Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.95
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.060 (2026)

When sentence begins to run

✓ current as of May 2026
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When a convicted person seeks appellate review of his or her conviction and is at liberty on bond pending the determination of the proceeding by the supreme court or the court of appeals, credit on his or her sentence will begin from the date such convicted person is returned to custody. The date of return to custody shall be certified to the department of corrections, the indeterminate sentence review board, and the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such convicted person was convicted and sentenced, by the sheriff of such county. If such convicted person does not seek review of the conviction, but is at liberty for a period of time subsequent to the signing of the judgment and sentence, or becomes a fugitive, credit on his sentence will begin from the date such convicted person is returned to custody. The date of return to custody shall be certified as provided in this section. In all other cases, credit on a sentence will begin from the date the judgment and sentence is signed by the court.
[ 1999 c 143 s 18; 1988 c 202 s 15; 1981 c 136 s 36; 1979 c 141 s 1; 1971 c 81 s 46; 1967 c 200 s 10; 1955 c 133 s 7. Prior: 1947 c 92 s 1, part; 1935 c 114 s 2, part; Rem. Supp. s10249-2, part.]

Notes:

Severability—1988 c 202: See note following RCW 2.24.050.
Effective date—1981 c 136: See RCW 72.09.900.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1953–2023 · leading case: State v. Hultman, 600 P.2d 1291 (Wash. 1979).
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State v. Hultman, 600 P.2d 1291 (Wash. 1979). · cites it 6× “The legislature has already declared such a policy in RCW 9.95.060. That statute provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, "credit on a sentence will begin from the date the judgment and sentence is signed by the court.”
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 2× “2d 949 (1974), we held that a sentence, pursuant to RCW 9.95.060, does not begin to run until the convicted person is in custody following the judgment and sentence.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Little, 627 P.2d 543 (Wash. 1981). · cites it 5× “RCW 9.95.060 provides, in pertinent part: If such convicted person does not appeal from his conviction, but is at liberty for a period of time subsequent to the signing of the judgment and sentence, or becomes a fugitive, credit on his sentence will begin from the date such…”
Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1974). · cites it 2× “2 *346 Pursuant to RCW 9.95.060, 3 a sentence, absent designated circumstances, ordinarily commences to run from the entry of judgment and sentence.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Akridge, 581 P.2d 1050 (Wash. 1978). “RCW 9.95.060 states the general rule that time on a sentence begins with the date of judgment and sentence.”
State v. Anderson, 937 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1997). “” RCW 9.95.060. The issue is more specifically addressed by RCW 9.”
State v. Shannon, 376 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1962). “On the face of the record, as it now stands, subject only to the discretion of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, in fixing the minimum, defendant’s sentence would commence to run from August 28, 1961.”
State Ex Rel. Schock v. Barnett, 259 P.2d 404 (Wash. 1953). “RCW 9.95.060, 10.73.030 [cf. Rem. Supp. 1947, § 10249-2, Rem.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Paschke, 811 P.2d 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “RCW 9.95.060. See DeLano v. Cranor, 44 Wn.”
Wickert v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 538 P.2d 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). · cites it 3× “The petitioner seeks some comfort from the language used in the last sentence of RCW 9.95.060. 3 She contends that the statute specifies period of time and nature of events which permit interruption of the running of her sentence, and then specifies that in all other cases…”
State v. Floyd, 521 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). “Defendant’s position is that the trial court thereby failed to follow the “broad no consecutive sentence rule” of RCW 9.95.060, which provides that (except in situations not here relevant): “credit on a sentence will begin from the date the judgment and sentence is signed by the…”
In RE FRYE v. Delmore, 288 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1955). “If petitioner had been sentenced and imprisoned pursuant to a valid judgment and sentence, the time of imprisonment would have commenced to run from May 25, 1940, that being the date of the signing and entry of the judgment and sentence.”
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