Wash. Rev. Code » Title 46 · Chapter 46.61
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.235 (2026)

Crosswalks

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The operator of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian, bicycle, or personal delivery device to cross the roadway within an unmarked or marked crosswalk when the pedestrian, bicycle, or personal delivery device is upon or within one lane of the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For purposes of this section "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway.
(2) No pedestrian, bicycle, or personal delivery device shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk, run, or otherwise move into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to stop.
(3) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply under the conditions stated in RCW 46.61.240(2).
(4) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian, bicycle, or personal delivery device to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.
(5)(a) If a person is found to have committed an infraction under this section within a school, playground, or crosswalk speed zone created under RCW 46.61.440, the person must be assessed a monetary penalty equal to twice the penalty assessed under RCW 46.63.110. The penalty may not be waived, reduced, or suspended.
(b) Fifty percent of the moneys collected under this subsection must be deposited into the school zone safety account.
[ 2019 c 214 s 12; 2010 c 242 s 1; 2000 c 85 s 1; 1993 c 153 s 1; 1990 c 241 s 4; 1965 ex.s. c 155 s 34.]

Notes:

Rules of court: Monetary penalty schedule—IRLJ 6.2.
Effective date—2019 c 214: See note following RCW 46.75.010.
Effective date—2010 c 242: See note following RCW 46.61.275.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1968–2026 · leading case: Pudmaroff v. Allen, 977 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1999).
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Pudmaroff v. Allen, 977 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 7× “400 in 1990 to exclude bicycles from the definition of pedestrian makes the protections afforded pedestrians in crosswalks by RCW 46.61.235 unavailable to bicyclists, and Crawford is no longer good law.”
Pudmaroff v. Allen, 138 Wash. 2d 55 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 7× “400 in 1990 to exclude bicycles from the definition of pedestrian makes the protections afforded pedestrians in crosswalks by RCW 46.61.235 unavailable to bicyclists, and Crawford is no longer good law.”
Chmela v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 561 P.2d 1085 (Wash. 1977). · cites it 6× “2d 388 (1969), this court explained the meaning of RCW 46.61.235 as follows: The protection afforded by this statute is strong and clear, and when an automobile strikes a pedestrian in a crosswalk the driver's burden is a heavy one if he would exonerate himself.”
Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “RCW 46.61.235(1). That the law directs pedestrians to use crosswalks can be inferred from the lack of priority given to pedestrians who cross at points other than crosswalks: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an…”
Alston v. Blythe, 88 Wash. App. 26 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “Ill Alston next contends that the trial court improperly instructed on the effect to be given to a violation, if any, of RCW 46.61.235. 30 The trial court instructed that any such violation "is not necessarily negligence, but may be *38 considered by you as evidence in…”
Alston v. Blythe, 943 P.2d 692 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “III Alston next contends that the trial court improperly instructed on the effect to be given to a violation, if any, of RCW 46.61.235. [30] The trial court instructed that *699 any such violation "is not necessarily negligence, but may be considered by you as evidence in…”
Jung v. York, 449 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1969). · cites it 3× “The statute, RCW 46.61.235, provides in subsection (2) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.”
Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “RCW 46.61.235(1). That the law directs pedestrians to use crosswalks can be inferred from the lack of priority given to pedestrians who cross at points other than crosswalks: “Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an…”
Todd Mclaughlin v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 446 P.3d 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “The court explained that to hold otherwise would yield an absurd result because under such an interpretation, a driver would not be liable under RCW 46.61.235(1)for 10 No. 78534-6-1/11 hitting a child riding his or her bicycle across a crosswalk.”
Panitz v. Orenge, 518 P.2d 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). · cites it 3× “The offered instruction is taken from RCW 46.61.235 (4). RCW46.61.235 (4) provides: Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from…”
Van Cleve v. Betts, 559 P.2d 1006 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977). “4 RCW 46.61.235 (2) provides: “No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is.”
Clements v. Blue Cross of Washington & Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). “We conclude that summary judgment was properly entered against the defendants on the question of Gaumer's negligence because the materials before the court showed that he was negligent per se for violation of a statute.”
Show all 24 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.235(1) — 6 cases
Pudmaroff v. Allen, 977 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1999). “400 in 1990 to exclude bicycles from the definition of pedestrian makes the protections afforded pedestrians in crosswalks by RCW 46.61.235 unavailable to bicyclists, and Crawford is no longer good law.”
Pudmaroff v. Allen, 138 Wash. 2d 55 (Wash. 1999). “400 in 1990 to exclude bicycles from the definition of pedestrian makes the protections afforded pedestrians in crosswalks by RCW 46.61.235 unavailable to bicyclists, and Crawford is no longer good law.”
Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “RCW 46.61.235(1). That the law directs pedestrians to use crosswalks can be inferred from the lack of priority given to pedestrians who cross at points other than crosswalks: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an…”
Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “RCW 46.61.235(1). That the law directs pedestrians to use crosswalks can be inferred from the lack of priority given to pedestrians who cross at points other than crosswalks: “Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an…”
Todd Mclaughlin v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 446 P.3d 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “The court explained that to hold otherwise would yield an absurd result because under such an interpretation, a driver would not be liable under RCW 46.61.235(1)for 10 No. 78534-6-1/11 hitting a child riding his or her bicycle across a crosswalk.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.235(1)(1993) — 1 case
Todd Mclaughlin v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 446 P.3d 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “The court explained that to hold otherwise would yield an absurd result because under such an interpretation, a driver would not be liable under RCW 46.61.235(1)for 10 No. 78534-6-1/11 hitting a child riding his or her bicycle across a crosswalk.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.235(2) — 2 cases
Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “RCW 46.61.235(1). That the law directs pedestrians to use crosswalks can be inferred from the lack of priority given to pedestrians who cross at points other than crosswalks: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an…”
Holmes v. Wallace, 926 P.2d 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.235(4) — 5 cases
Chmela v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 561 P.2d 1085 (Wash. 1977). “2d 388 (1969), this court explained the meaning of RCW 46.61.235 as follows: The protection afforded by this statute is strong and clear, and when an automobile strikes a pedestrian in a crosswalk the driver's burden is a heavy one if he would exonerate himself.”
Clements v. Blue Cross of Washington & Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). “We conclude that summary judgment was properly entered against the defendants on the question of Gaumer's negligence because the materials before the court showed that he was negligent per se for violation of a statute.”
Crawford v. Miller, 566 P.2d 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
Jung v. York, 449 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1969). “The statute, RCW 46.61.235, provides in subsection (2) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.”
Pudmaroff v. Allen, 951 P.2d 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
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