Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010 (2026)
General requirements of culpability
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) INTENT. A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime.
(b) KNOWLEDGE. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
(i) He or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or
(ii) He or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.
(c) RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.
(d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.
(2) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and Knowledge. When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.
(3) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.
(4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 594
cases (107 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988).
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). “RCW 9A.08.010; see State v. Allen, 101 Wn.”
Verda Lee Crosswhite Vv Washington State Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs., 389 P.3d 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “The i Department cites the definition of "knowledge" in RCW 9A.08.010 in contending that I "[ c]riminal law .”
State v. Acosta, 683 P.2d 1069 (Wash. 1984). “Knowledge is defined in RCW 9A.08.010, which provides in relevant part: (b) Knowledge.”
State v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 1992). “090 only requires that the defendant "know" the premises are being used for prostitution purposes, and under the definition of knowledge in RCW 9A.08.010(1)-(b)(ii), one may have a reasonable belief or subjective "knowledge" that a fact exists even though it objectively does not.”
State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash. 2d 904 (Wash. 2001). “42 It also correctly noted the traditional rule was abolished by legislative enactment of RCW 9A.08.010 with the result that expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental disorder should no longer be excluded or admitted on the basis of common-law distinctions of intent.”
State v. Atsbeha, 16 P.3d 626 (Wash. 2001). “[42] It also correctly noted the traditional rule was abolished by legislative enactment of RCW 9A.08.010 with the result that expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental disorder should no longer be excluded or admitted on the basis of common-law distinctions of intent.”
State v. Allen, 678 P.2d 798 (Wash. 1984). “State v. Edmon, 28 Wn. App. 98 , 621 P.2d 1310 , review denied, 95 Wn.”
State v. Rich, 365 P.3d 746 (Wash. 2016). “RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c) states, “A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would…”
State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983). “First, homicide is justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of…”
State v. Graham, 103 P.3d 1238 (Wash. 2005). “We also conclude that the juvenile court’s findings support its determination that Graham acted “recklessly,” as that term is defined in RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c). We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “The mens rea of each crime is different, which in and of itself is not unusual, but what makes this case distinguishable from the cases on which the State relies is that the higher degree crime, third degree assault of a child, has a lower mens rea than fourth degree assault.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1) — 23 cases
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Nordby, 723 P.2d 1117 (Wash. 1986).
State v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 1992). “090 only requires that the defendant "know" the premises are being used for prostitution purposes, and under the definition of knowledge in RCW 9A.08.010(1)-(b)(ii), one may have a reasonable belief or subjective "knowledge" that a fact exists even though it objectively does not.”
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “The mens rea of each crime is different, which in and of itself is not unusual, but what makes this case distinguishable from the cases on which the State relies is that the higher degree crime, third degree assault of a child, has a lower mens rea than fourth degree assault.”
State v. Rinier, 609 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1980).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(a) — 112 cases
State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983). “First, homicide is justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of…”
State v. Atsbeha, 16 P.3d 626 (Wash. 2001). “[42] It also correctly noted the traditional rule was abolished by legislative enactment of RCW 9A.08.010 with the result that expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental disorder should no longer be excluded or admitted on the basis of common-law distinctions of intent.”
State v. Allen, 678 P.2d 798 (Wash. 1984). “State v. Edmon, 28 Wn. App. 98 , 621 P.2d 1310 , review denied, 95 Wn.”
State v. Bea, 162 Wash. App. 570 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Caliguri, 664 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1983).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(b) — 87 cases
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Gerdts, 150 P.3d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 1992). “090 only requires that the defendant "know" the premises are being used for prostitution purposes, and under the definition of knowledge in RCW 9A.08.010(1)-(b)(ii), one may have a reasonable belief or subjective "knowledge" that a fact exists even though it objectively does not.”
State v. Shipp, 610 P.2d 1322 (Wash. 1980).
State v. J.M., 28 P.3d 720 (Wash. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) — 29 cases
State v. J.M., 28 P.3d 720 (Wash. 2001).
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 1992). “090 only requires that the defendant "know" the premises are being used for prostitution purposes, and under the definition of knowledge in RCW 9A.08.010(1)-(b)(ii), one may have a reasonable belief or subjective "knowledge" that a fact exists even though it objectively does not.”
State v. Acosta, 683 P.2d 1069 (Wash. 1984). “Knowledge is defined in RCW 9A.08.010, which provides in relevant part: (b) Knowledge.”
State v. Edmon, 621 P.2d 1310 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) — 32 cases
State v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 1992). “090 only requires that the defendant "know" the premises are being used for prostitution purposes, and under the definition of knowledge in RCW 9A.08.010(1)-(b)(ii), one may have a reasonable belief or subjective "knowledge" that a fact exists even though it objectively does not.”
State v. Shipp, 610 P.2d 1322 (Wash. 1980).
State v. J.M., 28 P.3d 720 (Wash. 2001).
State v. Allen, 341 P.3d 268 (Wash. 2015).
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(c) — 82 cases
State v. Roggenkamp, 106 P.3d 196 (Wash. 2005).
State v. Peters, 261 P.3d 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Henderson, 344 P.3d 1207 (Wash. 2015).
State v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). “RCW 9A.08.010; see State v. Allen, 101 Wn.”
State v. Gehrke, 434 P.3d 522 (Wash. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(c)(1975) — 2 cases
Swank v. Valley Christian Sch. (Wash. 2017).
In re Pers. Restraint of Canha (Wash. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(d) — 60 cases
State v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). “RCW 9A.08.010; see State v. Allen, 101 Wn.”
State v. Lewis, 233 P.3d 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “The mens rea of each crime is different, which in and of itself is not unusual, but what makes this case distinguishable from the cases on which the State relies is that the higher degree crime, third degree assault of a child, has a lower mens rea than fourth degree assault.”
State v. Gamble, 225 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2010).
State v. Gamble, 168 Wash. 2d 161 (Wash. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(d)(1975) — 1 case
In re Pers. Restraint of Canha (Wash. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(1)(ii) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Alex Michael Jones, 463 P.3d 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(2) — 68 cases
State v. Hayward, 217 P.3d 354 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Hayward, 217 P.3d 354 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Acosta, 683 P.2d 1069 (Wash. 1984). “Knowledge is defined in RCW 9A.08.010, which provides in relevant part: (b) Knowledge.”
State v. Shipp, 610 P.2d 1322 (Wash. 1980).
State v. Numrich, 480 P.3d 376 (Wash. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(3) — 1 case
State v. Allen, 678 P.2d 798 (Wash. 1984). “State v. Edmon, 28 Wn. App. 98 , 621 P.2d 1310 , review denied, 95 Wn.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(4) — 47 cases
Verda Lee Crosswhite Vv Washington State Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs., 389 P.3d 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “The i Department cites the definition of "knowledge" in RCW 9A.08.010 in contending that I "[ c]riminal law .”
State v. Sisemore, 55 P.3d 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
Bishop v. City of Spokane, 173 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
Bishop v. City of Spokane, 142 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Clowes, 104 Wash. App. 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(I)(c) — 1 case
Perez-contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615 (BIA 1992).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(a) — 2 cases
State v. Woo Won Choi, 781 P.2d 505 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
State Of Washington v. Justin Matthew Gray Bacani (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(b) — 12 cases
State v. Yishmael, 456 P.3d 1172 (Wash. 2020).
State v. Woody, 742 P.2d 133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
State v. Koch, 237 P.3d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State Of Washington v. Joshua Mason Webb (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
State Of Washington, V Richard Carl Howard, Ii (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(b)(i) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Eric Santiago Romero Lemus (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(b)(ii) — 5 cases
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
State Of Washington v. Charles Edwin Pillon (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State Of Washington, V. Curtis Johnson, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington, V. Jason Michael Jensen (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
State Of Washington, V. Richard R. Perry, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(c) — 10 cases
State v. Newbern, 975 P.2d 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Grier, 208 P.3d 1221 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State Of Washington v. Kevin Lee Garrison (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State Of Washington v. Hayden Adam Martin Cepa (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(d) — 4 cases
State v. Grier, 208 P.3d 1221 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State Of Washington, V. Guang Zheng & Dan Yu, 491 P.3d 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington v. Jennifer Mothershead (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State Of Washington v. Kevin Lee Garrison (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(a) — 51 cases
State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash. 2d 904 (Wash. 2001). “42 It also correctly noted the traditional rule was abolished by legislative enactment of RCW 9A.08.010 with the result that expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental disorder should no longer be excluded or admitted on the basis of common-law distinctions of intent.”
State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983). “First, homicide is justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of…”
State v. Allen, 678 P.2d 798 (Wash. 1984). “State v. Edmon, 28 Wn. App. 98 , 621 P.2d 1310 , review denied, 95 Wn.”
State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1997).
United States v. Jose Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(b) — 35 cases
Verda Lee Crosswhite Vv Washington State Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs., 389 P.3d 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “The i Department cites the definition of "knowledge" in RCW 9A.08.010 in contending that I "[ c]riminal law .”
State v. Gerdts, 136 Wash. App. 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Goble, 126 P.3d 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321 (Wash. 2000).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(b)(i) — 10 cases
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Box, 745 P.2d 23 (Wash. 1987).
State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Bower, 626 P.2d 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
State v. Fryer, 673 P.2d 881 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(b)(ii) — 13 cases
State v. Scott, 757 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1988). “Besides the levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, terms such as the following are separately defined: "building" (defined to include fenced areas, vehicles, or railway cars in RCW 9A.”
State v. Bryant, 950 P.2d 1004 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Keend, 140 Wash. App. 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. R.H.S., 974 P.2d 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Daniels, 784 P.2d 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(c) — 38 cases
State v. Rich, 365 P.3d 746 (Wash. 2016). “RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c) states, “A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would…”
State v. Graham, 103 P.3d 1238 (Wash. 2005). “We also conclude that the juvenile court’s findings support its determination that Graham acted “recklessly,” as that term is defined in RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c). We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
State v. Harris, 164 Wash. App. 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). “RCW 9A.08.010; see State v. Allen, 101 Wn.”
State v. Hanton, 614 P.2d 1280 (Wash. 1980).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(d) — 27 cases
State v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). “RCW 9A.08.010; see State v. Allen, 101 Wn.”
Ihar Sotnikau v. Loretta Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2017).
State v. Frahm, 444 P.3d 595 (Wash. 2019).
State v. Schaler, 169 Wash. 2d 274 (Wash. 2010).
State v. Hughes, 721 P.2d 902 (Wash. 1986).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.010(l)(e) — 2 cases
State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. 2d 614 (Wash. 2005).
Grange Ins. v. Roberts, 320 P.3d 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
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