Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.130
Limitation upon inquiry
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No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody, or discharge the party when the term of commitment has not expired, in either of the cases following:
(1) Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction except where it is alleged in the petition that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution of the state of Washington or of the United States have been violated and the petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.
(2) For any contempt of any court, officer or body having authority in the premises to commit; but an order of commitment, as for a contempt upon proceedings to enforce the remedy of a party, is not included in any of the foregoing specifications.
(3) Upon a warrant issued from the superior court upon an indictment or information.
[ 1989 c 395 s 3; 1947 c 256 s 3; 1891 c 43 s 1; Code 1881 s 677; 1869 p 157 s 617; 1854 p 213 s 445; Rem. Supp. 1947 s 1075.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1952–2026 · leading case: In re the Personal Restraint of Turay
In re the Personal Restraint of Turay (2003)
“We hold that the one-year time limitation applies under RCW 7.36.130, which incorporates the time allowed in RCW 10.”
In Re Turay (2003)
“We hold that the one-year time limitation applies under RCW 7.36.130, which incorporates the time allowed in RCW 10.”
In Re the Personal Restraint of Hagler (1982)
“But in 1947 the Legislature amended RCW 7.36.130(1) in an attempt to expand postconviction relief.”
Matter of Personal Restraint of Runyan (2000)
“Lybarger , at 132; see also RCW 7.36.130. We have adjudged this to be the scope of our state privilege ever since.”
In Re the Personal Restraint of James (1982)
“) The right to use postconviction proceedings to raise constitutional claims is specifically guaranteed by RCW 7.36.130 and .140. Like RAP 16.4, those statutes confer that right unconditionally.”
In re the Personal Restraint of Coats (2011)
“100, it also amended RCW 7.36.130 to provide: No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody, or discharge the party when the term of commitment has not expired, in either of the cases following: (1) Upon any process…”
State v. Ward (2005)
“Normally, under RCW 7.36.130, a detainee must file a personal restraint petition challenging commitment as a sexually violent predator within one year of commitment.”
In RE SCRUGGS v. Rhay (1967)
“Furthermore, RCW 7.36.130 [3] and 7.36.140 [4] impose upon this court the obligation to inquire into properly alleged violations of state or federal constitutional rights.”
In re the Detention of Ward (2005)
“Normally, under RCW 7.36.130, a detainee must file a personal restraint petition challenging commitment as a sexually violent predator within one year of commitment.”
In re the Personal Restraint of Ruiz-Sanabria (2015)
“See RCW 7.36.130(1) (no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody unless a petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.”
In re the Personal Restraint of Turay (2004)
“Following transfer of the petition to this court, it was dismissed as a mixed petition that included a claim time barred under RCW 7.36.130(1) (which incorporates the time allowed in RCW 10.”
In RE BUCKINGHAM v. Cranor (1954)
“1947, § 1075 (1); RCW 7.36.130 (1)), by providing for an exception to the strict rule of the statute and the law of this state: ".”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.130(1) — 19 cases
In Re the Personal Restraint of Hagler (1982)
“But in 1947 the Legislature amended RCW 7.36.130(1) in an attempt to expand postconviction relief.”
In re the Personal Restraint of Turay (2003)
“We hold that the one-year time limitation applies under RCW 7.36.130, which incorporates the time allowed in RCW 10.”
In Re Turay (2003)
“We hold that the one-year time limitation applies under RCW 7.36.130, which incorporates the time allowed in RCW 10.”
Matter of Personal Restraint of Runyan (2000)
“Lybarger , at 132; see also RCW 7.36.130. We have adjudged this to be the scope of our state privilege ever since.”
In Re the Personal Restraint of James (1982)
“) The right to use postconviction proceedings to raise constitutional claims is specifically guaranteed by RCW 7.36.130 and .140. Like RAP 16.4, those statutes confer that right unconditionally.”
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