Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010 (2026)
Definitions
✓ current as of May 2026
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The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Juror" means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court of this state, or tribal court, or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury; the term juror also includes any person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror;
(2) "Materially false statement" means any false statement oral or written, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding;
(3) "Oath" includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated; in this chapter, written statements shall be treated as if made under oath if:
(a) The statement was made on or pursuant to instructions on an official form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable;
(b) The statement recites that it was made under oath, the declarant was aware of such recitation at the time he or she made the statement, intended that the statement should be represented as a sworn statement, and the statement was in fact so represented by its delivery or utterance with the signed jurat of an officer authorized to administer oaths appended thereto; or
(c) It is a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, made within or outside the state of Washington, which is declared to be true under penalty of perjury as provided in chapter 5.50 RCW or under the code of any federally recognized tribe;
(4) "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard before any state, federally recognized tribal, or federal legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any tribal court, referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions;
(5) An oath is "required or authorized by law" when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision or when the oath is administered by a person authorized by state, a federally recognized tribe, or federal law to administer oaths;
(6) "Testimony" includes oral or written statements, documents, or any other material that may be offered by a witness in an official proceeding;
(7) "Tribal" means a federally recognized Indian tribe as defined by 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1301;
(8) "Tribal court" means an Indian court as defined by 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1301;
(9) "Tribal law" means the Constitution, codes, ordinance, regulations, case law, and customary law of a federally recognized tribe.
[ 2025 c 259 s 5; 2019 c 232 s 10; 2001 c 171 s 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 s 30; 1981 c 187 s 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.72.010.]
Notes:
Reviser's note: The definitions in this section have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k).
Purpose—2001 c 171: "The purpose of this act is to respond to State v. Thomas, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting, without changes, legislation relating to the crime of perjury, as amended in sections 30 and 31, chapter 285, Laws of 1995." [ 2001 c 171 s 1.]
Effective date—2001 c 171: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [May 7, 2001]." [ 2001 c 171 s 4.]
Effective date—1995 c 285: See RCW 48.30A.900.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1986–2024 · leading case: State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008).
State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008). “We must determine whether, under these cases, language in RCW 9A.72.010(1) is constitutionally infirm because it requires the trial judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law.”
State v. Abrams, 163 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2008). “We must determine whether, under these cases, language in RCW 9A.72.010(1) is constitutionally infirm because it requires the trial judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law.”
In re the Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “” RCW 9A.72.010(1). The Riccobono case was a discrimination suit brought by a former auditor’s employee, while the Bockwinkel case was a civil rights lawsuit arising from the ejection of two persons from the county’s ballot-counting facility.”
In Re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “" RCW 9A.72.010(1). With respect to the Bockwinkel deposition, in which Pearsall-Stipek misrepresented only her years of attendance at the University of Washington, it is quite clear that this falsehood was not a material statement.”
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “14 However, Dynan’s arguments focusing on the materiality of the undisclosed actual fee are inapposite because the real issue is whether statements Dynan submitted to the court (e.”
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “[14] However, Dynan's arguments focusing on the materiality of the undisclosed actual fee are inapposite because the real issue is whether statements Dynan submitted to the court (e.”
State Of Washington v. Yeshak K. Bedada, 463 P.3d 125 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “” RCW 9A.72.010(4). Here, Haile identified Bedada’s voice in a telephone call made from a jail telephone while Bedada was in jail, awaiting trial.”
State v. Dial, 720 P.2d 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). “030(1) states that: A person is guilty of perjury in the second degree if, with intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his duty, he makes a materially false statement, which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law.”
State v. Hovrud, 805 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “2d 73 (1978) on which the dissent relies, RCW 9A.72.010(3) defines the phrase "required or authorized by law", as follows: [a]n oath is "required or authorized by law" when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision .”
State v. Singh, 275 P.3d 1156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “” RCW 9A.72.010(1). ¶15 Heightened Proof. As recognized by the trial judge, the standard of proof in perjury proceedings is higher than in other criminal cases.”
State Of Washington, V. Frank Edmund Walton, 542 P.3d 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “While it does not appear from the record that the jury was provided an instruction on the meaning of “official proceeding,” RCW 9A.72.010(4) defines the phrase as, “a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official…”
State of Washington v. Claude L. Merritt (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “” RCW 9A.72.010(4). Both parties agree that the plain language of the tampering with physical evidence statute required the State to prove Merritt (1) destroyed, concealed, or altered physical evidence, (2) with reason to believe an official proceeding was about to begin and…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(1) — 12 cases
State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008). “We must determine whether, under these cases, language in RCW 9A.72.010(1) is constitutionally infirm because it requires the trial judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law.”
State v. Abrams, 163 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2008). “We must determine whether, under these cases, language in RCW 9A.72.010(1) is constitutionally infirm because it requires the trial judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law.”
In Re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “" RCW 9A.72.010(1). With respect to the Bockwinkel deposition, in which Pearsall-Stipek misrepresented only her years of attendance at the University of Washington, it is quite clear that this falsehood was not a material statement.”
In re the Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “” RCW 9A.72.010(1). The Riccobono case was a discrimination suit brought by a former auditor’s employee, while the Bockwinkel case was a civil rights lawsuit arising from the ejection of two persons from the county’s ballot-counting facility.”
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “14 However, Dynan’s arguments focusing on the materiality of the undisclosed actual fee are inapposite because the real issue is whether statements Dynan submitted to the court (e.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(2) — 2 cases
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “14 However, Dynan’s arguments focusing on the materiality of the undisclosed actual fee are inapposite because the real issue is whether statements Dynan submitted to the court (e.”
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “[14] However, Dynan's arguments focusing on the materiality of the undisclosed actual fee are inapposite because the real issue is whether statements Dynan submitted to the court (e.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(3) — 1 case
State v. Hovrud, 805 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “2d 73 (1978) on which the dissent relies, RCW 9A.72.010(3) defines the phrase "required or authorized by law", as follows: [a]n oath is "required or authorized by law" when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(4) — 6 cases
In re the Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “” RCW 9A.72.010(1). The Riccobono case was a discrimination suit brought by a former auditor’s employee, while the Bockwinkel case was a civil rights lawsuit arising from the ejection of two persons from the county’s ballot-counting facility.”
In Re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). “" RCW 9A.72.010(1). With respect to the Bockwinkel deposition, in which Pearsall-Stipek misrepresented only her years of attendance at the University of Washington, it is quite clear that this falsehood was not a material statement.”
State Of Washington v. Yeshak K. Bedada, 463 P.3d 125 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “” RCW 9A.72.010(4). Here, Haile identified Bedada’s voice in a telephone call made from a jail telephone while Bedada was in jail, awaiting trial.”
State Of Washington, V. Frank Edmund Walton, 542 P.3d 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “While it does not appear from the record that the jury was provided an instruction on the meaning of “official proceeding,” RCW 9A.72.010(4) defines the phrase as, “a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official…”
State of Washington v. Claude L. Merritt (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “” RCW 9A.72.010(4). Both parties agree that the plain language of the tampering with physical evidence statute required the State to prove Merritt (1) destroyed, concealed, or altered physical evidence, (2) with reason to believe an official proceeding was about to begin and…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(6) — 4 cases
State Of Washington v. Yeshak K. Bedada, 463 P.3d 125 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “” RCW 9A.72.010(4). Here, Haile identified Bedada’s voice in a telephone call made from a jail telephone while Bedada was in jail, awaiting trial.”
State Of Washington v. Jesse Butler (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
State of Washington v. William Ernesto Menjivar Hernandez (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
State of Washington v. Mitchell Eugene Crane (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.010(l) — 1 case
State v. Abrams, 163 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2008). “We must determine whether, under these cases, language in RCW 9A.72.010(1) is constitutionally infirm because it requires the trial judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law.”
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