Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.36
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031 (2026)

Assault in the third degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree:
(a) With intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself, herself, or another person, assaults another; or
(b) Assaults a person employed as a transit operator or driver, the immediate supervisor of a transit operator or driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, by a public or private transit company or a contracted transit service provider, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(c) Assaults a school bus driver, the immediate supervisor of a driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, employed by a school district transportation service or a private company under contract for transportation services with a school district, while the person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(d) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm; or
(e) Assaults a firefighter or other employee of a fire department, county fire marshal's office, county fire prevention bureau, or fire protection district who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering; or
(g) Assaults a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(h) Assaults a peace officer with a projectile stun gun; or
(i) Assaults a nurse, physician, or health care provider who was performing his or her nursing or health care duties at the time of the assault. For purposes of this subsection: "Nurse" means a person licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW; "physician" means a person licensed under chapter 18.57 or 18.71 RCW; and "health care provider" means a person certified under chapter 18.71 or 18.73 RCW who performs emergency medical services or a person regulated under Title 18 RCW and employed by, or contracting with, a hospital licensed under chapter 70.41 RCW; or
(j) Assaults a judicial officer, court-related employee, county clerk, or county clerk's employee, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault or as a result of that person's employment within the judicial system. For purposes of this subsection, "court-related employee" includes bailiffs, court reporters, judicial assistants, court managers, court managers' employees, and any other employee, regardless of title, who is engaged in equivalent functions; or
(k) Assaults a person located in a courtroom, jury room, judge's chamber, or any waiting area or corridor immediately adjacent to a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber. This section shall apply only: (i) During the times when a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber is being used for judicial purposes during court proceedings; and (ii) if signage was posted in compliance with RCW 2.28.200 at the time of the assault; or
(l) Is a licensed health care provider who implants or causes another to implant the provider's own gametes or reproductive material into a patient during an assisted reproduction procedure. For the purposes of this subsection, "gamete" means sperm, egg, or any part of a sperm or egg, and "reproductive material" means a human gamete or a human organism at any stage of development from fertilized ovum to embryo.
(2) Assault in the third degree is a class C felony.
[ 2024 c 220 s 1; 2013 c 256 s 1. Prior: 2011 c 336 s 359; 2011 c 238 s 1; 2005 c 458 s 1; 1999 c 328 s 1; 1998 c 94 s 1; 1997 c 172 s 1; 1996 c 266 s 1; 1990 c 236 s 1; 1989 c 169 s 1; 1988 c 158 s 3; 1986 c 257 s 6.]

Notes:

Effective date—1988 c 158: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 307 cases (58 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321 (Wash. 2000).
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State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 34× “55 Assault in the third degree is defined in RCW 9A.36.031, which provides in part: Assault in the third degree.”
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 8× “140 which provides: (1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d) or (f)…”
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 12× “Assault Convictions Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g))…”
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 24× “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
State v. Marohl, 246 P.3d 177 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 18× “*699 RCW 9A.36.031. 1 The statute does not define “other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.”
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 6× “¶ 38 I do not suggest that acts leading to the death of another person should be treated lightly.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 5× “2d at 614 (quoting RCW 9A.36.031(1)(b)). It is questionable whether such an assault should serve as the predicate felony for a second degree felony murder conviction.”
State v. Hopper, 822 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 6× “It is this special meaning of "assault" under Washington law that undercuts the majority's reasoning on this point.”
State v. Bauer, 329 P.3d 67 (Wash. 2014). · cites it 6× “” RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d). Bauer moved to dismiss pretrial under State v.”
State v. Armendariz, 156 P.3d 201 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 2× “120(20) expressly authorized a five-year no-contact order as part of Armendariz's sentence for assault.”
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 5× “¶10 Saunders contends that the terms “substantial pain” and “considerable suffering,” as used in RCW 9A.36.031, are unconstitutionally vague.”
State v. Mierz, 875 P.2d 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 9× “020(1) (raising premeditated murder to aggravated murder if the victim is a law enforcement officer performing official duties); RCW 9A.36.031 (providing special protection against assault for officers).”
Show all 307 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1) — 10 cases
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). “Assault Convictions Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g))…”
State v. Latham, 335 P.3d 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
State v. Ross, 863 P.2d 102 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Belleman, 856 P.2d 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(a) — 28 cases
State v. Godsey, 127 P.3d 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Hoffman, 804 P.2d 577 (Wash. 1991).
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). “Assault Convictions Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g))…”
State v. Garcia, 146 Wash. App. 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Garcia, 193 P.3d 181 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(b) — 6 cases
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005). “¶ 38 I do not suggest that acts leading to the death of another person should be treated lightly.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (Wash. 2005). “2d at 614 (quoting RCW 9A.36.031(1)(b)). It is questionable whether such an assault should serve as the predicate felony for a second degree felony murder conviction.”
State Of Washington, V. Chaz R. Butler (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington v. Khadim H. Gueye (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
In Re Pers. Restraint of Andress, 56 P.3d 981 (Wash. 2002).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(d) — 44 cases
State v. Gamble, 114 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2005). “¶ 38 I do not suggest that acts leading to the death of another person should be treated lightly.”
State v. Hopper, 822 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1992). “It is this special meaning of "assault" under Washington law that undercuts the majority's reasoning on this point.”
State v. Gamble, 154 Wash. 2d 457 (Wash. 2005). “2d at 614 (quoting RCW 9A.36.031(1)(b)). It is questionable whether such an assault should serve as the predicate felony for a second degree felony murder conviction.”
State v. Bauer, 329 P.3d 67 (Wash. 2014). “” RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d). Bauer moved to dismiss pretrial under State v.”
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “140 which provides: (1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d) or (f)…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(e) — 1 case
State Of Washington, V. Joseph Allen Shreve, 538 P.3d 958 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(f) — 35 cases
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “140 which provides: (1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d) or (f)…”
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “¶10 Saunders contends that the terms “substantial pain” and “considerable suffering,” as used in RCW 9A.36.031, are unconstitutionally vague.”
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
United States v. Lawrence, 627 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2010).
State v. Moreno, 132 P.3d 1137 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(g) — 77 cases
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). “Assault Convictions Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g))…”
State v. Tunney, 917 P.2d 95 (Wash. 1996).
State v. Finley, 982 P.2d 681 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Kolesnik, 146 Wash. App. 790 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Bush, 102 Wash. App. 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(h) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Edward Raymond Cruz (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(i) — 7 cases
State of Washington v. Edward Raymond Cruz (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington, V. A.T (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
In Re The Det. Of L.n. (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).
State Of Washington, V Terry L. Silbernagel (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
State Of Washington v. Trygve Nelson (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(1)(k) — 3 cases
State of Washington v. Steven Paul White (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State Of Washington v. Brandon Van Winkle (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State of Washington v. John Louis Vassallo Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(2) — 25 cases
State v. Armendariz, 156 P.3d 201 (Wash. 2007). “120(20) expressly authorized a five-year no-contact order as part of Armendariz's sentence for assault.”
State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash. 2d 106 (Wash. 2007).
State v. Davis, 846 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1993).
State v. Torngren, 147 Wash. App. 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Marohl, 246 P.3d 177 (Wash. 2010). “*699 RCW 9A.36.031. 1 The statute does not define “other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(a) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Dale Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(c) — 1 case
State v. Davis, 827 P.2d 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(d) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Skylar Nemetz (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(f) — 5 cases
State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “140 which provides: (1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d) or (f)…”
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State Of Washington v. Joe Joseph, 416 P.3d 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
United States v. Striet, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
State Of Washington v. Pablo Lara Bellon (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(g) — 3 cases
State v. Bush, 9 P.3d 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
Det. Of M.h. (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Blatt, 160 P.3d 1106 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(a) — 13 cases
State v. Godsey, 131 Wash. App. 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Belleman, 856 P.2d 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Calvin, 316 P.3d 496 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State v. Mierz, 875 P.2d 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). “020(1) (raising premeditated murder to aggravated murder if the victim is a law enforcement officer performing official duties); RCW 9A.36.031 (providing special protection against assault for officers).”
State v. Crider, 866 P.2d 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Thompson, 867 P.2d 691 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(c) — 2 cases
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
State v. Warren, 820 P.2d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(d) — 13 cases
State v. Marohl, 246 P.3d 177 (Wash. 2010). “*699 RCW 9A.36.031. 1 The statute does not define “other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.”
State v. Bauer, 329 P.3d 67 (Wash. 2014). “” RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d). Bauer moved to dismiss pretrial under State v.”
State v. Shepard, 275 P.3d 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Taylor, 140 Wash. 2d 229 (Wash. 2000).
State v. Lewis, 233 P.3d 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(e) — 1 case
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(f) — 14 cases
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “¶10 Saunders contends that the terms “substantial pain” and “considerable suffering,” as used in RCW 9A.36.031, are unconstitutionally vague.”
Marek Partyka, Petitioner v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, Respondent, 417 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2005).
State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
State v. Torngren, 147 Wash. App. 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(g) — 23 cases
State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321 (Wash. 2000). “55 Assault in the third degree is defined in RCW 9A.36.031, which provides in part: Assault in the third degree.”
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). “Assault Convictions Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g))…”
State v. Mierz, 875 P.2d 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). “020(1) (raising premeditated murder to aggravated murder if the victim is a law enforcement officer performing official duties); RCW 9A.36.031 (providing special protection against assault for officers).”
State v. Williams, 159 Wash. App. 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(h) — 2 cases
State v. Gray, 102 P.3d 814 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Brown, 972 P.2d 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “This conclusion is bolstered by other definitions of third degree assault contained in RCW 9A.36.031. For example, a person is guilty of third degree assault if he or she “[w]ith intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(i) — 1 case
State v. Hurst, 269 P.3d 1023 (Wash. 2012).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.031(l)(k) — 2 cases
State v. Manlove, 347 P.3d 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
State of Washington v. David Emory Manlove (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
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