Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.48
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.030 (2026)

Arson in the second degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously causes a fire or explosion which damages a building, or any structure or erection appurtenant to or joining any building, or any wharf, dock, machine, engine, automobile, or other motor vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, bridge, or trestle, or hay, grain, crop, or timber, whether cut or standing or any range land, or pasture land, or any fence, or any lumber, shingle, or other timber products, or any property.
(2) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 366; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.48.030.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1977–2024 · leading case: State v. Westling, 40 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2002).
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State v. Westling, 40 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 4× “Westling appealed, and argued that his three convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because he set only one fire. The State contended, however, that the three convictions were proper because the fire damaged three cars owned by three different individuals.”
State v. Westling, 145 Wash. 2d 607 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 4× “Westling appealed, and argued that his three convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because he set only one fire. The State contended, however, that the three convictions were proper because the fire damaged three cars owned by three different individuals.”
State v. Sutherby, 204 P.3d 916 (Wash. 2009). “3d 669 (quoting RCW 9A.48.030(1)). Citing to Smith, we held that "`any'" means "`every'" and "`all,'" and one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles.”
State v. Graham, 103 P.3d 1238 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 2× “” RCW 9A.48.030(1) (emphasis added). The analysis in Westling was straightforward: [T]he statute refers, in relevant part, to the causing of “a fire” *406 that damages “any automobile.”
State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash. 2d 870 (Wash. 2009). “2d at 611 (quoting RCW 9A.48.030(1)). Citing to Smith, we held that “ ‘any’ ” means “ ‘every’ ” and “ ‘all,’ ” and one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles.”
State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wash. 2d 402 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 2× “In Westling, this court looked to the “plain language” of RCW 9A.48.030(1) to determine its meaning.”
State v. DeSantiago, 68 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 2× “In Westling, this court looked to the "plain language" of RCW 9A.48.030(1) to determine its meaning.”
State v. Tvedt, 153 Wash. 2d 705 (Wash. 2005). “The unit of prosecution need not be defined by only a single characteristic or element of a crime and the legislature has not done so.”
State v. Tvedt, 107 P.3d 728 (Wash. 2005). “The unit of prosecution need not be defined by only a single characteristic or element of a crime and the legislature has not done so.”
United States v. Javier Velasquez-Reyes, A.K.A. Javier Alvarado-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2005). “Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.48.030 (1991), provides: Arson in the second degree (1) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree if he knowingly and maliciously causes a fire or explosion which damages a building, or any structure or erection appurtenant to or joining any building,…”
United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2010). “16-11-150; Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.48.030. 4 . See Ark.Code Ann.”
State v. Ose, 156 Wash. 2d 140 (Wash. 2005). “For example, in Westling, we considered the second degree arson statute and the difference between the word “a” and the word “any.” The statute at issue in Westling provided that “[a] person is guilty of arson in the second degree if he knowingly and maliciously causes a fire or…”
Show all 33 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.030(1) — 21 cases
State v. Westling, 40 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2002). “Westling appealed, and argued that his three convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because he set only one fire. The State contended, however, that the three convictions were proper because the fire damaged three cars owned by three different individuals.”
State v. Westling, 145 Wash. 2d 607 (Wash. 2002). “Westling appealed, and argued that his three convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because he set only one fire. The State contended, however, that the three convictions were proper because the fire damaged three cars owned by three different individuals.”
State v. Sutherby, 204 P.3d 916 (Wash. 2009). “3d 669 (quoting RCW 9A.48.030(1)). Citing to Smith, we held that "`any'" means "`every'" and "`all,'" and one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles.”
State v. Graham, 103 P.3d 1238 (Wash. 2005). “” RCW 9A.48.030(1) (emphasis added). The analysis in Westling was straightforward: [T]he statute refers, in relevant part, to the causing of “a fire” *406 that damages “any automobile.”
State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash. 2d 870 (Wash. 2009). “2d at 611 (quoting RCW 9A.48.030(1)). Citing to Smith, we held that “ ‘any’ ” means “ ‘every’ ” and “ ‘all,’ ” and one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles.”
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