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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 51Chapter 51.08

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.013 (2025)

"Acting in the course of employment."

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1965–2020 49citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 49 opinions since 1965. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (23 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.013 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENEntila v. Cook, 386 P.3d 1099 (Wash. 2017).
cites § 51.08.013 13×subsections: (1)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“013(1) states: “Acting in the course of employment” means the worker acting at his or her employer’s direction or in the furtherance of his or her employer’s business which shall include time spent going to and from work on the jobsite, as defined in RCW 51.”
Later courts cite it for
“rcw 51.24.100 is unambiguous that an employee's receipt of benefits is inadmissible in a third party action” · 1 citing court
2
GREENBall-foster Glass Cont. Co. v. Giovanelli, 177 P.3d 692 (Wash. 2008).
cites § 51.08.013 10×subsections: (1) 7× (2)(b) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Supporting this conclusion is another problem; Giovanelli does not qualify as an employee in travel status.”
The case’s holding
A traveling employee remains in the course of employment continuously during a trip except during a distinct departure for a personal errand.
Later courts cite it for
“including sleeping, eating, and seeking fresh air and exercise,” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENUniv. of Washington v. Marengo, 95 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 51.08.013 12×subsections: (1) 11×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“The Department of Labor and Industries (the Department) decided that under the parking area exception to RCW 51.08.013(1) Marengo’s injury was not covered and denied his claim for benefits.”
4
GREENMadera v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 104 Wash. App. 93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 51.08.013 7×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Madera because of a “parking areas” exclusion found in RCW 51.08.013. The superior court reversed on summary judgment.”
5
GREENBall-Foster Glass Container Co. v. Giovanelli, 163 Wash. 2d 133 (2008).
cites § 51.08.013 9×subsections: (1) 7× (2)(b)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Supporting this conclusion is another problem: Giovanelli does not qualify as an employee in travel status.”
6
GREENShelton v. Azar, Inc., 954 P.2d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 51.08.013 7×subsections: (1) 4× (2) (2)(a) (3)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“*937 Respondents suggest that because the time Reed spent traveling from California was not immediate to the time he was engaged in work for his employer, he was not acting in the course of his employment under RCW 51.08.013(1). But that statute, which provides coverage for…”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by granting a motion to compel discovery when the pursuit of a new claim would be futile (basis: trial court abuse of discretion).
7
GREENHamilton v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 462 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1969).
cites § 51.08.013 14×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“The facts are virtually undisputed and the only issue arising therefrom concerns itself with whether respondent, at the time of her injury, was "acting in the course of employment" as that phrase is defined in RCW 51.08.013. At the time of respondent's injury, and for some years…”
The case’s holding
The court noted that RCW 51.36.040 appears to contain a typographical error, so the statute's apparent literal wording may not reflect the legislature's intended meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“to exclude from coverage injuries occurring to an employee in a parking area maintained either on or off the employer's premises. . . .” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENBoeing Co. v. Rooney, 10 P.3d 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 51.08.013 8×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“We hold that the Board did not err in finding that Rooney’s injury fell within the “going and coming” rule in RCW 51.08.013, and thus he was entitled to coverage under the act.”
Later courts cite it for
“the statute's exclusion of parking areas did not prevent coverage because the exclusion applied only to areas where vehicles are parked, such as an employee parking lot or garage.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENFrancisco Entila v. Gerald Cook, 360 P.3d 870 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
cites § 51.08.013 8×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“The trial court decided that RCW 51.08.013 provided Cook immunity if the alleged tort occurred on the jobsite.”
Later courts cite it for
“considered this evidence to decide the threshold ques tion of whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the iia applied to orris.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENBelnap v. Boeing Co., 823 P.2d 528 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 51.08.013 5×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“His payroll records reflect that his salary included leave with pay for jury service through Belnap's full shift on October 24, 1985, the day of his death.”
The case’s holding
An employee is not acting in the course of employment while serving as a juror or while commuting, even if the employer pays full salary during jury service.
Later courts cite it for
“pursuant to the inherent power of appellate courts to address issues which are crucial,to the case and necessary to a proper decision.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENCochran Elec. Co. v. Mahoney, 121 P.3d 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 51.08.013 5×subsections: (2) 2× (2)(b)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“[9] RCW 51.08.013 (emphasis added). [10] Lunz v.”
12
GREENBoeing Co. v. Rooney, 10 P.3d 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 51.08.013 7×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Under RCW 51.08.013, "`[a]cting in the course of employment'" is defined to include travel to and from work on the jobsite in areas controlled by the employer.”
13
GREENBolden v. State Dep't of Transp., 974 P.2d 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 51.08.013 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“The issue presented is whether this mixed-use area is subject to the RCW 51.08.013 exception from workers’ compensation coverage for parking areas.”
14
GREENEvans v. Thompson, 879 P.2d 938 (Wash. 1994).
cites § 51.08.013 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“RCW 51.08.013. This inquiry, however, generally focuses on the time or place of the negligence that caused the injury, and the analysis is performed to determine whether a particular act was committed in the course of employment.”
The case’s holding
Legal entity status is a question of fact for the jury and the dual persona doctrine applies when individuals own property separately from a corporation.
Later courts cite it for
“scope and course of his or her employment” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENDep't of Labor & Indus. v. Johnson, 928 P.2d 1138 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 51.08.013 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Under RCW 51.08.013, "acting in the course of employment" is defined as: the worker acting at his or her employer's direction or in the furtherance of his or her employer's business which shall include time spent going to and from work on the jobsite .”
Later courts cite it for
“acting in the course of employment' " when” · 1 citing court
16
GREENMadera v. JR Simplot Co., 15 P.3d 649 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 51.08.013 7×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Madera because of a "parking areas" exclusion found in RCW 51.08.013. The superior court reversed on summary judgment.”
Later courts cite it for
“specifically excepted from coverage are injuries occurring in 'parking areas' while going to or from work.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENCagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434 (Wash. 1986).
cites § 51.08.013 1×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“" RCW 51.08.013. Here, the plaintiff's emotional distress resulted from termination of employment; it did not occur while "acting in the course of employment".”
The case’s holding
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort does not bar a wrongful termination action or prevent recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from such termination.
Later courts cite it for
“damages for emotional distress are recoverable as an element of damages merely upon proof of 'an intentional tort'.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENUniv. of Wash. Harborview Med. Ctr. v. Marengo, 95 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 51.08.013 16×subsections: (1) 16×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“The Department of Labor and Industries (the Department) decided that under the parking area exception to RCW 51.08.013(1) Marengo's injury was not covered and denied his claim for benefits.”
19
GREENAloha Lumber Corp. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 466 P.2d 151 (Wash. 1970).
cites § 51.08.013 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“RCW 51.08.013 provides, insofar as pertinent here: “Acting in the course of employment” means the workman acting at his employer’s direction or in the furtherance of his employer’s business .”
The case’s holding
An employee is in the course of employment while traveling to or from work in a vehicle furnished by the employer as an incident to the employment.
Later courts cite it for
“a workman is in the course of his employment while going to or from work in a vehicle furnished by his employer as an incident to his employment pursuant to custom or contractual obligation, either express or implied.” · 6 citing courts
20
GREENRobinson v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 326 P.3d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 51.08.013 1×subsections: (1)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 51.08.013
“Under RCW 51.08.013(1), an individual is “acting in the course of employment” when their actions are at the employer’s direction or in the furtherance of the employer’s business.”
Later courts cite it for
“substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the matter asserted.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196519922020

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1980. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.39Wash.10
By subsection
(1)23 cases
Univ. of Washington v. Marengo, 95 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).“The Department of Labor and Industries (the Department) decided that under the parking area exception to RCW 51.08.013(1) Marengo’s injury was not covered and denied his claim for benefits.”
Ball-foster Glass Cont. Co. v. Giovanelli, 177 P.3d 692 (Wash. 2008).“Supporting this conclusion is another problem; Giovanelli does not qualify as an employee in travel status.”
Ball-Foster Glass Container Co. v. Giovanelli, 163 Wash. 2d 133 (2008).“Supporting this conclusion is another problem: Giovanelli does not qualify as an employee in travel status.”
Shelton v. Azar, Inc., 954 P.2d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).“*937 Respondents suggest that because the time Reed spent traveling from California was not immediate to the time he was engaged in work for his employer, he was not acting in the course of his employment under RCW 51.08.013(1). But that statute, which provides coverage for…”
Univ. of Wash. Harborview Med. Ctr. v. Marengo, 95 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).“The Department of Labor and Industries (the Department) decided that under the parking area exception to RCW 51.08.013(1) Marengo's injury was not covered and denied his claim for benefits.”
Showing the top 5 of 23. More in the list view →
(2)2 cases
Cochran Elec. Co. v. Mahoney, 121 P.3d 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).“[9] RCW 51.08.013 (emphasis added). [10] Lunz v.”
Shelton v. Azar, Inc., 954 P.2d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
(2)(a)1 case
Shelton v. Azar, Inc., 954 P.2d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
(2)(b)3 cases
Ball-foster Glass Cont. Co. v. Giovanelli, 177 P.3d 692 (Wash. 2008).
Cochran Elec. Co. v. Mahoney, 121 P.3d 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
(3)1 case
Shelton v. Azar, Inc., 954 P.2d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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