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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9AChapter 9A.32

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.060 (2025)

Manslaughter in the first degree

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1978–2026 147citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 147 opinions since 1978, 11 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1)(a) (81 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.060 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005).
cites § 9A.32.060 5×subsections: (1)(a) 5×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“The State must prove all essential elements of the above two offenses in order to achieve a guilty verdict for second degree felony murder.”
The case’s holding
Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of second degree felony murder when the predicate felony is second degree assault.
Later courts cite it for
“the risk contemplated per the assault statute is of 'substantial bodily harm” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (2005).
cites § 9A.32.060 5×subsections: (1)(a) 5×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“The State must prove all essential elements of the above two offenses in order to achieve a guilty verdict for second degree felony murder.”
3
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Montoya, 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 1987).
cites § 9A.32.060 3×subsections: (1)(a) 3×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“On July 20, 1983, the prosecuting attorney filed an amended information which charged Montoya with first degree manslaughter under RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a) and stated that the maximum penalty was 10 years and/ or $20,000.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must exercise extreme care to ensure an Alford plea is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice that satisfies constitutional requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“a constitutionally invalid guilty plea gives rise to actual prejudice.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Berlin, 947 P.2d 700 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (1)(a) 2×cited by 252 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a). The elements of manslaughter in the second degree are that the defendant, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person.”
The case’s holding
An offense is a lesser included offense if each of its elements is a necessary element of the charged offense and the evidence supports an inference of the lesser crime.
Later courts cite it for
“if the evidence would permit a jury to rationally find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater, a lesser included offense instruction should be given.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Dennison, 801 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1990).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×cited by 190 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“Dennison's assumption that second degree murder and first and second degree manslaughter are lesser included offenses of felony murder is incorrect.”
The case’s holding
First and second degree manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder (holding).
Later courts cite it for
“cause in fact refers to the "but for” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Acosta, 683 P.2d 1069 (Wash. 1984).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 168 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“Similarly, in Hanton , we held that evidence of self-defense negated the element of "recklessness" in the first degree manslaughter statute, RCW 9A.32.060(1)(a). There we focused upon the requirement of wrongful action in the definition of recklessness.”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction is constitutionally deficient if it fails to inform the jury that the state bears the burden of proof regarding every element of the offense (State v. Acosta).
Later courts cite it for
“the test is whether the jury was informed, or could understand from the instructions as a whole, that the state bears the burden of proof” · 4 citing courts
7
REDState v. Gamble, 118 Wash. App. 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9A.32.060 3×subsections: (1)(a) 3×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“See RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a). *335 Gamble and others beat Carroll to death at a party in Vancouver, Washington, on March 26, 1999.”
8
GREENState v. Sublett, 292 P.3d 715 (Wash. 2012).
cites § 9A.32.060 1×cited by 300 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“However, more than mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person is an accomplice. A person who is an accomplice in the commission of a crime is guilty of that crime whether present at the scene or not.”
The case’s holding
Courts apply an experience and logic test to determine whether a courtroom is closed when a judge addresses the jury inside the jury room.
Later courts cite it for
“not every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial, or constitute a closure if closed to the public.” · 38 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Shipp, 610 P.2d 1322 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×cited by 145 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“For example, under this redefinition, it would be possible to convict every negligent driver who causes injury, in a situation where the ordinary person would have known that injury would result, of second-degree assault, because RCW 9A.36.020(1)(b) makes it a class B felony,…”
The case’s holding
A jury may infer knowledge from information that would lead a reasonable person to believe relevant facts exist, but it must still determine the defendant's subjective knowledge.
Later courts cite it for
“permitting, rather than directing, the jury to find that the defendant had knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge under the circumstances.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENIn re Burchfield, 46 P.3d 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9A.32.060 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“011 reads: (1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm: (a) Assaults another with a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death; or (b) Administers, exposes,…”
The case’s holding
Convictions for first degree manslaughter and first degree assault arising from the same gunshot violate the double jeopardy clause (double jeopardy).
Later courts cite it for
“although the offenses do not contain identical legal elements, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to punish shooting a victim both as an assault and as a homicide.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Pascal, 736 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1987).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×cited by 118 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“RCW 9A.32.060. Reckless conduct involves knowingly disregarding a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur where such disregard is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.”
The case’s holding
A court may depart from standard sentencing guidelines based on the victim being the initiator, duress, or battered woman syndrome (mitigating factors).
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court's subjective determination that these ranges are unwise, or that they do not adequately advance the above goals, is not a substantial and compelling reason justifying a departure.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 979 P.2d 417 (Wash. 1999).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (2)cited by 99 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“021 (setting maximum sentences); former RCW 9A.32.060 (first degree manslaughter); 2 RCW 9A.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must enter findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the reasons for a sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“are regarded and interpreted as contracts and both parties are bound by the terms of a valid plea agreement.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Anderson, 638 P.2d 1205 (Wash. 1982).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“030(1)(b) which makes it a crime to cause the death of a person "[u]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life".”
The case’s holding
A reversal not based on evidentiary insufficiency permits a defendant to be retried for the original offense and any lesser included offenses.
Later courts cite it for
“the defendant may be retried for the convicted offense and any lesser included offenses.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Gamble, 225 P.3d 973 (Wash. 2010).
cites § 9A.32.060 1×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 136 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“RCW 9A.32.060(1)(a). Second degree manslaughter is committed when a person, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person.”
Later courts cite it for
“denial of a motion for mistrial should be overturned only when there is a substantial likelihood that the prejudice affected the verdict.” · 10 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Gamble, 168 Wash. 2d 161 (2010).
cites § 9A.32.060 1×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 135 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“RCW 9A.32.060(1)(a). Second degree manslaughter is committed when a person, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person.”
The case’s holding
The ends of justice exception to mandatory joinder applies when original convictions are vacated due to a change in the law.
16
GREENState v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“060, in turn, was repealed in 1975 to create two degrees of manslaughter: recklessly causing the death of another, RCW 9A.32.060, and with criminal negligence causing the death of another, RCW 9A.”
The case’s holding
A person commits first degree manslaughter by failing to provide necessary medical treatment to a sick child for religious reasons (affirming first degree manslaughter conviction).
Later courts cite it for
“review of a case on appeal is limited to matters in the record.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState v. Creekmore, 783 P.2d 1068 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (1)(a) 2×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“Any recklessly caused death establishes first degree manslaughter, RCW 9A.32.060(1)(a), whereas felony murder by criminal mistreatment depends on three additional elements: (1) the defendant must be a parent or custodian of the victim; (2) the victim must be a child or…”
The case’s holding
A sentence is not clearly excessive if no reasonable person would impose it, and extreme youth and lack of remorse serve as aggravating factors in homicide cases.
Later courts cite it for
“no reasonable person would impose it.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENPeople v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th 797 (1994).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“) In the remaining five states, however, the act is criminal only if the unborn child is killed "by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother." ( Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.09 ; Ga.”
The case’s holding
An instruction that erroneously omits an element of a special circumstance is nonprejudicial under the California Constitution (Cantrell-Thornton exception).
Later courts cite it for
“an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates in the same manner as an ex post facto law.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Parr, 606 P.2d 263 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 9A.32.060 2×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“The argument of the petitioner is that manslaughter in the first degree, as defined in RCW 9A.32.060, requires the same proof. RCW 9A.”
The case’s holding
Hearsay testimony regarding a victim's fear is admissible to rebut an accident or self-defense claim, but testimony describing a defendant's prior threats is inadmissible.
Later courts cite it for
“but where a defense such as that of accident of self-defense is interposed, as is the case here, courts have generally allowed the admission of the victim's fears, as probative of the question whether that person would have been likely to do the acts claimed by the defendant.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENState v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 9A.32.060 1×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 9A.32.060
“2 (2009) (pro *796 scribing killing of fetus); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.32.060 (1) (b) (West 2009) (designating as first degree manslaughter unlawful and intentional killing of unborn quick child by infliction of injury on mother of such child); W.”
The case’s holding
The state must prove a newborn was not brain dead at the time of birth to establish the victim was a person for purposes of murder charges.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 2018. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.96Wash.422d Cir.2W.D. Wash.2Ala.1Cal.1Conn.1N.H.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 9 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)8 cases
State v. Davis, 827 P.2d 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Gilmer, 981 P.2d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Berlin, 911 P.2d 414 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Gamble, 155 P.3d 962 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Gamble, 137 Wash. App. 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(1)(a)81 cases
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005).“The State must prove all essential elements of the above two offenses in order to achieve a guilty verdict for second degree felony murder.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (2005).“The State must prove all essential elements of the above two offenses in order to achieve a guilty verdict for second degree felony murder.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Montoya, 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 1987).“On July 20, 1983, the prosecuting attorney filed an amended information which charged Montoya with first degree manslaughter under RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a) and stated that the maximum penalty was 10 years and/ or $20,000.”
State v. Berlin, 947 P.2d 700 (Wash. 1997).“RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a). The elements of manslaughter in the second degree are that the defendant, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person.”
State v. Gamble, 118 Wash. App. 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).“See RCW 9A.32.060(l)(a). *335 Gamble and others beat Carroll to death at a party in Vancouver, Washington, on March 26, 1999.”
Showing the top 5 of 81. More in the list view →
(1)(b)5 cases
State v. Lamy, 969 A.2d 451 (N.H. 2009).
Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013).
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
(2)4 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 979 P.2d 417 (Wash. 1999).“021 (setting maximum sentences); former RCW 9A.32.060 (first degree manslaughter); 2 RCW 9A.”
In re Breedlove, 979 P.2d 417 (Wash. 1999).
State Of Washington v. Skylar Nemetz, No. 48788-8 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018).
State Of Washington V. Ivan Lopez Gutierrez, No. 87378-4 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2025).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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