Wash. Rev. Code » Title 69 · Chapter 69.50
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408 (2026)

Second or subsequent offenses

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this chapter may be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined an amount up to twice that otherwise authorized, or both.
(2) For purposes of this section, an offense is considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to his or her conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted under this chapter or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drugs, cannabis, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs.
(3) This section does not apply to offenses under RCW 69.50.4013.
[ 2022 c 16 s 89; 2003 c 53 s 341; 1989 c 8 s 3; 1971 ex.s. c 308 s 69.50.408.]

Notes:

Intent—Finding—2022 c 16: See note following RCW 69.50.101.
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: In re the Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 134 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2006).
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In re the Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 134 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 30× “Cruz to double the low end of the standard range sentence pursuant to its interpretation of RCW 69.50.408. That statute provides that any person convicted of a subsequent controlled substance offense may be imprisoned for “a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized.”
State v. O'NEAL, 109 P.3d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 10× “Because Greg had a prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine, the trial court employed RCW 69.50.408, the doubling statute. [25] Using this statute, the trial court doubled the statutory maximum on the methamphetamine count.”
State v. McNeal, 175 P.3d 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 11× “[1] He argues that the resentencing court erred when it (1) applied RCW 69.50.408, which allowed it "to double" [2] the statutory maximum for his drug offense; (2) concluded that Blakely v.”
State v. McNeal, 142 Wash. App. 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 11× “1 He argues that the resentencing court erred when *781 it (1) applied RCW 69.50.408, which allowed it “to double” 2 the statutory maximum for his drug offense; (2) concluded that Blakely v.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hopkins, 976 P.2d 616 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 8× “Holding that the statutory maximum sentence was doubled to 10 years under the sentencing doubling provisions of RCW 69.50.408, the Court of Appeals found the sentence within the maximum allowed by law and denied the petition.”
State v. Clark, 94 P.3d 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 12× “Clark argues the trial court erred when it included two Skagit County convictions, entered after his Jefferson County convictions but before his resentencing, in his offender score and when it doubled the standard range for his manufacturing conviction under RCW 69.50.408.…”
State v. Cyr, 461 P.3d 360 (Wash. 2020). · cites it 52× “If Cyr has a prior qualifying conviction for purposes of RCW 69.50.408, must he be sentenced within the SRA standard range? B.”
State Of Washington, V Johnny Ray Cyr, 441 P.3d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 36× “Cyr argues that the trial court had discretion whether to treat 60 months as the maximum sentence or to double the maximum sentence under RCW 69.50.408. In addition, RCW 69.50.410(2)(a) provides that a person convicted under RCW 69.”
State v. McCollum, 947 P.2d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “Ill McCollum argues in his pro se brief that the trial court erred when it applied RCW 69.50.408 to double the statutory maximum sentence for his offenses.”
In Re Pers. Restraint of Hopkins, 976 P.2d 616 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 8× “Holding that the statutory maximum sentence was doubled to 10 years under the sentencing doubling provisions of RCW 69.50.408, the Court of Appeals found the sentence within the maximum allowed by law and denied the petition.”
State v. Roy, 195 P.3d 967 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 7× “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner's ruling is the law of the case.”
State v. Roy, 147 Wash. App. 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 7× “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner’s ruling is the law of the case.”
Show all 52 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(1) — 19 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 134 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2006). “Cruz to double the low end of the standard range sentence pursuant to its interpretation of RCW 69.50.408. That statute provides that any person convicted of a subsequent controlled substance offense may be imprisoned for “a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized.”
State v. Roy, 195 P.3d 967 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner's ruling is the law of the case.”
State v. Roy, 147 Wash. App. 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner’s ruling is the law of the case.”
State v. Cyr, 461 P.3d 360 (Wash. 2020). “If Cyr has a prior qualifying conviction for purposes of RCW 69.50.408, must he be sentenced within the SRA standard range? B.”
State Of Washington, V Johnny Ray Cyr, 441 P.3d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “Cyr argues that the trial court had discretion whether to treat 60 months as the maximum sentence or to double the maximum sentence under RCW 69.50.408. In addition, RCW 69.50.410(2)(a) provides that a person convicted under RCW 69.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(2) — 8 cases
State v. Cyr, 461 P.3d 360 (Wash. 2020). “If Cyr has a prior qualifying conviction for purposes of RCW 69.50.408, must he be sentenced within the SRA standard range? B.”
State v. Roy, 195 P.3d 967 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner's ruling is the law of the case.”
State v. Roy, 147 Wash. App. 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Because legal authority on maximum terms has not changed between proceedings, our commissioner’s ruling is the law of the case.”
State Of Washington, V Johnny Ray Cyr, 441 P.3d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “Cyr argues that the trial court had discretion whether to treat 60 months as the maximum sentence or to double the maximum sentence under RCW 69.50.408. In addition, RCW 69.50.410(2)(a) provides that a person convicted under RCW 69.”
State v. McGrew, 234 P.3d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(3) — 5 cases
State Of Washington, V Johnny Ray Cyr, 441 P.3d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “Cyr argues that the trial court had discretion whether to treat 60 months as the maximum sentence or to double the maximum sentence under RCW 69.50.408. In addition, RCW 69.50.410(2)(a) provides that a person convicted under RCW 69.”
State v. Cyr, 461 P.3d 360 (Wash. 2020). “If Cyr has a prior qualifying conviction for purposes of RCW 69.50.408, must he be sentenced within the SRA standard range? B.”
State v. McGrew, 234 P.3d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. McGrew, 156 Wash. App. 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State of Washington v. Eric Allen Haggin (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(a) — 16 cases
State v. McNeal, 175 P.3d 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “[1] He argues that the resentencing court erred when it (1) applied RCW 69.50.408, which allowed it "to double" [2] the statutory maximum for his drug offense; (2) concluded that Blakely v.”
State v. McNeal, 142 Wash. App. 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “1 He argues that the resentencing court erred when *781 it (1) applied RCW 69.50.408, which allowed it “to double” 2 the statutory maximum for his drug offense; (2) concluded that Blakely v.”
State v. McCarthy, 48 P.3d 1014 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Mayer, 120 Wash. App. 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. McCarthy, 48 P.3d 1014 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(b) — 3 cases
State v. Mayer, 120 Wash. App. 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Mayer, 86 P.3d 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Clark, 94 P.3d 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(c) — 5 cases
State v. McCollum, 947 P.2d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “Ill McCollum argues in his pro se brief that the trial court erred when it applied RCW 69.50.408 to double the statutory maximum sentence for his offenses.”
State v. McGrew, 234 P.3d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Clark, 94 P.3d 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. McGrew, 156 Wash. App. 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State Of Washington v. Steven Pink (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(l) — 2 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 134 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2006). “Cruz to double the low end of the standard range sentence pursuant to its interpretation of RCW 69.50.408. That statute provides that any person convicted of a subsequent controlled substance offense may be imprisoned for “a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized.”
State v. McGrew, 156 Wash. App. 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
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