Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.16
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable in the following cases:
(a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or
(b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or
(c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid:
(i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony;
(ii) To prevent the escape of a person from a federal or state correctional facility or in retaking a person who escapes from such a facility;
(iii) To prevent the escape of a person from a county or city jail or holding facility if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or
(iv) To lawfully suppress a riot if the actor or another participant is armed with a deadly weapon.
(2) In considering whether to use deadly force under subsection (1)(c) of this section, to arrest or apprehend any person for the commission of any crime, the peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others. Among the circumstances which may be considered by peace officers as a "threat of serious physical harm" are the following:
(a) The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a weapon in a manner that could reasonably be construed as threatening; or
(b) There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.
Under these circumstances deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer, where, if feasible, some warning is given, provided the officer meets the good faith standard of this section.
(3) A public officer covered by subsection (1)(a) of this section shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section.
(4) A peace officer shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force in good faith, where "good faith" is an objective standard which shall consider all the facts, circumstances, and information known to the officer at the time to determine whether a similarly situated reasonable officer would have believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to the officer or another individual.
(5) This section shall not be construed as:
(a) Affecting the permissible use of force by a person acting under the authority of RCW 9A.16.020 or 9A.16.050; or
(b) Preventing a law enforcement agency from adopting standards pertaining to its use of deadly force that are more restrictive than this section.
[ 2019 c 4 s 3. Prior: 2019 c 1 s 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940); ( 2018 c 11 s 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940) repealed by 2019 c 4 s 8); (2018 c 10 s 3 repealed by 2019 c 4 s 8); 1986 c 209 s 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.040.]

Notes:

Effective date—2019 c 4: See note following RCW 43.101.455.
Short title—Intent—Liberal construction—Subject—2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See notes following RCW 43.101.450.
Rule making—2019 c 4; 2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See note following RCW 43.101.455.
Legislative recognition: "The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200, 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers." [ 1986 c 209 s 3.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case: Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019).
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Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019). · cites it 8× “The statute the City relies on, RCW 9A.16.040, governs “[jlustifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, [or] person aiding.”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). “§ 40-7-108 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3) (1977). Oregon limits use of deadly force to violent felons, but also allows its use against any felon if "necessary.”
State v. Groom, 133 Wash. 2d 679 (Wash. 1997). · cites it 2× “, RCW 9A.16.040(3); RCW 10.31.100(12); RCW 13.”
State v. Groom, 947 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1997). · cites it 2× “[3] If the Legislature had intended to include a good or bad faith component in RCW 10.”
State v. Hendrickson, 989 P.2d 1210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “020(1) and (2), and also in RCW 9A.16.040. Hendrickson fails to cite or discuss either statute.”
Le v. Urquhart (W.D. Wash. 2021). · cites it 3× “It contends that the applicable standard of care is set forth in RCW 9A.16.040, 4 which provides that “[h]omicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable .”
Miller v. Sawant (W.D. Wash. 2023). · cites it 2× “See RCW 9A.16.040(3) (2016). And when Sawant made her second statements, the 23 results of the inquest and SPD reviews were public, which allowed the public even more 24 1 information to make its own determinations about Sawant’s remarks were truthful.”
Strickland v. City of Auburn (W.D. Wash. 2023). · cites it 2× “” RCW 9A.16.040(4). 19 A year before Snohomish County declined to prosecute Lyman, the King County 20 Prosecuting Attorney brought charges against another City of Auburn police officer, Jeffrey 21 Nelson.”
Snaza v. State, 534 P.3d 1181 (Wash. 2023). “010(1); see also RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c)(iv) (“Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable .”
Hadley v. Washington State Patrol (W.D. Wash. 2025). “The Court assumes they refer to the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorney’s (WAPA) investigation that 21 conducted an external review of the use of force and concluded it was in “good faith” as defined in RCW 9A.16.040(4). Dkt. 24-1. Neither WSP nor the Cowlitz police…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(1)(b) — 1 case
Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019). “The statute the City relies on, RCW 9A.16.040, governs “[jlustifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, [or] person aiding.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(1)(c)(i) — 1 case
Le v. Urquhart (W.D. Wash. 2021). “It contends that the applicable standard of care is set forth in RCW 9A.16.040, 4 which provides that “[h]omicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(1)(c)(iv) — 1 case
Snaza v. State, 534 P.3d 1181 (Wash. 2023). “010(1); see also RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c)(iv) (“Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3) — 4 cases
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). “§ 40-7-108 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3) (1977). Oregon limits use of deadly force to violent felons, but also allows its use against any felon if "necessary.”
State v. Groom, 133 Wash. 2d 679 (Wash. 1997). “, RCW 9A.16.040(3); RCW 10.31.100(12); RCW 13.”
State v. Groom, 947 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1997). “[3] If the Legislature had intended to include a good or bad faith component in RCW 10.”
Miller v. Sawant (W.D. Wash. 2023). “See RCW 9A.16.040(3) (2016). And when Sawant made her second statements, the 23 results of the inquest and SPD reviews were public, which allowed the public even more 24 1 information to make its own determinations about Sawant’s remarks were truthful.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(4) — 4 cases
Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019). “The statute the City relies on, RCW 9A.16.040, governs “[jlustifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, [or] person aiding.”
Strickland v. City of Auburn (W.D. Wash. 2023). “” RCW 9A.16.040(4). 19 A year before Snohomish County declined to prosecute Lyman, the King County 20 Prosecuting Attorney brought charges against another City of Auburn police officer, Jeffrey 21 Nelson.”
Le v. Urquhart (W.D. Wash. 2021). “It contends that the applicable standard of care is set forth in RCW 9A.16.040, 4 which provides that “[h]omicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable .”
Hadley v. Washington State Patrol (W.D. Wash. 2025). “The Court assumes they refer to the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorney’s (WAPA) investigation that 21 conducted an external review of the use of force and concluded it was in “good faith” as defined in RCW 9A.16.040(4). Dkt. 24-1. Neither WSP nor the Cowlitz police…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(l)(b) — 1 case
Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019). “The statute the City relies on, RCW 9A.16.040, governs “[jlustifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, [or] person aiding.”
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