Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.100 (2026)
"Injury."
✓ current as of May 2026
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"Injury" means a sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom.
[ 1961 c 23 s 51.08.100. Prior: 1959 c 308 s 3; 1957 c 70 s 12; prior: 1939 c 41 s 2, part; 1929 c 132 s 1, part; 1927 c 310 s 2, part; 1921 c 182 s 2, part; 1919 c 131 s 2, part; 1917 c 120 s 1, part; 1911 c 74 s 3, part; RRS s 7675, part.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 72
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1952–2025 · leading case: Sheila Larose, Appellant/cross-resp v. King Cnty. & Pda, Respondent/cross-appellants, 437 P.3d 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
Sheila Larose, Appellant/cross-resp v. King Cnty. & Pda, Respondent/cross-appellants, 437 P.3d 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “” RCW 51.08.140 defines “occupational disease” as “such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment.”
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 725 P.2d 463 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). “Whether appellant suffered an "industrial injury", under RCW 51.08.100, where appellant could fix the time he first noticed pain as somewhere between the second and third hours of his shift? 4.”
Windust v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 323 P.2d 241 (Wash. 1958). “The statute in question is RCW 51.08.100 [ cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.”
Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 497 (Wash. 1987). “While the definition of "injury" has been expanded, see RCW 51.08.100, and an additional basis for IIA recovery has been added, see RCW 51.”
Cowlitz Stud Co. v. Clevenger, 141 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2006). “¶ 17 Thus, we hold that the last injurious exposure rule is inapplicable in industrial injury cases.”
Cowlitz Stud Co. v. Clevenger, 157 Wash. 2d 569 (Wash. 2006). “LEXIS 15, ¶ 12 (citing RCW 51.08.100). Similarly, we believe it is easier for a worker in an injury case to prove that a specific incident caused an injury than it is to prove that a certain exposure caused an occupational disease.”
Rothwell v. Nine Mile Falls Sch. Dist., 295 P.3d 328 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “” RCW 51.08.100. RCW 51.08.100 requires a relation between the injury and “some identifiable happening, event, cause or occurrence capable of being fixed at some point in time and connected with the employment.”
Elliott v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. App. 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “” RCW 51.08.100. ¶11 A claim for benefits for an occupational disease, in contrast to an injury, is timely if filed within two years after the worker receives notice from a medical provider that the disease exists and that a claim may be filed: (1) Except as provided in…”
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278 (Wash. 1995). “" RCW 51.08.100. Likewise, the plaintiff's injury was not an "occupational disease as defined in RCW 51.”
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 97 (Wash. 1995). “” RCW 51.08.100. Likewise, the plaintiff’s injury was not an "occupational disease as defined in RCW 51.”
Walston v. Boeing Co., 334 P.3d 519 (Wash. 2014). “” RCW 51.08.100. An “occupational disease” means a disease or infection that arises out of employment.”
Michael Michelbrink, Jr. v. Washington State Patrol, 363 P.3d 6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “” RCW 51.08.100. ¶13 Originally, the deliberate intention exception was applied primarily in situations where employees were physically assaulted in the workplace.”
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