Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.72
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.020 (2026)

Perjury in the first degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he or she makes a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law.
(2) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this crime, and the actor's mistaken belief that his or her statement was not material is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.
(3) Perjury in the first degree is a class B felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 391; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.72.020.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 38 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1978–2024 · leading case: State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008).
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State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 3× “A jury may determine materiality just as it does every other element in RCW 9A.72.020. In fact, Washington's pattern jury instructions already include materiality as an element of perjury.”
State v. Abrams, 163 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 3× “A jury may determine materiality just as it does every other element in RCW 9A.72.020. In fact, Washington’s pattern jury instructions already include materiality as an element of perjury.”
Blinka v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 36 P.3d 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “See RCW 9A.72.020; 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1). *1100 Our analysis of this issue, however, must also be informed by Thompson and its progeny and their cautious approach to application of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.”
State v. Olson, 594 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1979). · cites it 4× “[1] Exploring the rationale of the general rule, from which only Oklahoma appears to deviate, the United States Supreme Court said: The seminal modern treatment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy over-shadowed all others during the years…”
Blinka v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 109 Wash. App. 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “See RCW 9A.72.020; 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1). Our analysis of this issue, however, must also be informed by Thompson and its progeny and their cautious approach to application of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.”
In re the Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.72.020 defines the crime of peijury in the first degree, which is a class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of peijury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he makes a materially false statement which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by…”
In Re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 10 P.3d 1034 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.72.020 defines the crime of perjury in the first degree, which is a class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he makes a materially false statement which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by…”
Stiley v. Block, 925 P.2d 194 (Wash. 1996). “See RCW 9A.72.020 (perjury in the first degree) and RCW 9A.”
Sarausad v. State, 39 P.3d 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “" [16] RCW 9A.72.020 & .030 [17] RCW 9A.72.040 [18] RCW 9A.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Sarausad, 109 Wash. App. 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “” RCW 9A.72.020, .030. RCW 9A.72.040. RCW 9A.”
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “Following these standards, the presumptive sanction for counts I and II is disbarment as these counts involve false swearing under oath in an official proceeding, a criminal violation.”
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 98 P.3d 444 (Wash. 2004). “ABA Standards std. 5.11. Following these standards, the presumptive sanction for counts I and II is disbarment as these counts involve false swearing under oath in an official proceeding, a criminal violation.”
Show all 38 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.020(1) — 14 cases
State v. Abrams, 178 P.3d 1021 (Wash. 2008). “A jury may determine materiality just as it does every other element in RCW 9A.72.020. In fact, Washington's pattern jury instructions already include materiality as an element of perjury.”
State v. Abrams, 163 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2008). “A jury may determine materiality just as it does every other element in RCW 9A.72.020. In fact, Washington’s pattern jury instructions already include materiality as an element of perjury.”
State v. White, 644 P.2d 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
Dan Young, V. Todd S. Rayan, 533 P.3d 123 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
State Of Washington v. Joshua C. Frahm, 418 P.3d 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
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