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Wis. Stat.Chapter 135 — Dealership Practices

Wis. Stat. § 135.03 (2026)

Cancellation and alteration of dealerships

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1976–2026 103citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 103 opinions since 1976, 13 of them in the last five years.

135.03135.03 Cancellation and alteration of dealerships. No grantor, directly or through any officer, agent or employee, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause. The burden of proving good cause is on the grantor.
135.03 HistoryHistory: 1973 c. 179; 1977 c. 171.
135.03 AnnotationA grantor may cancel, terminate, or non-renew a dealership if the dealer refuses to accept changes that are essential, reasonable, and not discriminatory. A dealer’s failure to substantially comply with the changes constitutes good cause. Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, 147 Wis. 2d 308, 433 N.W.2d 8 (1988).
135.03 AnnotationA drug supplier violated this section by terminating without good cause all dealership agreements with independently owned pharmacies in the state. Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Service, Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345 (1985).
135.03 AnnotationThis chapter did not apply to a grantor’s action that was due to business exigencies unrelated to the dealer and was done in a nondiscriminatory manner. Remus v. Amoco Oil Co., 794 F.2d 1238 (1986).
135.03 AnnotationEconomic duress may serve as a basis for a claim of constructive termination of a dealership. JPM, Inc. v. John Deere, 94 F.3d 270 (1996).
135.03 AnnotationA grantor’s substantial loss of money under a dealership relationship may constitute “good cause” for changes in the contract, including termination. Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Electronics, Inc., 142 F.3d 373 (1998).
135.03 AnnotationThis chapter is applicable to nonprofit grantors. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of America, 646 F.3d 983 (2011).
135.03 AnnotationA change in credit terms was a change in a dealer’s “competitive circumstances.” Van v. Mobil Oil Corp., 515 F. Supp. 487 (1981).
135.03 AnnotationThis section did not apply when a grantor withdrew in a nondiscriminatory fashion from a product market on a large geographic scale. A 90-day notice was required. St. Joseph Equipment v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1245 (1982).
135.03 AnnotationFranchisees failed to meet their burden of proof that their competitive circumstances would be substantially changed by a new agreement. Bresler’s 33 Flavors Franchising Corp. v. Wokosin, 591 F. Supp. 1533 (1984).
135.03 AnnotationGood cause for termination includes failure to achieve reasonable sales goals. L.O. Distributors, Inc. v. Speed Queen Co., 611 F. Supp. 1569 (1985).
135.03 AnnotationFederal law preempts this chapter in petroleum franchise cases. Baker v. Amoco Oil Co., 761 F. Supp. 1386 (1991).
135.03 AnnotationWhen parties continue their relations after the term of a dealership contract has expired, the contract has been renewed for another period of the same length. Praefke Auto Electric & Battery Co. v. Tecumseh Products, Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 899 (2000).
135.03 AnnotationReversed on other grounds. 255 F.3d 460 (2001).
135.03 AnnotationPlaintiffs could proceed under this chapter if they could adduce evidence either that defendant made a change in the competitive circumstances of their dealership agreements that had a discriminatory effect on them or that defendant’s actions were intended to eliminate them or all of its dealers from the state. It is critical that plaintiff-dealers show an intent to terminate on the part of the grantor. Although it would not be enough to show that the grantor made bad management decisions; it might be enough if the plaintiff-dealers can show that the bad decisions were a cover for an intent to slough off the dealers and take over the markets they had developed. Conrad’s Sentry, Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (2005).
135.03 AnnotationAssignment of a second distributor in Wisconsin did not breach the agreement or cause a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of the nonexclusive dealership agreement in violation of this section. However, the defendant’s assignment of a second distributorship was a violation of s. 135.04 because it caused a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of the plaintiff’s truck blower distributorship and the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with 90 days’ written notice. Wisconsin Compressed Air Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 992 (2008).
135.03 AnnotationWhen an action becomes so egregious as to amount to constructive termination of the dealership this section is violated. Constructive termination of a dealership agreement can occur when the grantor takes actions that amount to an effective end to the commercially meaningful aspects of the dealership relationship, regardless of whether the formal contractual relationship between the parties continues in force. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of America, 700 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (2011).
135.03 AnnotationAffirmed in part, reversed in part. 646 F.3d 983 (2011).
135.03 Annotation“Good cause” is not limited to the statutory definition of the term under s. 135.02 (4). A grantor’s own circumstances can constitute good cause for reasonable, essential, and nondiscriminatory changes in the way it does business with dealers. To show good cause for making a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement, the grantor must demonstrate: 1) an objectively ascertainable need for change; 2) a proportionate response to that need; and (3) a nondiscriminatory action.” This chapter makes no distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit entities, and, as such, the court cannot judicially craft a lower threshold for when not-for-profit organizations wish to substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of America, 700 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (2011).
135.03 AnnotationAffirmed in part, reversed in part. 646 F.3d 983 (2011).
135.03 AnnotationConstructive Termination Under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. Cross & Janssen. Wis. Law. June 1997.
The 20 cases that cite Wis. Stat. § 135.03 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENWinebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 2018 WI 60, 914 N.W.2d 631.
cites § 135.03 16×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“See Wis. Stat. § 135.03 . ¶3 Winebow unilaterally terminated its relationship with Capitol-Husting Co.”
The case’s holding
Appellate courts should resolve appeals on the narrowest possible grounds, deciding no broader question than the case requires.
Later courts cite it for
“legislative intent behind enactment of a law . . . cannot govern statutory interpretation. rather, our analysis must focus on the statutory language itself.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENSuper Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 135.03 19×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“" Cahak argues that Super Valu's announcement that it was planning to open another store in the area "substantially changed the competitive circumstances of D-Mart" in violation of sec. 135.03, Stats. We disagree. Cahak made the same argument to the trial court, and the court…”
The case’s holding
A party does not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by exercising rights specifically authorized by the terms of an agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“compliance with the express terms of the dealership agreement cannot, under the circumstances of this case, give rise to a violation of sec. 135.03.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENZiegler Co. v. Rexnord, 433 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1988).
cites § 135.03 20×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Section 135.03, Stats., [1] gives a grantor the right to terminate, cancel, or fail to renew a dealership for "good cause.”
The case’s holding
A grantor's economic circumstances may constitute good cause to alter its method of doing business with its dealers if the changes are essential, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.
Later courts cite it for
“the grantor's economic circumstances may constitute good cause to alter its method of doing business with its dealers, but such changes must be essential, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENJungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. 1996).
cites § 135.03 13×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“04 so as to harmonize what the court felt was an ambiguous section with Wis. Stat. § 135.03 , while still remaining within the meaning and intent of the legislature.”
The case’s holding
A grantor must provide ninety days' prior written notice when its actions substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership, even if those actions are expressly authorized by contract.
5
GREENThomas F. Benson v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 65, 897 N.W.2d 16.
cites § 135.03 8×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“For instance, grantors are prohibited from "terminat[ing], cancel[ling], fail[ing] to renew or substantially chang[ing] the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause," Wis. Stat. § 135.03 , and usually must provide "at least 90 days' prior written…”
The case’s holding
Courts do not apply the canon of noscitur a sociis when the statutory term is unambiguous (interpreting state statute and declining to use noscitur a sociis when word corporation is not unclear).
Later courts cite it for
“have typically divided the statutory language into three parts: (1) the existence of a contract or agreement between two or more persons; (2) by which a person is granted one of the rights specified; and (3) in which there is the requisite 'community of interest.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENLee Beverage Co. v. I.S.C. Wines of California, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
cites § 135.03 16×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“(“United”), terminated, cancelled or substantially changed the plaintiff’s distributorship of wines and brandies without good cause in violation of Wis.Stat. § 135.03. The plaintiff has further alleged that the defendants violated the notice requirements set forth in Wis.”
7
GREENSt. Joseph Equip. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1245 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
cites § 135.03 10×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“The withdrawal is alleged to be a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of the Dealership Agreement which, under the terms of § 135.03, Wis.Stats., cannot be done without “good cause.”
The case’s holding
A grantor's non-discriminatory withdrawal from a product market over a large geographic area, without more, does not violate the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law's good-cause requirement, though statutory notice still applies.
Later courts cite it for
“in cases where ... the grantor undertakes a non-discriminatory withdrawal from a product market on a large geographic scale.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENWisconsin Compressed Air Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 992 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
cites § 135.03 21×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims of breach of contract and its statutory claims that plaintiff violated Wis. Stat. §§ 135.03 and 135.04 of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law by assigning a second distributor in Wisconsin; plaintiff has filed…”
cites § 135.03 2×cited by 378 cases
Abrogated by Nken v. Holder on other grounds: 13 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 135.03
“In defense of its actions, GSUSA argues, first, that it is not changing the competitive circumstances of Manitou’s agreement with GSUSA, and, alternatively, that if GSUSA is doing so, it is with good cause. For the following reasons, we conclude that Manitou has a…”
The case’s holding
A preliminary injunction requires a showing of irreparable harm, inadequate legal remedies, and a likelihood of success on the merits, with the balance of harms weighing on a sliding scale.
Later courts cite it for
“specifically, the court weighs the irreparable harm that the moving party would endure without the protection of the preliminary injunction against any irreparable harm the nonmoving party would suffer if the court were to grant the requested relief.” · 31 citing courts
10
GREENDesigns in Med., Inc. v. Xomed, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
cites § 135.03 14×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Under Wis.Stat. § 135.03: No grantor, directly or through any officer, agent or employe, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause.”
11
GREENH. Phillips Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
cites § 135.03 9×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Section 135.03 of the original statute prohibited cancellation or alteration, without good cause, of dealerships entered into after its effective date.”
Later courts cite it for
“i suggest that it would amount to something like this: we legislators desire the statute to apply to all dealerships, whenever granted; we recognize that constitutional questions exist with respect to its application to dealerships granted prior to april 5, 1974; we abandon our independent responsibility to construe and to honor constitutional limits upon our power; we leave it to the courts to limit application if they decide it must be limited.” · 1 citing court
cites § 135.03 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Under Wis.Stat. § 135.03: No grantor, directly or through any officer, agent or employe, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause.”
Later courts cite it for
“reduction of business perhaps can be compensated by money, but the destruction of a business cannot be compensated with money” · 1 citing court
13
GREENCent. Corp. v. Rsch. Prods. Corp., 2004 WI 76, 681 N.W.2d 178.
cites § 135.03 3×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“" Central alleged that Research's decision to terminate the parties' relationship violated Wis. Stat. § 135.03 2 since there was no good cause to terminate the dealership arrangement.”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is improper when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether a community of interest exists under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.
Later courts cite it for
“an issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” · 6 citing courts
14
GREENKealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
cites § 135.03 5×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“§ 135.03. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the language of the statute as it was originally enacted, that pre-April 5, 1974 agreements were not entitled to coverage under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.”
The case’s holding
The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law bars a grantor from terminating a dealership without statutory good cause, even in nondiscriminatory statewide terminations for business reasons, recognizing the legislature's concern with dealer-grantor power imbalance.
cites § 135.03 31×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 135.03
“” Wis. Stat. § 135.03 . The plaintiff contends that GSUSA’s attempt to eliminate sixty percent of Manitou’s jurisdiction, prevented only by the preliminary injunction, would have “terminated, canceled, failed to re *1074 new, or substantially changed the competitive…”
16
GREENKinn v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 582 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
cites § 135.03 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“When a dealership agreement provides for nonexclusivity, furthermore, the appointment of a second nonexclusive *685 dealer within the territory of an existing dealer does not change the competitive circumstances of the dealership agreement contrary to Wis.Stat. § 135.03. See…”
17
GREENKania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 300 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1981).
cites § 135.03 2×cited by 112 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“The plaintiff in his request for a permanent injunction alleged that on March 19, 1979, the defendant gave a thirty-day written notice of termination of a written contract without reciting good cause in violation of sec. 135.03, Stats., 1 and failing to comply with the 90-day…”
The case’s holding
The construction of a written contract is a question of law for the court in the absence of a claim of ambiguity.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a claim of ambiguity, which might require extrinsic evidence, the construction of a written contract is only a question of law for the court.” · 2 citing courts
18
REDJungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 135.03 12×cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc. (1996): the Wisconsin Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 135.03
“We do so mindful that the WFDL is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying remedial purposes and policies.”
19
GREENBrauman Paper Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 563 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
cites § 135.03 6×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“CONGOLEUM CORPORATION Plaintiff’s claim against Congoleum is founded upon Wis.Stat. § 135.03, which provides: No grantor, directly or through any officer, agent or employe, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership…”
20
GREENTele-Port, Inc. v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 2001 WI App 261, 637 N.W.2d 782.
cites § 135.03 3×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 135.03
“Tele-Port asserts that Ameritech's alleged preferential treatment of Car Phones + violated provisions of Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Law, specifically Wis. Stat. §§ 135.03 and 135.04, by changing the competitive circumstances of Tele-Port's dealership agreement with Ameritech.”

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Citing cases by year
197620012026

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 1981. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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E.D. Wis.42W.D. Wis.207th Cir.12Wis.12Wis. Ct. App.9D. Minn.2Bankr. W.D. Wis.2D. Me.1

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