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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9AChapter 9A.56

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.050 (2025)

Theft in the third degree

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1978–2026 100citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 100 opinions since 1978, 15 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (19 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.050 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 9A.56.050 12×subsections: (2) 8× (1) 2×cited by 162 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“RCW 9A.56.050; RCW 9A.20.020(2)). At the time he committed forgery in California in 1965, the maximum penalty was 14 years in the state prison with a minimum of 1 year in the county jail.”
The case’s holding
A life sentence for a third conviction of writing bad checks constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (State v. Fain).
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the nature of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the habitual criminal statute; (3) the punishment defendant would have received in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.” · 17 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Delmarter, 618 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 562 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“RCW 9A.56.050(1). There was substantial evidence in the record to establish the elements of attempted third degree theft.”
The case’s holding
Specific criminal intent may be inferred from conduct where that intent is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, circumstantial evidence is not to be considered any less reliable than direct evidence.” · 33 citing courts
3
GREENIn re the Recall of Feetham, 72 P.3d 741 (Wash. 2003).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“020, RCW 9A.56.050, and of his oath of office.”
The case’s holding
A recall petition is legally sufficient only if it alleges specific facts constituting a prima facie case of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.
4
GREENState v. Tinker, 118 P.3d 885 (Wash. 2005).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×subsections: (1)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“TINKER in King County, Washington, on or *886 about 17 December 2002, with intent to deprive another of property, to-wit: merchandise, did wrongfully obtain such property belonging to Play It Again Sports; contrary to RCW 9A.56.050 and 9A.56.020(1)(a).... Clerk's Papers at 1.”
The case’s holding
The value of property is not an essential element of third degree theft and need not be specified in the charging document.
Later courts cite it for
“a person is guilty of theft in the third degree if he or she commits theft of property or services which (a) does not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars in value.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Tinker, 155 Wash. 2d 219 (2005).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×subsections: (1)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“TINKER in King County, Washington, on or about 17 December 2002, with intent to deprive another of property, to-wit: merchandise, did wrongfully obtain such property belonging to Play It Again Sports; contrary to RCW 9A.56.050 and 9A.56.020(l)(a).... Clerk’s Papers at 1.”
6
REDState of Washington v. Gary Bruce Farnworth, 398 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 9A.56.050 4×subsections: (1)(a)cited by 4 cases
Reversed by State v. Farnworth (2018): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“RCW 9A.56.050. Currently this offense is capped at a maximum value of $750.”
Later courts cite it for
“the value of property, for purposes of the theft statute, is the total value of the property relinquished by the victim regardless of whether the victim received some offsetting value in exchange.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENState v. Larson, 365 P.3d 740 (Wash. 2015).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“RCW 9A.56.050. Third degree retail theft with “extenuating” circumstances is a class C felony.”
The case’s holding
The principle of ejusdem generis limits the scope of a statutory list of specific terms to items created for the specific purpose of overcoming security systems.
Later courts cite it for
“as 'the surest indication of legislative intent.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Goss, 378 P.3d 154 (Wash. 2016).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×subsections: (1)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“2d at 222 (quoting former RCW 9A.56.050(1) (1998)). The charging document did not allege a value for the snowboarding pants Tinker allegedly stole.”
The case’s holding
The lower age limit for second degree child molestation is not an essential element of the crime, so the State need not prove the victim's exact lower age bound.
Later courts cite it for
“the lower age limit (unlike the highest)” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENIn re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Placide, 414 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2018).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“040 and/or RCW 9A.56.050 and/or RCW 9A.56.060 ), and/or violated RPC 8.”
10
GREENIn re Recall Charges Against Feetham, 72 P.3d 741 (Wash. 2003).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“020, RCW 9A.56.050, and of his oath of office.”
11
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Keene, 622 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1981).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“Keene's unauthorized personal use of the $100 constituted third degree theft under RCW 9A.56.050, not forgery as defined in RCW 9A.”
The case’s holding
A defendant cannot deny facts in a plea statement on appeal if they previously affirmed to the trial court that they read and agreed with the statement's contents.
Later courts cite it for
“due process requirement that the trial judge orally question the defendant to determine that he or she understands the nature of the offense and the consequences of pleading guilty in order for the plea to be accepted” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Walters, 255 P.3d 835 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“020; RCW 9A.56.050; RCW 9A.76.040. The first element for obtaining an intoxication instruction was satisfied.”
The case’s holding
A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction when physical manifestations of intoxication provide sufficient evidence to infer that mental processing was affected.
Later courts cite it for
“that a motion to suppress likely would have been granted.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENCouch v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“021(2); RCW 9A.56.050; RCW 9.92.020. See former RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
A supervising officer must have a court order to take charge of an offender and may only enforce that order according to its terms and applicable statutes.
Later courts cite it for
“is not authorized to intervene, it cannot have a duty to do so.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Campbell, 888 P.2d 1185 (Wash. 1995).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 85 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“040 (property in excess of $250 but less than $1,500 is second degree); RCW 9A.56.050 (property less than $250 is third degree).”
The case’s holding
A charging document is constitutionally insufficient if it fails to allege an essential element of a crime required to provide notice for the preparation of a defense.
Later courts cite it for
“if the document cannot be construed to give notice of or to contain in some manner the essential elements of a crime, the most liberal reading cannot cure it.” · 10 citing courts
15
GREENState v. McCorkle, 945 P.2d 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“RCW 9A.56.050. Not comparable to a felony in Washington, the 1987 Oregon theft II conviction cannot be used in calculating McCorkle’s offender score.”
The case’s holding
Remand is the appropriate remedy if a defendant objects to the state's evidence regarding a prior offense classification and the state fails to meet its burden of proof (State v. McCorkle).
Later courts cite it for
“record does not clearly indicate that the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENState v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“The jury found McKague guilty of third degree theft, in violation of former RCW 9A.56.050 (1998), as a lesser included offense of first degree robbery, and guilty of second degree assault as charged.”
17
GREENState v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“040 sets forth the elements of felony theft, RCW 9A.56.050 sets forth the elements of misdemeanor theft.”
18
GREENState v. Davis, 116 Wash. App. 81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“040 sets forth the elements of felony theft, RCW 9A.56.050 sets forth the elements of misdemeanor theft.”
19
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Hilyard, 695 P.2d 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 9A.56.050 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“Keene's unauthorized personal use of the $100 constituted third degree theft under RCW 9A.56.050, not forgery as defined in RCW 9A.”
Later courts cite it for
“the duty imposed by court rule that the judge must be satisfied of the plea's factual basis should not be confused with the constitutional requirement that the accused have an understanding of the nature of the charge.” · 3 citing courts
20
REDState v. Leyda, 94 P.3d 397 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 9A.56.050 1×subsections: (1)cited by 16 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Leyda (2006): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case ("Therefore, we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision which affirms Leyda's four separate identity theft convictio…
Where it cites § 9A.56.050
“[16] RCW 9A.56.050(1). [17] Leyda contends this conclusion is inconsistent with our supreme court's decision in State v.”
The case’s holding
Each use of stolen identification or financial information constitutes a separate unit of prosecution under the identity theft statute.
Later courts cite it for
“a ceiling above which the offense is elevated to a higher degree, not a floor that must exist to support the charge or conviction.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 2013. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.79Wash.18W.D. Wash.29th Cir.1
By subsection
(1)19 cases
State v. Delmarter, 618 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1980).“RCW 9A.56.050(1). There was substantial evidence in the record to establish the elements of attempted third degree theft.”
State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980).“RCW 9A.56.050; RCW 9A.20.020(2)). At the time he committed forgery in California in 1965, the maximum penalty was 14 years in the state prison with a minimum of 1 year in the county jail.”
State v. Goss, 378 P.3d 154 (Wash. 2016).“2d at 222 (quoting former RCW 9A.56.050(1) (1998)). The charging document did not allege a value for the snowboarding pants Tinker allegedly stole.”
State v. Tinker, 118 P.3d 885 (Wash. 2005).“TINKER in King County, Washington, on or *886 about 17 December 2002, with intent to deprive another of property, to-wit: merchandise, did wrongfully obtain such property belonging to Play It Again Sports; contrary to RCW 9A.56.050 and 9A.56.020(1)(a).... Clerk's Papers at 1.”
State v. Tinker, 155 Wash. 2d 219 (2005).“TINKER in King County, Washington, on or about 17 December 2002, with intent to deprive another of property, to-wit: merchandise, did wrongfully obtain such property belonging to Play It Again Sports; contrary to RCW 9A.56.050 and 9A.56.020(l)(a).... Clerk’s Papers at 1.”
Showing the top 5 of 19. More in the list view →
(1)(a)13 cases
State v. Lust, 300 P.3d 846 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State of Washington v. Gary Bruce Farnworth, 398 P.3d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).“RCW 9A.56.050. Currently this offense is capped at a maximum value of $750.”
State v. George, 164 P.3d 506 (Wash. 2007).
State v. George, 161 Wash. 2d 203 (2007).
State of Washington v. David Michael Lust, No. 30786-7 (Wash. Ct. App. May 21, 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 13. More in the list view →
(2)4 cases
State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980).
State v. Norton, 606 P.2d 714 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Christopher, 583 P.2d 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
State Of Washington v. Joseph W. Webb, No. 70360-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2013).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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