Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.56
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section WA-LEGapp.leg.wa.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if:
(a) He or she possesses stolen property, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, which exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars in value but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value; or
(b) He or she possesses a stolen public record, writing or instrument kept, filed, or deposited according to law; or
(c) He or she possesses a stolen access device.
(2) Possessing stolen property in the second degree is a class C felony.
[ 2009 c 431 s 13; 2007 c 199 s 7; 1995 c 129 s 15 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1994 sp.s. c 7 s 434; 1987 c 140 s 4; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.56.160.]

Notes:

Applicability—2009 c 431: See note following RCW 4.24.230.
Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.
Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.
Finding—Intent—Severability—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.
Effective date—1994 sp.s. c 7 ss 401-410, 413-416, 418-437, and 439-460: See note following RCW 9.41.010.
Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 87 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: State v. Ose, 156 Wash. 2d 140 (Wash. 2005).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Ose, 156 Wash. 2d 140 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 10× “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Ose, 124 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 10× “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Pruitt, 187 P.3d 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 8× “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(1)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. Pruitt, 145 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 8× “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(l)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. Hayes, 262 P.3d 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “This can be seen by comparing it to RCW 9A.56.160, the statute that actually establishes the crime of possessing stolen property in the second degree.”
State v. Hall, 230 P.3d 1048 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 3× “There, the defendant pleaded guilty to 25 counts of second degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if.”
State v. Hall, 168 Wash. 2d 726 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 3× “There, the defendant pleaded guilty to 25 counts of second degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if.”
State v. Smith, 744 P.2d 1096 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 5× “140(1) must be included in the information with that of RCW 9A.56.160. To illustrate, conform the decision relied upon by the majority, State v.”
State v. McPhee, 156 Wash. App. 44 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 3× “And count VI alleged that McPhee knowingly possessed stolen property other than a firearm, to-wit: field binoculars and ivory tusks in violation of former RCW 9A.56.160(l)(a) (1995). 3 First Jury Trial ¶3 On November 27, 2007, McPhee’s jury trial on the original charges…”
State v. Schloredt, 987 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “2 The information charged Schloredt with possession of stolen credit cards in violation of RCW 9A.56.160, which prohibits possession of stolen “access devices.”
State v. Griffith, 195 P.3d 506 (Wash. 2008). “[2] Former RCW 9A.56.160 (1995) provides: (1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if: (a) He or she possesses stolen property other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.”
State v. Griffith, 164 Wash. 2d 960 (Wash. 2008). “Former RCW 9A.56.160 (1995) provides: (1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if: (a) He or she possesses stolen property other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.”
Show all 87 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(1) — 8 cases
State v. Ose, 156 Wash. 2d 140 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Ose, 124 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Hayes, 262 P.3d 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “This can be seen by comparing it to RCW 9A.56.160, the statute that actually establishes the crime of possessing stolen property in the second degree.”
State v. Rose, 282 P.3d 1087 (Wash. 2012).
State Of Washington v. Raymond R. Cruz (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(1)(a) — 12 cases
State v. Pruitt, 187 P.3d 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(1)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. McPhee, 230 P.3d 284 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State Of Washington v. Daniel John Walter Dougal (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington v. Pavel F. Zalozh (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State Of Washington v. Terez Lejuan Bardwell (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(1)(c) — 22 cases
State v. Ose, 124 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Pruitt, 187 P.3d 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(1)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. Hall, 230 P.3d 1048 (Wash. 2010). “There, the defendant pleaded guilty to 25 counts of second degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if.”
State v. Hall, 168 Wash. 2d 726 (Wash. 2010). “There, the defendant pleaded guilty to 25 counts of second degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if.”
State v. Barbee, 386 P.3d 729 (Wash. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(1)(d) — 1 case
State v. Smith, 744 P.2d 1096 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). “140(1) must be included in the information with that of RCW 9A.56.160. To illustrate, conform the decision relied upon by the majority, State v.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(1)(e) — 2 cases
State v. McReynolds, 71 P.3d 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 1141 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(2) — 5 cases
State v. Harris, 693 P.2d 750 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Linnemeyer, 776 P.2d 151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
State of Washington v. Maxwell Delvon Jones (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State Of Washington, V Vasiliy v. Slobodyanyuk (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State Of Washington v. Scott E. Collins (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(l)(a) — 7 cases
State v. McPhee, 156 Wash. App. 44 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “And count VI alleged that McPhee knowingly possessed stolen property other than a firearm, to-wit: field binoculars and ivory tusks in violation of former RCW 9A.56.160(l)(a) (1995). 3 First Jury Trial ¶3 On November 27, 2007, McPhee’s jury trial on the original charges…”
State v. Pruitt, 145 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(l)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. Jones, 591 P.2d 796 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
State v. Davidson, 584 P.2d 401 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
State v. Griffith, 151 P.3d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(l)(b) — 1 case
State v. Douglas, 751 P.2d 311 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(l)(c) — 10 cases
State v. Ose, 156 Wash. 2d 140 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 9A.56.160(1). In interpreting the above statute, Division Three, relying on State v.”
State v. Pruitt, 145 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “And the May 2007 judgment and sentence did not include any reference to RCW 9A.56.160(l)(a), the means based on the value of stolen property.”
State v. Hayes, 262 P.3d 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “This can be seen by comparing it to RCW 9A.56.160, the statute that actually establishes the crime of possessing stolen property in the second degree.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Shale, 160 Wash. 2d 489 (Wash. 2007).
State v. Schloredt, 987 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “2 The information charged Schloredt with possession of stolen credit cards in violation of RCW 9A.56.160, which prohibits possession of stolen “access devices.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(l)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Smith, 744 P.2d 1096 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). “140(1) must be included in the information with that of RCW 9A.56.160. To illustrate, conform the decision relied upon by the majority, State v.”
State v. Rhode, 821 P.2d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.160(l)(e) — 4 cases
State v. McReynolds, 117 Wash. App. 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Richards, 621 P.2d 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Williams, 840 P.2d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Steinbach, 667 P.2d 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.