Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.94A
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530 (2026)

Standard sentence range

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The intersection of the column defined by the offender score and the row defined by the offense seriousness score determines the standard sentence range (see RCW 9.94A.510, (Table 1) and RCW 9.94A.517, (Table 3)). The additional time for deadly weapon findings or for other adjustments as specified in RCW 9.94A.533 shall be added to the entire standard sentence range. The court may impose any sentence within the range that it deems appropriate. All standard sentence ranges are expressed in terms of total confinement.
(2) In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing, or proven pursuant to RCW 9.94A.537. Where the defendant disputes material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point. The facts shall be deemed proved at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, except as otherwise specified in RCW 9.94A.537. On remand for resentencing following appeal or collateral attack, the parties shall have the opportunity to present and the court to consider all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal history not previously presented.
(3) In determining any sentence above the standard sentence range, the court shall follow the procedures set forth in RCW 9.94A.537. Facts that establish the elements of a more serious crime or additional crimes may not be used to go outside the standard sentence range except upon stipulation or when specifically provided for in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(d), (e), (g), and (h).
[ 2023 c 102 s 15; 2008 c 231 s 4; 2005 c 68 s 2; 2002 c 290 s 18; 2000 c 28 s 12; 1999 c 143 s 16; 1996 c 248 s 1; 1989 c 124 s 2; 1987 c 131 s 1; 1986 c 257 s 26; 1984 c 209 s 20; 1983 c 115 s 8. Formerly RCW 9.94A.370.]

Notes:

Intent—2008 c 231 ss 2-4: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.
Severability—2008 c 231: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.
Intent—Severability—Effective date—2005 c 68: See notes following RCW 9.94A.537.
Effective date—2002 c 290 ss 7-11 and 14-23: See note following RCW 9.94A.515.
Intent—2002 c 290: See note following RCW 9.94A.517.
Technical correction bill—2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 17-35: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Effective dates—1984 c 209: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 281 cases (63 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case: State v. Mendoza, 205 P.3d 113 (Wash. 2009).
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State v. Mendoza, 205 P.3d 113 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 12× “500 and RCW 9.94A.530 help resolve any ambiguity.”
State v. Hunley, 287 P.3d 584 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 9× “94A RCW, that allow a sentencing court to rely on an unchallenged prosecutor summary of a defendant’s criminal history in imposing a sentence violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the State to the…”
State v. Mendoza, 165 Wash. 2d 913 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 10× “500 and RCW 9.94A.530 help resolve any ambiguity.”
State v. Hunley, 253 P.3d 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 21× “Correspondingly, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.530 to authorize sentencing courts to rely on information that is “acknowledged” during “the time of sentencing,” including “criminal history presented at the time of sentencing” to which the defendant does “not object[].”
State v. Grayson, 111 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 5× “2d 403 (2004); RCW 9.94A.530(2). Under the *339 SRA, a trial judge may rely on facts that are admitted, proved, or acknowledged to determine “any sentence,” including whether to sentence a defendant to a DOSA.”
State v. Jones, 338 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2014). · cites it 7× “The State, however, argued that the 2008 amendments to RCW 9.94A.530, which were made in direct response to our decision in Ford, permit the State to offer new evidence on remand, regardless of defense objection.”
State v. Brown, 440 P.3d 962 (Wash. 2019). · cites it 8× “'^ ^ The dissent argues we should apply the Pearce presumption because our Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SKA)requires courts to consider only the "real facts" of the crimes at sentencing, RCW 9.94A.530(2), distinct from the federal sentencing guidelines, which allow courts to…”
State v. Bergstrom, 169 P.3d 816 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 3× “Former RCW 9.94A.530(2) (2002); Cadwallader, 155 Wash.”
State v. Bergstrom, 162 Wash. 2d 87 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 3× “Former RCW 9.94A.530(2) (2002); Cadwallader, 155 Wn.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Adolph, 170 Wash. 2d 556 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 4× “110(1) (2000), recodified as RCW 9.94A.530(1)). “It is the obligation of the State, not the defendant, to assure that the record before the sentencing court supports the criminal history determination.”
In Re Adolph, 243 P.3d 540 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 4× “110(1) (2000), recodified as RCW 9.94A.530(1)). "It is the obligation of the State, not the defendant, to assure that the record before the sentencing court supports the criminal history determination.”
State v. Foster, 140 Wash. App. 266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “The State responds that Foster’s stipulation is sufficient and that it does not need to provide the trial court with additional evidence to prove his criminal history.”
Show all 281 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530(1) — 50 cases
State v. Alvarado, 164 Wash. 2d 556 (Wash. 2008).
State v. Alvarado, 192 P.3d 345 (Wash. 2008).
State v. Campbell, 260 P.3d 235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Jones, 149 P.3d 636 (Wash. 2006).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Adolph, 170 Wash. 2d 556 (Wash. 2010). “110(1) (2000), recodified as RCW 9.94A.530(1)). “It is the obligation of the State, not the defendant, to assure that the record before the sentencing court supports the criminal history determination.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530(1)(2008) — 1 case
State Of Washington, V. Albert Jermaine Mcclendon (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530(2) — 189 cases
State v. Hunley, 287 P.3d 584 (Wash. 2012). “94A RCW, that allow a sentencing court to rely on an unchallenged prosecutor summary of a defendant’s criminal history in imposing a sentence violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the State to the…”
State v. Mendoza, 205 P.3d 113 (Wash. 2009). “500 and RCW 9.94A.530 help resolve any ambiguity.”
State v. Mendoza, 165 Wash. 2d 913 (Wash. 2009). “500 and RCW 9.94A.530 help resolve any ambiguity.”
State v. Grayson, 111 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 2005). “2d 403 (2004); RCW 9.94A.530(2). Under the *339 SRA, a trial judge may rely on facts that are admitted, proved, or acknowledged to determine “any sentence,” including whether to sentence a defendant to a DOSA.”
State v. Hunley, 253 P.3d 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “Correspondingly, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.530 to authorize sentencing courts to rely on information that is “acknowledged” during “the time of sentencing,” including “criminal history presented at the time of sentencing” to which the defendant does “not object[].”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530(3) — 7 cases
State v. Bluehorse, 159 Wash. App. 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Bluehorse, 248 P.3d 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Peeler, 349 P.3d 842 (Wash. 2015).
State Of Washington, V Timothy Lloyd Menzies Jr (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
State Of Washington, V. Matthew Michael Heleniak (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.530(l) — 3 cases
State Of Washington v. Antonio Zamudio, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State of Washington v. Dennis L. Sproul (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State of Washington v. Stephen Anthony Bailey (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
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