber (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
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