Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021 (2026)
Assault in the second degree
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree:
(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or
(b) Intentionally and unlawfully causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn quick child by intentionally and unlawfully inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child; or
(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or
(d) With intent to inflict bodily harm, administers to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or
(e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults another; or
(f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture; or
(g) Assaults another by strangulation or suffocation.
(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, assault in the second degree is a class B felony.
[ 2011 c 166 s 1; 2007 c 79 s 2; 2003 c 53 s 64; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 355; 1997 c 196 s 2. Prior: 1988 c 266 s 2; 1988 c 206 s 916; 1988 c 158 s 2; 1987 c 324 s 2; 1986 c 257 s 5.]
Notes:
Finding—2007 c 79: "The legislature finds that assault by strangulation may result in immobilization of a victim, may cause a loss of consciousness, injury, or even death, and has been a factor in a significant number of domestic violence related assaults and fatalities. While not limited to acts of assault against an intimate partner, assault by strangulation is often knowingly inflicted upon an intimate partner with the intent to commit physical injury, or substantial or great bodily harm. Strangulation is one of the most lethal forms of domestic violence. The particular cruelty of this offense and its potential effects upon a victim both physically and psychologically, merit its categorization as a ranked felony offense under chapter 9A.36 RCW." [ 2007 c 79 s 1.]
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Effective date—1988 c 266: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1988 c 266 s 3.]
Effective date—1988 c 206 ss 916, 917: "Sections 916 and 917 of this act shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1988 c 206 s 922.]
Effective date—1988 c 158: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Effective date—1987 c 324: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 680
cases (128 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005).
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005). “[4] The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution directs that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”
State v. McCreven, 284 P.3d 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.36.021(l)(a); Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473 -74 (citing Janes, 121 Wn.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (Wash. 2005). “The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution directs that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.”
State v. Ferguson, 15 P.3d 1271 (Wash. 2001). “320 indicates assault in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.021) with a seriousness level of IV; RCW 9.”
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). “[2] Petitioner further agreed to an additional charge of second-degree assault involving domestic violence, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9A.36.021(1)(c), 10.”
State v. Smith, 154 P.3d 873 (Wash. 2007). “However, the record shows plainly that the jury was instructed on only one, not multiple, means of committing second degree assault: assault of another with a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.”
State v. Kier, 194 P.3d 212 (Wash. 2008). “RCW 9A.36.021(1). I cannot agree with the majority that the jury somehow mistakenly found Ellison, riding in the passenger seat, was the (car) robbery victim, which would merge the two crimes and prevent Kier from two convictions.”
State Of Washington, V. Charles Freeman Christian, 489 P.3d 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “In Smith, our Supreme Court analyzed former RCW 9A.36.021(1) (1988), which contained six separate subsections representing the alternative means of committing the crime of assault in the second degree.”
United States v. Kenneth Door, 917 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019). “Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1). UNITED STATES V.”
State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “To support this argument, Hovig contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that MH's injury rose to the level of substantial bodily harm as RCW 9A.36.021 requires. We disagree. *323 ¶ 24 In his briefing, Hovig explores the evolution of Washington's…”
State v. Smith, 159 Wash. 2d 778 (Wash. 2007). “011 (first degree); RCW 9A.36.021 (second degree); RCW 9A.36.”
State v. Gamble, 118 Wash. App. 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “Here, we answer the question: What is the appropriate remedy following vacation of Gamble’s second degree felony murder by assault conviction? We hold that when the conviction of second degree felony murder is based on the death occurring as a result of an intentional assault…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1) — 51 cases
State Of Washington, V. Charles Freeman Christian, 489 P.3d 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “In Smith, our Supreme Court analyzed former RCW 9A.36.021(1) (1988), which contained six separate subsections representing the alternative means of committing the crime of assault in the second degree.”
United States v. Kenneth Door, 917 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019). “Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1). UNITED STATES V.”
State v. Smith, 154 P.3d 873 (Wash. 2007). “However, the record shows plainly that the jury was instructed on only one, not multiple, means of committing second degree assault: assault of another with a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.”
State v. Smith, 159 Wash. 2d 778 (Wash. 2007). “011 (first degree); RCW 9A.36.021 (second degree); RCW 9A.36.”
State v. Knight, 309 P.3d 776 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Crockett, 78 P.3d 658 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
Fabian v. King Cnty. (W.D. Wash. 2023).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(a) — 164 cases
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005). “[4] The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution directs that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (Wash. 2005). “The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution directs that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.”
State v. Keend, 166 P.3d 1268 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “To support this argument, Hovig contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that MH's injury rose to the level of substantial bodily harm as RCW 9A.36.021 requires. We disagree. *323 ¶ 24 In his briefing, Hovig explores the evolution of Washington's…”
State v. Fuller, 367 P.3d 1057 (Wash. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(b) — 3 cases
State v. Latham, 335 P.3d 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Kier, 194 P.3d 212 (Wash. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(c) — 179 cases
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). “[2] Petitioner further agreed to an additional charge of second-degree assault involving domestic violence, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9A.36.021(1)(c), 10.”
State v. Abuan, 257 P.3d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017).
State v. Eakins, 902 P.2d 1236 (Wash. 1995).
State v. Gonzales-Morales, 979 P.2d 826 (Wash. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Huddleston, 912 P.2d 1068 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
State of Washington v. Caleb Joel Stanley (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(e) — 20 cases
State v. Goins, 92 P.3d 181 (Wash. 2004).
State v. Leming, 138 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
United States v. Kenneth Door, 917 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019). “Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1). UNITED STATES V.”
State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
United States v. Robert Vederoff, 914 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(f) — 4 cases
State v. Trout, 105 P.3d 69 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Taylor, 996 P.2d 571 (Wash. 2000).
United States v. Carson (9th Cir. 2007).
State Of Washington v. Juwayne Pinckney (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(g) — 47 cases
State v. Peterson, 948 P.2d 381 (Wash. 1997).
State Of Washington, V. Charles Freeman Christian, 489 P.3d 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “In Smith, our Supreme Court analyzed former RCW 9A.36.021(1) (1988), which contained six separate subsections representing the alternative means of committing the crime of assault in the second degree.”
State v. Villanueva-Gonzalez, 329 P.3d 78 (Wash. 2014).
State v. Coryell, 483 P.3d 98 (Wash. 2021).
State v. Reed, 278 P.3d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(2) — 10 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of McWilliams, 340 P.3d 223 (Wash. 2014).
State v. Ward, 32 P.3d 1007 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Phillip Lamont Alexander (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State of Washington v. Julian Miguel Juarez (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State Of Washington v. Carlos Lima (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(2)(a) — 37 cases
State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350 (Wash. 2010).
State v. Aguirre, 229 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2010).
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Dawn Marie Sullivan, Appellant, 196 Wash. App. 277 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Breitung, 155 Wash. App. 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(2)(b) — 5 cases
State v. Higgins, 136 Wash. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Jose Luis Isidro-Soto (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State of Washington v. Clayton Dennis Jones (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
State Of Washington v. Michael Thomas Thrasher (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State Of Washington v. Jeremiah Charles Crowell (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(I)(a) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Alan Ross Hackney (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(a) — 5 cases
State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). “To support this argument, Hovig contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that MH's injury rose to the level of substantial bodily harm as RCW 9A.36.021 requires. We disagree. *323 ¶ 24 In his briefing, Hovig explores the evolution of Washington's…”
State Of Washington v. David Thompson (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Lonnie Tennant (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State Of Washington v. Fawn Lefay Little Sky (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
In Re The Pers. Restraint Petition Of Aaron W. Trotter (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(c) — 14 cases
In Re Crace, 236 P.3d 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Davis, 827 P.2d 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Baggett, 13 P.3d 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
State v. Hartzell, 221 P.3d 928 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(d) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Chad Daniel Sullivan (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(e) — 3 cases
State v. Goins, 54 P.3d 723 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Goins, 113 Wash. App. 723 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
State Of Washington v. Marcelis Christopher King (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(g) — 6 cases
State v. Jackson, 944 P.2d 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
State Of Washington, V Cynthia Sue Miller (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
In Re The Det. Of C.j. (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
In Re The Pers. Restraint Petition Of Aaron W. Trotter (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State of Washington v. Julio Cesar Pantoja (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(a) — 62 cases
State v. McCreven, 284 P.3d 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.36.021(l)(a); Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473 -74 (citing Janes, 121 Wn.”
State v. Gamble, 118 Wash. App. 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “Here, we answer the question: What is the appropriate remedy following vacation of Gamble’s second degree felony murder by assault conviction? We hold that when the conviction of second degree felony murder is based on the death occurring as a result of an intentional assault…”
State v. Keend, 140 Wash. App. 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Rich, 365 P.3d 746 (Wash. 2016).
State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(b) — 5 cases
State v. Kier, 194 P.3d 212 (Wash. 2008). “RCW 9A.36.021(1). I cannot agree with the majority that the jury somehow mistakenly found Ellison, riding in the passenger seat, was the (car) robbery victim, which would merge the two crimes and prevent Kier from two convictions.”
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Higgins, 136 Wash. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Davis, 827 P.2d 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(c) — 60 cases
State v. McCreven, 284 P.3d 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.36.021(l)(a); Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473 -74 (citing Janes, 121 Wn.”
State v. Kier, 194 P.3d 212 (Wash. 2008). “RCW 9A.36.021(1). I cannot agree with the majority that the jury somehow mistakenly found Ellison, riding in the passenger seat, was the (car) robbery victim, which would merge the two crimes and prevent Kier from two convictions.”
State v. Abuan, 161 Wash. App. 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Carlson, 828 P.2d 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Dawn Marie Sullivan, Appellant, 196 Wash. App. 277 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Higgins, 136 Wash. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State of Washington v. Rusty Joe Abrams (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(e) — 8 cases
State v. Ferguson, 15 P.3d 1271 (Wash. 2001). “320 indicates assault in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.021) with a seriousness level of IV; RCW 9.”
State v. Goins, 151 Wash. 2d 728 (Wash. 2004).
State v. Leming, 138 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Aguilar, 308 P.3d 778 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State v. Martin, 149 Wash. App. 689 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(f) — 4 cases
State v. Peterson, 133 Wash. 2d 885 (Wash. 1997).
United States v. Jeremy Alexander Carson, 486 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2007).
State v. Trout, 125 Wash. App. 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Taylor, 140 Wash. 2d 229 (Wash. 2000).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(l)(g) — 9 cases
State v. Rodriquez, 352 P.3d 200 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
State Of Washington v. Euran J. Woods, 393 P.3d 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Peterson, 133 Wash. 2d 885 (Wash. 1997).
State v. Stacy, 326 P.3d 136 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Brown, 802 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
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