Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.40
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060 (2026)

Custodial interference in the first degree

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section WA-LEGapp.leg.wa.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(1) A relative of a child under the age of eighteen or of an incompetent person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child or incompetent person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person and:
(a) Intends to hold the child or incompetent person permanently or for a protracted period; or
(b) Exposes the child or incompetent person to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or
(c) Causes the child or incompetent person to be removed from the state of usual residence; or
(d) Retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person in another state after expiration of any authorized visitation period with intent to intimidate or harass a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having lawful right to physical custody or to prevent a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person with lawful right to physical custody from regaining custody.
(2) A parent of a child is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child, with the intent to deny access, from the other parent having the lawful right to time with the child pursuant to a court order making residential provisions for the child, and:
(a) Intends to hold the child permanently or for a protracted period; or
(b) Exposes the child to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or
(c) Causes the child to be removed from the state of usual residence.
(3) A parent or other person acting under the directions of the parent is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent or other person intentionally takes, entices, retains, or conceals a child, under the age of eighteen years and for whom no lawful custody order or order making residential provisions for the child has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, from the other parent with intent to deprive the other parent from access to the child permanently or for a protracted period.
(4) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class C felony.
[ 2015 c 38 s 2; 1998 c 55 s 1; 1994 c 162 s 1; 1984 c 95 s 1.]

Notes:

Intent—2015 c 38: "It is the intent of the legislature to address the Washington supreme court's decision in State v. Veliz, 176 Wn.2d 849 (2013). The court held that a parent cannot be charged with custodial interference under RCW 9A.40.060(2) if a parent withholds the other parent from having access to the child in violation of residential provisions of a domestic violence protection order. The legislature intends that the provisions of RCW 9A.40.060(2) and 9A.40.070(2) be applicable in cases in which a court has entered any order making residential provisions for a child including, but not limited to, domestic violence protection orders that include such residential provisions." [ 2015 c 38 s 1.]
Severability—1984 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1984 c 95 s 8.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 45 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1986–2026 · leading case: State v. Veliz, 298 P.3d 75 (Wash. 2013).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Veliz, 298 P.3d 75 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 22× “8 It appears rather plainly that subsection (1) of RCW 9A.40.060 would have sufficed to charge Veliz without regard to the existence of a “court-ordered parenting plan.”
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 14× “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
State v. Boss, 223 P.3d 506 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 8× “Boss argues the trial court committed reversible error because jury instruction 10 omitted one express element (lawfulness of the custody order) and one implied element (her knowledge of CPS's right to custody of her daughter) of first degree custodial interference and jury…”
State v. Boss, 167 Wash. 2d 710 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 7× “¶1 This case involves a challenge to a conviction for first degree custodial interference pursuant to RCW 9A.40.060. Cynthia Boss was charged with intentionally denying Child Protective Services (CPS) access to her daughter, O.”
State v. Carver, 789 P.2d 306 (Wash. 1990). · cites it 4× “Appellant Peter Carver challenges the constitutionality of the custodial interference statute, RCW 9A.40.060, and maintains that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence of guilt to support a conviction for that offense.”
State v. Boss, 184 P.3d 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 5× “But neither Cornwall nor the statute it interprets have any bearing on RCW 9A.40.060. Nowhere in RCW 9A.40.060 does it state that the defendant is required to have knowledge of a custody order's validity in order to violate the statute's terms.”
State v. Boss, 144 Wash. App. 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 5× “But neither Cornwall nor the statute it interprets have any bearing on RCW 9A.40.060. Nowhere in RCW 9A.40.060 does it state that the defendant is required to have knowledge of a custody order’s validity in order to violate the statute’s terms.”
State v. Chambers, 237 P.3d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child [by an] agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of [the child], the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child [from an]…”
In Re: Catherine Maclaren v. Travis Maclaren, 440 P.3d 1055 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “78067-1-1/18 parent has been convicted of custodial interference in the first or second degree under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070. ROW 26.09.270 unequivocally states that the court shall deny the motion to modify the parenting plan unless the court finds the affidavits present…”
In re the Marriage of Grigsby, 57 P.3d 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “he other parent in substantial deviation from the parenting plan; (c) The child’s present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the…”
State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 5× “2 The State's brief argues that it does not matter whether a custody order had been entered or whether McCray was aware of such an order, because he was also guilty of custodial interference as defined by subsection (2) of RCW 9A.40.060. Subsection (2) makes it unlawful for a…”
In Re Marriage of Grigsby, 57 P.3d 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “in substantial deviation from the parenting plan; (c) The child's present environment is detrimental to the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child; or (d)…”
Show all 45 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(1) — 10 cases
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
State v. Veliz, 298 P.3d 75 (Wash. 2013). “8 It appears rather plainly that subsection (1) of RCW 9A.40.060 would have sufficed to charge Veliz without regard to the existence of a “court-ordered parenting plan.”
State v. Boss, 144 Wash. App. 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “But neither Cornwall nor the statute it interprets have any bearing on RCW 9A.40.060. Nowhere in RCW 9A.40.060 does it state that the defendant is required to have knowledge of a custody order’s validity in order to violate the statute’s terms.”
State v. Boss, 167 Wash. 2d 710 (Wash. 2009). “¶1 This case involves a challenge to a conviction for first degree custodial interference pursuant to RCW 9A.40.060. Cynthia Boss was charged with intentionally denying Child Protective Services (CPS) access to her daughter, O.”
State v. Boss, 223 P.3d 506 (Wash. 2009). “Boss argues the trial court committed reversible error because jury instruction 10 omitted one express element (lawfulness of the custody order) and one implied element (her knowledge of CPS's right to custody of her daughter) of first degree custodial interference and jury…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(1)(a) — 5 cases
State v. Chambers, 237 P.3d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child [by an] agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of [the child], the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child [from an]…”
State v. Boss, 184 P.3d 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “But neither Cornwall nor the statute it interprets have any bearing on RCW 9A.40.060. Nowhere in RCW 9A.40.060 does it state that the defendant is required to have knowledge of a custody order's validity in order to violate the statute's terms.”
State v. Boss, 223 P.3d 506 (Wash. 2009). “Boss argues the trial court committed reversible error because jury instruction 10 omitted one express element (lawfulness of the custody order) and one implied element (her knowledge of CPS's right to custody of her daughter) of first degree custodial interference and jury…”
State v. Chambers, 237 P.3d 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Stephanie Marelda Salyers (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(1)(c) — 1 case
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(1)(d) — 1 case
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(2) — 11 cases
State v. Veliz, 298 P.3d 75 (Wash. 2013). “8 It appears rather plainly that subsection (1) of RCW 9A.40.060 would have sufficed to charge Veliz without regard to the existence of a “court-ordered parenting plan.”
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
In Re the Marriage of James, 903 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Cawyer, 330 P.3d 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Veliz, 160 Wash. App. 396 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(2)(a) — 5 cases
State v. Justesen, 86 P.3d 1259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Justesen, 121 Wash. App. 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Veliz, 247 P.3d 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Veliz, 160 Wash. App. 396 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Veliz (Wash. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(2)(c) — 1 case
State v. Kirwin, 271 P.3d 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9A.40.060(1)-(3). The charging document filed against Ms.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(3) — 1 case
State v. Cline, 323 P.3d 614 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(l) — 1 case
State v. Veliz, 298 P.3d 75 (Wash. 2013). “8 It appears rather plainly that subsection (1) of RCW 9A.40.060 would have sufficed to charge Veliz without regard to the existence of a “court-ordered parenting plan.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.060(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). “2 The State's brief argues that it does not matter whether a custody order had been entered or whether McCray was aware of such an order, because he was also guilty of custodial interference as defined by subsection (2) of RCW 9A.40.060. Subsection (2) makes it unlawful for a…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.