Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 70.129.150 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Prior to admission, all long-term care facilities or nursing facilities licensed under chapter 18.51 RCW that require payment of an admissions fee, deposit, or a minimum stay fee, by or on behalf of a person seeking admission to the long-term care facility or nursing facility, shall provide the resident, or resident representative, full disclosure in writing in a language the resident or resident representative understands, a statement of the amount of any admissions fees, deposits, prepaid charges, or minimum stay fees. The facility shall also disclose to the person, or resident representative, the facility's advance notice or transfer requirements, prior to admission. In addition, the long-term care facility or nursing facility shall also fully disclose in writing prior to admission what portion of the deposits, admissions fees, prepaid charges, or minimum stay fees will be refunded to the resident or resident representative to the extent provided by law, if the resident leaves the long-term care facility or nursing facility. Receipt of the disclosures required under this subsection must be acknowledged in writing. If the facility does not provide these disclosures, the deposits, admissions fees, prepaid charges, or minimum stay fees may not be kept by the facility. If a resident dies or is hospitalized or is transferred to another facility for more appropriate care and does not return to the original facility, the facility shall refund any deposit or charges already paid less the facility's per diem rate for the days the resident actually resided or reserved or retained a bed in the facility notwithstanding any minimum stay policy or discharge notice requirements, except that the facility may retain an additional amount to cover its reasonable, actual expenses incurred as a result of a private-pay resident's move, not to exceed five days' per diem charges, unless the resident has given advance notice in compliance with the admission agreement. All long-term care facilities or nursing facilities covered under this section are required to refund any and all refunds due the resident or resident representative to the extent provided by law, within thirty days from the resident's date of discharge from the facility. Nothing in this section applies to provisions in contracts negotiated between a nursing facility or long-term care facility and a certified health plan, health or disability insurer, health maintenance organization, managed care organization, or similar entities.
(2) Where a long-term care facility or nursing facility requires the execution of an admission contract by or on behalf of an individual seeking admission to the facility, the terms of the contract shall be consistent with the requirements of this section, and the terms of an admission contract by a long-term care facility shall be consistent with the requirements of this chapter.
Notes:
Findings—2021 c 159: See note following RCW 18.20.520.
Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2002–2023 · leading case: Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 38 P.3d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 38 P.3d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “[7] Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “” 7 Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
Hai En Mai & Julianne Stutzman-mai, Apps V. Phillips Law Firm (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “In Sorrel, the widower of a nursing home resident sued the nursing home for its failure to refund his prepayment within 30 days as required under RCW 70.129.150(1). 110 Wn. App. at 293-94 .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 70.129.150(1) — 3 cases
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 38 P.3d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “[7] Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “” 7 Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
Hai En Mai & Julianne Stutzman-mai, Apps V. Phillips Law Firm (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “In Sorrel, the widower of a nursing home resident sued the nursing home for its failure to refund his prepayment within 30 days as required under RCW 70.129.150(1). 110 Wn. App. at 293-94 .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 70.129.150(2) — 2 cases
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 38 P.3d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “[7] Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “” 7 Because a resident who has passed away is released from custody, no ambiguity exists in RCW 70.129.150(1). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself and courts assume the Legislature means exactly what it says.”
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