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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9Chapter 9.95

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.060 (2025)

When sentence begins to run

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1953–2023 17citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 17 opinions since 1953, 1 of them in the last five years.

The 17 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.060 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Hultman, 600 P.2d 1291 (Wash. 1979).
cites § 9.95.060 6×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“The legislature has already declared such a policy in RCW 9.95.060. That statute provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, "credit on a sentence will begin from the date the judgment and sentence is signed by the court.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may revoke a suspended sentence after probation ends if the petition was timely filed and the hearing is diligently pursued and delayed only by reasonable continuances.
2
GREENState v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
cites § 9.95.060 2×cited by 113 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“2d 949 (1974), we held that a sentence, pursuant to RCW 9.95.060, does not begin to run until the convicted person is in custody following the judgment and sentence.”
The case’s holding
The state may impose juvenile confinement terms exceeding adult maximums under a manifest injustice finding because the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system justifies such classification.
Later courts cite it for
“i n resolving any issue which turns on the legislative purpose of the jaa, we must ensure that our decision effectuates to the fullest possible extent both the purpose of rehabilitation and the purpose of punishment.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Little, 627 P.2d 543 (Wash. 1981).
cites § 9.95.060 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“RCW 9.95.060 provides, in pertinent part: If such convicted person does not appeal from his conviction, but is at liberty for a period of time subsequent to the signing of the judgment and sentence, or becomes a fugitive, credit on his sentence will begin from the date such…”
4
GREENReanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1974).
cites § 9.95.060 2×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“2 *346 Pursuant to RCW 9.95.060, 3 a sentence, absent designated circumstances, ordinarily commences to run from the entry of judgment and sentence.”
The case’s holding
Defendants in pretrial detention and defendants in postconviction detention must be treated equally (basis).
Later courts cite it for
“an accused person, unable to or precluded from posting bail or otherwise procuring his release from confinement prior to trial” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Akridge, 581 P.2d 1050 (Wash. 1978).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“RCW 9.95.060 states the general rule that time on a sentence begins with the date of judgment and sentence.”
The case’s holding
A parolee convicted of a felony during parole is entitled, under Morrissey, to an opportunity to explain before the parole board why the conviction should not result in revocation.
6
GREENState v. Anderson, 937 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“” RCW 9.95.060. The issue is more specifically addressed by RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
The rational basis test applies to equal protection challenges that do not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right.
7
GREENState v. Shannon, 376 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1962).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“On the face of the record, as it now stands, subject only to the discretion of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, in fixing the minimum, defendant’s sentence would commence to run from August 28, 1961.”
The case’s holding
Statutory credit for time served pending appeal applies to discretionary minimum terms. (State v. Shannon)
Later courts cite it for
“brought before the court wherein probation was granted” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState ex rel. Schock v. Barnett, 259 P.2d 404 (Wash. 1953).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“RCW 9.95.060, 10.73.030 [cf. Rem. Supp. 1947, § 10249-2, Rem.”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks power to grant probation or suspend a sentence on a petition filed after judgment is affirmed on appeal.
9
GREENMatter of Pers. Restraint of Paschke, 811 P.2d 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“RCW 9.95.060. See DeLano v. Cranor, 44 Wn.”
10
NEUTRALWickert v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 538 P.2d 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
cites § 9.95.060 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“The petitioner seeks some comfort from the language used in the last sentence of RCW 9.95.060. 3 She contends that the statute specifies period of time and nature of events which permit interruption of the running of her sentence, and then specifies that in all other cases…”
Later courts cite it for
“(1) whenever a person while under sentence of felony shall commit another felony and be sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until the expiration of all prior terms: provided, that any person granted probation pursuant to the provisions of rcw 9.95.210 and/or 9.92.060 shall not be considered to he under sentence of a felony for the purposes of this subsection.” · 1 citing court
11
NEUTRALState v. Floyd, 521 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“Defendant’s position is that the trial court thereby failed to follow the “broad no consecutive sentence rule” of RCW 9.95.060, which provides that (except in situations not here relevant): “credit on a sentence will begin from the date the judgment and sentence is signed by the…”
12
GREENIn re FRYE v. Delmore, 288 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1955).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“If petitioner had been sentenced and imprisoned pursuant to a valid judgment and sentence, the time of imprisonment would have commenced to run from May 25, 1940, that being the date of the signing and entry of the judgment and sentence.”
13
GREENDeLano v. Cranor, 265 P.2d 263 (Wash. 1954).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“RCW 9.95.060]), provides as follows: “When a convicted person appeals from his or her conviction and is at liberty on bond pending the determination of his or her appeal by the supreme court, credit on his or her sentence will begin from the date of the remittitur.”
14
NO FLAGState Of Washington, Resp/cross-app V. Hussein S. Ali, App/cross-resp., No. 83721-4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 5, 2023).
cites § 9.95.060 3×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“The State asserts that RCW 9.95.060 and RCW 9.94A.507(4) permit a court to deny credit for a serious sex offense and that there is no federal right to credit for time served.”
15
NEUTRALTown of Ruston v. Wingard, 364 P.2d 553 (Wash. 1961).
cites § 9.95.060 3×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“Appellant seizes upon this date as the date on which jail time begins to run, relying on RCW 9.95.060 2 , and asserts that his jail sentences expired thirty days later on March 16, 1960, and that thereafter any jail time served must be applied on the fines and costs.”
16
NEUTRALHodges v. Lawrence, 318 P.2d 326 (Wash. 1957).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“, The relator admits that he was not taken into custody at the time of his sentence, but contends, nevertheless, that under the terms of RCW 9.95.060 [cf. Rem. Supp. 1947, § 10249-2, part] his sentence began to run at the time he was sentenced, and, consequently, it had expired…”
17
GREENState v. Anderson, 937 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 9.95.060 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.060
“" RCW 9.95.060. The issue is more specifically addressed by RCW 9.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195219872023

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 3 cases in 1974–1975. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash.13Wash. Ct. App.4
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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