Wash. Rev. Code » Title 49 · Chapter 49.60
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (2026)

Unfair practices of employers

✓ current as of May 2026
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It is an unfair practice for any employer:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
[ 2020 c 52 s 10; 2007 c 187 s 9; 2006 c 4 s 10; 1997 c 271 s 10; 1993 c 510 s 12; 1985 c 185 s 16; 1973 1st ex.s. c 214 s 6; 1973 c 141 s 10; 1971 ex.s. c 81 s 3; 1961 c 100 s 1; 1957 c 37 s 9. Prior: 1949 c 183 s 7, part; Rem. Supp. 1949 s 7614-26, part.]

Notes:

Severability—1993 c 510: See note following RCW 49.60.010.
Effective date—1971 ex.s. c 81: See note following RCW 49.60.120.
Element of age not to affect apprenticeship agreements: RCW 49.04.910.
Employment rights of persons serving in uniformed services: RCW 73.16.032.
Labor—Prohibited practices: Chapter 49.44 RCW.
Unfair practices in employment because of age of employee or applicant: RCW 49.44.090.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 517 cases (120 in the last 5 years), 1966–2026 · leading case: MacKay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1995).
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MacKay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 58× “We noted that a plaintiff must provide direct evidence that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive and that the discriminatory motivation was a "significant or substantial factor in an employment decision...”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 32× “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was “withdrawing [its] offer of employment” because her “availability” did not permit her “to perform the job.”
Kilian v. Atkinson, 50 P.3d 638 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 20× “17 The Legislature refers to age discrimination in employment only in RCW 49.60.180 and RCW 49.44.090. Plaintiffs acknowledge that on its face RCW 49.”
Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39 (Wash. 2019). · cites it 16× “RCW 49.60.180. In contrast, WLAD provisions prohibiting discrimination in a public accommodation do not limit themselves to the "terms or conditions" of a public accommodation.”
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 137 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 16× “¶ 7 McClarty, acting pro se, filed a complaint in July 2001 in Thurston County Superior Court against Totem Electric and against his union, Local 76, alleging unfair employment practices in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and .190, retaliatory practices in violation of RCW 51.”
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wash. 2d 214 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 16× “¶7 McClarty, acting pro se, filed a complaint in July 2001 in Thurston County Superior Court against Totem Electric and against his union, Local 76, alleging unfair employment practices in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and .190, retaliatory practices in violation of RCW 51.”
Blackburn v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 375 P.3d 1076 (Wash. 2016). · cites it 11× “¶15 Since 1949, the WLAD has existed to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, among other protected characteristics.”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 33× “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was "withdrawing [its] offer of employment" because her "availability" did not permit her "to perform the job.”
Fahn v. Cowlitz Cnty., 610 P.2d 857 (Wash. 1981). · cites it 22× “Respondents then brought an action for declaratory judgment that the height regulation constituted a violation of RCW 49.60.180 and WAC 162-12-140(3)(g). [2] They also sought a writ of mandamus ordering appellant to (1) cease *372 enforcement of its height requirement, (2)…”
Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 22× “RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis added). One of the acts prohibited by the law against discrimination is discrimination by an employer against an employee because of “the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability.”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 132 P.3d 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 15× “We reverse and remand for determination of Hegwine's damages, holding that disability accommodation analysis does not apply and that Fibre impermissibly assumed that her pregnancy constituted a temporary disability that it could not accommodate and wrongly fired Hegwine in…”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 132 Wash. App. 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 15× “¶1 — Stacy Hegwine sued Longview Fibre Company (Fibre) in Cowlitz County Superior Court, alleging that Fibre discharged her from employment based on her gender and pregnancy in violation of RCW 49.60.180 of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).”
Show all 517 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(1) — 52 cases
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was “withdrawing [its] offer of employment” because her “availability” did not permit her “to perform the job.”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was "withdrawing [its] offer of employment" because her "availability" did not permit her "to perform the job.”
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 557 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1976).
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 137 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2006). “¶ 7 McClarty, acting pro se, filed a complaint in July 2001 in Thurston County Superior Court against Totem Electric and against his union, Local 76, alleging unfair employment practices in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and .190, retaliatory practices in violation of RCW 51.”
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wash. 2d 214 (Wash. 2006). “¶7 McClarty, acting pro se, filed a complaint in July 2001 in Thurston County Superior Court against Totem Electric and against his union, Local 76, alleging unfair employment practices in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and .190, retaliatory practices in violation of RCW 51.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(1)(2) — 1 case
Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2) — 136 cases
MacKay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1995). “We noted that a plaintiff must provide direct evidence that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive and that the discriminatory motivation was a "significant or substantial factor in an employment decision...”
Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999). “RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis added). One of the acts prohibited by the law against discrimination is discrimination by an employer against an employee because of “the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability.”
Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999).
Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 23 P.3d 440 (Wash. 2001).
McClarty v. Totem Elec., 137 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2006). “¶ 7 McClarty, acting pro se, filed a complaint in July 2001 in Thurston County Superior Court against Totem Electric and against his union, Local 76, alleging unfair employment practices in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and .190, retaliatory practices in violation of RCW 51.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2)(3) — 1 case
Haubry v. Snow, 31 P.3d 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(3) — 121 cases
Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39 (Wash. 2019). “RCW 49.60.180. In contrast, WLAD provisions prohibiting discrimination in a public accommodation do not limit themselves to the "terms or conditions" of a public accommodation.”
Blackburn v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 375 P.3d 1076 (Wash. 2016). “¶15 Since 1949, the WLAD has existed to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, among other protected characteristics.”
Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999). “RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis added). One of the acts prohibited by the law against discrimination is discrimination by an employer against an employee because of “the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability.”
Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999).
Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash. 2d 35 (Wash. 2002).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(4) — 8 cases
Fahn v. Cowlitz Cnty., 610 P.2d 857 (Wash. 1981). “Respondents then brought an action for declaratory judgment that the height regulation constituted a violation of RCW 49.60.180 and WAC 162-12-140(3)(g). [2] They also sought a writ of mandamus ordering appellant to (1) cease *372 enforcement of its height requirement, (2)…”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was “withdrawing [its] offer of employment” because her “availability” did not permit her “to perform the job.”
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 172 P.3d 688 (Wash. 2007). “On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was "withdrawing [its] offer of employment" because her "availability" did not permit her "to perform the job.”
White v. Twp. of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Fahn v. Cowlitz Cnty., 628 P.2d 813 (Wash. 1981).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(l) — 3 cases
Phillips v. City of Seattle, 766 P.2d 1099 (Wash. 1989).
Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 586 P.2d 1149 (Wash. 1978).
Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colorado), LLC, 152 Wash. App. 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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