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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9AChapter 9A.82

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.82.050 (2025)

Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree

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laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1989–2026 76citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 76 opinions since 1989, 13 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (43 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.82.050 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Owens, 323 P.3d 1030 (Wash. 2014).
cites § 9A.82.050 18×subsections: (1) 6× (2) 3×cited by 101 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“The Court of Appeals, Division One, held that RCW 9A.82.050 describes eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction.”
The case’s holding
A jury does not require a particularized instruction on unanimity regarding the specific means of an alternative means crime if the evidence supports each alternative means.
Later courts cite it for
“this right may also include the right to a unanimous jury determination as to the means by which the defendant committed the crime when the defendant is charged with (and the jury is instructed on) an alternative means crime.” · 9 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Lindsey, 311 P.3d 61 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 9A.82.050 18×subsections: (1) 10× (2) 4×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“¶13 RCW 9A.82.050 defines “first degree trafficking in stolen property”: (1) A person who knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of…”
The case’s holding
A statute describing multiple facets of criminal conduct within a single clause constitutes a single means of committing an offense rather than multiple alternative means.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute divided into subparts is more likely to be found to designate alternative means.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState Of Washington v. David Palaukekala Makekau, 378 P.3d 577 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 9A.82.050 6×subsections: (1) 5×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“The State points out that the words listed in the first clause of RCW 9A.82.050 do not address distinct acts because of how closely related those terms are.”
The case’s holding
Disjunctive terms in a possession statute are definitional rather than alternative means, requiring the state to prove only one term to sustain a conviction.
Later courts cite it for
“the only purpose of rcw 9a.56.140(1) is definitional-to provide a better understanding of the single element stated in rcw 9a.56.068(1).” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Strohm, 879 P.2d 962 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 9A.82.050 6×subsections: (2) 5×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“ever *308 sold parts from or tried to sell parts from the flatbed truck (count 8), there was no evidence that he placed parts from the stolen vehicle on Kneeland’s red Mustang 1 (count 15), and that since there was no evidence as to who stole the Mustangs from Southgate Ford the…”
The case’s holding
A jury must be unanimous regarding the alternative circumstances satisfying an offense but need not unanimously agree on the specific facts satisfying each alternative circumstance.
Later courts cite it for
“although the jury must be unanimous as to the alternative circumstances satisfying aggravated murder, it was not required to unanimously agree as to facts (alternative ways) satisfying each of the alternative circumstances.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Killingsworth, 269 P.3d 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 9A.82.050 2×subsections: (1)cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“RCW 9A.82.050; RCW 9A.82.010(19); State v.”
The case’s holding
Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“point out improbabilities or a lack of evidentiary support for the defense's theory of the case.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 9A.82.050 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 248 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“RCW 9A.82.050(2). Stolen property is defined as "property that has been obtained by theft, robbery, or extortion.”
The case’s holding
A court may dismiss charges in the furtherance of justice if the state's mismanagement forces a defendant to choose between their right to a speedy trial and effective counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“such prejudice includes the right to a speedy trial and the 'right to be represented by counsel who has had sufficient opportunity to adequately prepare a material part of his defense.” · 13 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Stearman, 348 P.3d 394 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
cites § 9A.82.050 3×subsections: (1)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“040 (conspiracy); RCW 9A.82.050 (trafficking). First degree trafficking can be proved in one of two ways: (1) knowingly initiating, organizing, planning, financing, directing, managing, or supervising the theft of property for sale to others or (2) knowingly trafficking in…”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion, such as by refusing to reconsider a renewed venue objection when trial evidence does not establish venue.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState v. Barboza-Cortes, 451 P.3d 707 (Wash. 2019).
cites § 9A.82.050 2×subsections: (1)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“96397-5 By way of example, this court in Sandholm explained that the mere listing of eight actions in the trafficking in stolen property statute, RCW 9A.82.050, did not create eight alternative means but only two true alternatives.”
9
GREENState v. Laico, 987 P.2d 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 9A.82.050 3×subsections: (2) 3×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“010(10) 2 created alternative means of trafficking in stolen property under RCW 9A.82.050(2). 3 We rejected this argument, concluding “that definition statutes do not create additional alternative means, ‘means within means’, of committing an offense.”
The case’s holding
The statutory definition of great bodily harm is merely descriptive and does not add alternative elements or means to the first degree assault statute.
Later courts cite it for
“the definition of 'great bodily harm' did not add elements to the first degree assault statute, but rather was intended to provide understanding.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Smith, 154 P.3d 873 (Wash. 2007).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (2)cited by 145 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“2d 962 (1994) (definition of "traffic" included in jury instruction did not create alternative means of trafficking in stolen property under RCW 9A.82.050(2) because the definition did not add to the criminal statute and its only purpose is to prove understanding of the term…”
Later courts cite it for
“substantial evidence of each of the relied- on alternative means must be presented.” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Smith, 159 Wash. 2d 778 (2007).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (2)cited by 144 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“2d 962 (1994) (definition of “traffic” included in jury instruction did not create alternative means of trafficking in stolen property under RCW 9A.82.050(2) because the definition did not add to the criminal statute and its only purpose is to prove understanding of the term…”
The case’s holding
Common law definitions of assault provided in a jury instruction do not constitute alternative means of committing the crime and do not trigger the alternative means doctrine.
12
GREENState Of Washington v. Koran Butler, 374 P.3d 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 9A.82.050 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“” RCW 9A.82.050(1). There, the defendant argued that the eight different verbs articulated eight alternative means for committing the crime of first degree trafficking in stolen property.”
Later courts cite it for
“because no single action in the statute could be completed without simultaneously completing at least one other action, the various acts are too similar to constitute distinct alternative means.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENState v. Sandholm, 364 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2015).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“Similarly, in Owens , we held that the trafficking in stolen property statute, RCW 9A.82.050, 3 describes two—not eight—alternative means to commit the offense.”
The case’s holding
The driving under the influence statute does not create alternative means because its subsections describe facets of the same criminal conduct rather than distinct acts.
Later courts cite it for
“in alternative means cases, where the criminal offense can be committed in more than one way, we have announced a rule that an expression of jury unanimity is not required provided each alternative means presented to the jury is supported by sufficient evidence.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Hermann, 138 Wash. App. 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (1)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“¶22 A defendant “who knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree.”
15
GREENState v. Hermann, 158 P.3d 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (1)cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“" RCW 9A.82.050(1). "Traffic" is defined as "to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of stolen property to another person.”
The case’s holding
A trial court errs by instructing the jury that evidence of retail price paid is sufficient to establish the value of stolen property.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining the value of an item, evidence of price paid is entitled to great weight.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENState v. Hayes, 262 P.3d 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“” 6 This notation reflected an apparent concession by the State to the defense argument that the convictions had to be merged either because of a double jeopardy problem 7 or because of the mandatory joinder provision in RCW 9A.82.050. 8 Each conviction was listed separately.”
The case’s holding
A defendant cannot be convicted of leading organized crime through accomplice liability because the statute requires the defendant to personally organize, manage, direct, supervise, or finance the group.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant does not establish ineffective assistance simply by identifying an instruction that would have likely been given had it been requested.” · 1 citing court
17
YELLOWState v. Fleming, 877 P.2d 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (2)cited by 48 cases
Overruled by Washington v. Recuenco on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“By amended information, the charge was changed to first degree trafficking in stolen property: [D]uring March or April, 1989, in Skagit County, Washington, [Fleming] did knowingly initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, or supervise the theft of personal property,…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may use market value fluctuations to determine restitution if the evidence provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss without relying on mere speculation.
Later courts cite it for
“need not be established with specific accuracy.” · 6 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Al-Hamdani, 109 Wash. App. 599 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (2)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“010(10) are merely factual circumstances which support the traffics alternative under RCW 9A.82.050(2). Thus, there is no requirement that the jurors agree on the facts supporting the “traffics” alternative means of committing the offense of “Trafficking in stolen property”.”
19
GREENState Of Washington v. Llewellyn Roy, 466 P.3d 1142 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 9A.82.050 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“In Owens, the court addressed RCW 9A.82.050(1), which prohibits trafficking in stolen property.”
20
GREENState v. Al-Hamdani, 36 P.3d 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 9A.82.050 1×subsections: (2)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 9A.82.050
“010(10) are merely factual circumstances which support the traffics alternative under RCW 9A.82.050(2). Thus, there is no requirement that the jurors agree on the facts supporting the "traffics" alternative means of committing the offense of "Trafficking in Stolen Property.”
The case’s holding
Mental incapacity and physical helplessness are not alternative means of committing second degree rape but definitional ways a victim may be incapable of consent, and extreme intoxication can establish incapacity.
Later courts cite it for
“stumbling, vomiting, and passing in and out of consciousness . . . .” · 3 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198920072026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 2014. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.67Wash.9
By subsection
(1)43 cases
State v. Lindsey, 311 P.3d 61 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).“¶13 RCW 9A.82.050 defines “first degree trafficking in stolen property”: (1) A person who knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of…”
State Of Washington v. David Palaukekala Makekau, 378 P.3d 577 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).“The State points out that the words listed in the first clause of RCW 9A.82.050 do not address distinct acts because of how closely related those terms are.”
State v. Owens, 323 P.3d 1030 (Wash. 2014).“The Court of Appeals, Division One, held that RCW 9A.82.050 describes eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction.”
State v. Killingsworth, 269 P.3d 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).“RCW 9A.82.050; RCW 9A.82.010(19); State v.”
State Of Washington v. Koran Butler, 374 P.3d 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).“” RCW 9A.82.050(1). There, the defendant argued that the eight different verbs articulated eight alternative means for committing the crime of first degree trafficking in stolen property.”
Showing the top 5 of 43. More in the list view →
(2)14 cases
State v. Owens, 323 P.3d 1030 (Wash. 2014).
State v. Lindsey, 311 P.3d 61 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State v. Strohm, 879 P.2d 962 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).“ever *308 sold parts from or tried to sell parts from the flatbed truck (count 8), there was no evidence that he placed parts from the stolen vehicle on Kneeland’s red Mustang 1 (count 15), and that since there was no evidence as to who stole the Mustangs from Southgate Ford the…”
State v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1997).“RCW 9A.82.050(2). Stolen property is defined as "property that has been obtained by theft, robbery, or extortion.”
State v. Laico, 987 P.2d 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).“010(10) 2 created alternative means of trafficking in stolen property under RCW 9A.82.050(2). 3 We rejected this argument, concluding “that definition statutes do not create additional alternative means, ‘means within means’, of committing an offense.”
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →

Show all 76 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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