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Wis. Stat.Chapter 893 — Limitations of Commencement of Actions and Proceedings; Procedure for Claims Against Governmental Units

Wis. Stat. § 893.16 (2026)

Person under disability

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1967–2026 60citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 60 opinions since 1967, 16 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (19 cases).

893.16893.16 Person under disability.
893.16(1)(1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues, either under the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers; or mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, except that where the disability is due to mental illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years.
893.16(2)(2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of limitation otherwise prescribed.
893.16(3)(3) A disability does not exist, for the purposes of this section, unless it existed when the cause of action accrues.
893.16(4)(4) When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the time the cause of action accrues, the 2-year period specified in sub. (1) does not begin until they all are removed.
893.16(5)(5) This section applies only to statutes in this chapter limiting the time for commencement of an action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim except it does not apply to:
893.16(5)(a)(a) Actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for escape;
893.16(5)(b)(b) Extend the time limited by s. 893.33, 893.41, 893.59, 893.62, 893.73 to 893.76, 893.77 (3), 893.86 or 893.91 or subch. VIII for commencement of an action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim; or
893.16(5)(c)(c) A cause of action which accrues prior to July 1, 1980.
893.16 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 1997 a. 133.
893.16 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is based on present ss. 893.135, 893.33, 893.37 and 893.38. Previous ss. 893.135 and 893.33 stated that the time of disability is not counted as the running of a statute of limitation and further stated that an action could be brought within a specified time after the disability ceased. This is inherently inconsistent and is replaced in s. 893.16 by the simple provision that the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases. Changes from previous s. 893.135 are:
893.16 Note(a) The period within which to sue after the period of disability ends is reduced from 5 years to 2 years.
893.16 Note(b) The maximum extension time available to those under disability of insanity or imprisonment is limited to 5 years. This means that such individuals must sue within 5 years after the basic applicable statute of limitations would have run against one not under disability, or within 2 years after the disability ends, whichever period is shorter.
893.16 Note(c) The phrase in previous s. 893.135, “at the time such title shall first descend or accrue” is changed to “at the time the cause of action accrues,” and this is reinforced by subsection (3). Despite appearances, this represents no change in substance because of the decision in Swearingen v. Roberts, 39 Wis. 462 (1876).
893.16 NoteOther changes include:
893.16 Note(a) A specific provision provides that no limitation period is shortened by the application of this section. This represents no substantive change.
893.16 Note(b) In view of the 5-year extension provision reasons for excluding those imprisoned for life from the benefits of the disability provision disappear and the exclusion has been dropped.
893.16 Note(c) The period within which to sue provided in previous s. 893.33 has been increased from one year to 2 years.
893.16 NoteTo illustrate some of the effects of these revisions:
893.16 Note(a) If a statute of limitation has run on a cause of action of a minor for a personal injury the minor would have one year to commence an action after attaining age 18 under previous s. 893.33. Under s. 893.16 the minor has 2 years to commence an action after attaining age 18.
893.16 Note(b) If a minor has a cause of action affecting title to real estate and the statute of limitation has run the minor has 5 years to commence an action after attaining age 18 under previous s. 893.135. Under s. 893.16 the minor has 2 years to commence the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.16 AnnotationSub. (1) is effective to toll the running of a statute of limitations even when, under s. 893.07, the plaintiff would be barred from bringing suit under applicable foreign law. Scott v. First State Insurance Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990).
893.16 AnnotationIf a party wishes the benefit of the disability tolling statute, then the party does not get the benefit of the discovery rule. Kilaab v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 198 Wis. 2d 699, 543 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1995).
893.16 AnnotationInjury from intentional acts of sexual assault against minors and the cause of any injury should have been discovered, as a matter of law, at the time of the assaults. A claim of repressed memory does not indefinitely toll the statute of limitations regardless of the victim’s minority or the position of trust occupied by the alleged perpetrator. Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997), 94-0423.
893.16 AnnotationParents’ claims for injury resulting from the sexual assault of their child accrue when the child’s claims accrue, regardless of when the parents learn of their claim. Joseph W. v. Catholic Diocese of Madison, 212 Wis. 2d 925, 569 N.W.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2220.
893.16 AnnotationUnder sub. (1), “mental illness” is a mental condition that renders a person functionally unable to understand or appreciate the situation giving rise to the legal claim so that the person can assert legal rights or functionally unable to understand legal rights and appreciate the need to assert them. Legal consultation and filings are probative of a plaintiff’s mental health and functional ability to appreciate and act upon the plaintiff’s legal rights. Storm v. Legion Insurance Co., 2003 WI 120, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353, 01-1139.
893.16 AnnotationDeath constitutes a cessation of disability under this section. Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2005 WI 64, 281 Wis. 2d 99, 697 N.W.2d 36, 03-2164.
893.16 AnnotationThis section does not apply to a negligence claim alleging injury to a developmentally disabled child caused by a health care provider. The legislature has not provided a statute of limitations for claims against health care providers alleging injury to a developmentally disabled child. Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Foundation, Inc., 2005 WI 171, 286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853, 03-1307.
893.16 AnnotationStorm, 2003 WI 120, does not stand for the proposition that sub. (1) tolls the three-year period of limitation under s. 893.555 (2) (a) when a claimant survives one month after an injury. Rather, the Storm court’s use of the term “toll” reflects the practical effect of sub. (1) under circumstances in which a claimant’s disability never ceases. In that event, a period of limitation is never triggered by the cessation of the claimant’s disability, and the underlying period of limitation can be effectively “tolled” for up to five years. In contrast, in this case in which the decedent’s disability ceased upon death one month after the injury, the two-year period of limitation in sub. (1) was not triggered, and, pursuant to sub. (2), the otherwise applicable three-year period of limitation in s. 893.555 (2) (a) applied and was not tolled. Estate of Cohen v. Trinity Health Management, LLC, 2022 WI App 26, 402 Wis. 2d 220, 975 N.W.2d 293, 21-1195.
893.16 AnnotationA prisoner is entitled to the tolling provision under sub. (1) when bringing a 42 USC 1983 action. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 109 S. Ct. 1998, 104 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1989).
The 20 cases that cite Wis. Stat. § 893.16 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENStorm ex rel. Smoler v. Legion Ins., 2003 WI 120, 665 N.W.2d 353.
cites § 893.16 100×subsections: (1) 11× (5)cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“55(1)(a) to be extended up to five additional years by application of the disability tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 893.16 . Storm's last day of treatment from the two mental health care providers who are the subject of this appeal *175 was more than five years — but less…”
The case’s holding
Mental illness tolls the statute of limitations if it renders a person functionally unable to understand the situation giving rise to a claim or to assert legal rights.
Later courts cite it for
“a mental condition that renders a person functionally unable to understand or appreciate the situation giving rise to the legal claim so that the person can assert legal rights or functionally unable to understand legal rights and appreciate the need to assert them.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENHaferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, 707 N.W.2d 853.
cites § 893.16 156×subsections: (1) 24× (3) 14×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“56 to exclude the developmentally disabled, and she also correctly notes that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 does not provide the developmentally disabled with an extension for filing medical malpractice actions.”
3
GREENJohn Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 734 N.W.2d 827.
cites § 893.16 20×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“33 was revamped and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 893.16 . § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.”
The case’s holding
Claims for intentional misrepresentation are independent of underlying torts and accrue when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the facts constituting the fraud.
Later courts cite it for
“we have held that acts can be the equivalent of a representation.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENDoe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94 (Wis. 1997).
cites § 893.16 24×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“See Wis. Stat. § 893.16 . [22] Prior to 1971, the age of majority in Wisconsin was 21 years.”
The case’s holding
A cause of action accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury and its cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Later courts cite it for
“when the plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENWalberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2005 WI 64, 697 N.W.2d 36.
cites § 893.16 35×subsections: (1) 2× (2)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 is the relevant statute for calculating the limitations at issue and that the claims were timely commenced, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.”
6
GREENWenke ex rel. Laufenberg v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 682 N.W.2d 405.
cites § 893.16 10×subsections: (1) 6×cited by 146 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“For the reasons explained in this opinion, it is simply mistaken to attribute any meaning to the term "statute of repose" in the *263 Maryland Casualty case, quoted in the Judicial Council Note, other than that which we have conclusively established.”
The case’s holding
A state borrowing statute encompassing foreign periods of limitation also applies to foreign statutes of repose.
Later courts cite it for
“we are not required to adhere to interpretations of statutes that are objectively wrong.” · 5 citing courts
7
REDHaferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2004 WI App 206, 689 N.W.2d 636.
cites § 893.16 45×subsections: (1) 4× (3)cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Foundation, Inc. (2005): the Wisconsin Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 893.16
“*160 § 893.16 (2001-02) [1] was the applicable statute of limitation, thereby finding that Toby Haferman, Jr.”
8
GREENWalberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2004 WI App 120, 683 N.W.2d 518.
cites § 893.16 24×subsections: (2) 3× (1)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“Between March 29, 1994, and December 3, 1996, Yox was a resident of St. Francis Home.”
Later courts cite it for
“we are bound by supreme court precedent, even if it is over a century old.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENJohn Doe 67C v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, 700 N.W.2d 180.
cites § 893.16 8×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“However, Doe was a minor at the time of the alleged abuse, and so the limitation period would have been tolled by present Wis. Stat. § 893.16 , "Person under disability.”
The case’s holding
A complaint fails to state a claim if it relies on bare conclusions rather than factual allegations showing the defendant had knowledge of the misconduct at the time of injury.
Later courts cite it for
“in short, we will dismiss a complaint if, 'under the guise of notice pleading, the complaint before us requires the court to indulge in too much speculation leaving too much to the imagination of the court.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 893.16 8×cited by 149 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“Until late 1998, Wis. Stat. § 893.16 provided in part: Person under disability.”
The case’s holding
A statute is constitutional under the rational basis test if the legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Later courts cite it for
“indulge every presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and if any doubt exists about a statute's constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor of constitutionality.” · 8 citing courts
11
GREENScott ex rel. Ricciardi v. First State Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1990).
cites § 893.16 12×subsections: (1) 8× (5) 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“Section 893.16 grants minors an extended period in which to bring an action to ensure that the minor does not lose rights because a guardian neglected to protect the minor's interest by bringing an action on the minor's behalf soon after the action accrued.”
The case’s holding
The forum state's tolling laws apply to determine if a borrowed foreign period of limitation has expired.
Later courts cite it for
“the cardinal rule in all statutory interpretation, as this court has often said, is to discern the intent of the legislature.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, 661 N.W.2d 832.
cites § 893.16 7×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“" Wis. Stat. § 893.16 (1) (1977). ¶ 23. These provisions, read together in the context of state-ordered child support judgments, created a 20-year statute of limitations period for independent actions on child support arrearages that began to run on the date of the youngest…”
The case’s holding
The twenty-year statute of limitations for independent actions to collect child support arrearages begins to run upon the entry of the judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“one of the few exceptions to this sound principle is that we will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENPatricia A. Johnson v. Michael R. Masters, 2013 WI 43, 830 N.W.2d 647.
cites § 893.16 13×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“It combined and modified the provisions of two repealed statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.16 (1) and 893.18(1). The former statute had provided a 20-year statute of limitations: "Within 20 years.”
The case’s holding
The statute of repose for actions upon a judgment does not begin to run until the legislature authorizes the performance of a provision that was previously prohibited by law.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion within the context of the original action” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENHammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 893.16 5×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“1 Because we conclude that the discovery rule applies to the facts of this case, and because there still exist genuine issues of material fact to be resolved, we reverse the trial court’s determination that the claims were barred by sec. 893.16, Stats., and remand for trial.”
The case’s holding
A cause of action for incestuous abuse does not accrue until the victim discovers or should have discovered the fact and cause of the injury through reasonable diligence.
Later courts cite it for
“as a matter of law, that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury.” · 5 citing courts
15
GREENBell v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 541 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 893.16 17×subsections: (1) 17×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“07(1), explaining: *367 The text of the statutes does not support the defendants' contention.”
Later courts cite it for
“there is no need to re-confer personal jurisdiction ... via the service of an amended summons upon the person.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENEst. of Mark David Cohen v. Trinity Health Mgmt., LLC, 2022 WI App 26, 975 N.W.2d 293.
cites § 893.16 30×subsections: (1) 19× (2) 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 893.16
“That is a question of law we review independently and without deference to the decision of the circuit court.”
cites § 893.16 12×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“54 as extended by Wis. Stat. § 893.16 , which the parties agree would bar Fleming's negligence claim against AAU if applicable.”
Later courts cite it for
“as always, we begin with the text of the statute.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENCarlson v. Pepin Cnty., 481 N.W.2d 498 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 893.16 5×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“We first address Carlson's argument that sec. 893.16, Stats., tolls his three-year, limitation period because he was disabled.”
The case’s holding
A cause of action accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered through reasonable diligence the injury, its nature, its cause, and the identity of the responsible defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered his injury, its nature, its cause and the identity of the allegedly responsible defendant.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENLord v. Hubbell, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 893.16 7×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“[8] Section 893.16, STATS., provides in part: Person under disability.”
The case’s holding
A minor-tolling statute does not extend the limitations period for an estate's survival claim merely because the estate's beneficiaries are minors entitled to a wrongful death claim.
Later courts cite it for
“we are mindful that we are to look beyond the labels of'derivative' and 'separate' claims” · 1 citing court
20
GREENKilaab v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 543 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 893.16 11×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 893.16
“Kilaab argues that he gets the benefit of the discovery rule 4 plus his disability under § 893.16, Stats. In essence, he argues that he gets the six years from September 24, 1987, 5 which we use as the date of discovery, plus the *703 disability under § 893.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196719962026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2004. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wis. Ct. App.18Wis.16E.D. Wis.12W.D. Wis.77th Cir.4Ill. App. Ct.1SCOTUS1Tax Ct.1
By subsection
(1)19 cases
Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, 707 N.W.2d 853.“56 to exclude the developmentally disabled, and she also correctly notes that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 does not provide the developmentally disabled with an extension for filing medical malpractice actions.”
Wenke ex rel. Laufenberg v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 682 N.W.2d 405.“For the reasons explained in this opinion, it is simply mistaken to attribute any meaning to the term "statute of repose" in the *263 Maryland Casualty case, quoted in the Judicial Council Note, other than that which we have conclusively established.”
Storm ex rel. Smoler v. Legion Ins., 2003 WI 120, 665 N.W.2d 353.“55(1)(a) to be extended up to five additional years by application of the disability tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 893.16 . Storm's last day of treatment from the two mental health care providers who are the subject of this appeal *175 was more than five years — but less…”
Scott ex rel. Ricciardi v. First State Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1990).“Section 893.16 grants minors an extended period in which to bring an action to ensure that the minor does not lose rights because a guardian neglected to protect the minor's interest by bringing an action on the minor's behalf soon after the action accrued.”
Bell v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 541 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).“07(1), explaining: *367 The text of the statutes does not support the defendants' contention.”
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(2)4 cases
Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2004 WI App 120, 683 N.W.2d 518.“Between March 29, 1994, and December 3, 1996, Yox was a resident of St. Francis Home.”
Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2005 WI 64, 697 N.W.2d 36.“Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 is the relevant statute for calculating the limitations at issue and that the claims were timely commenced, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.”
Est. of Mark David Cohen v. Trinity Health Mgmt., LLC, 2022 WI App 26, 975 N.W.2d 293.“That is a question of law we review independently and without deference to the decision of the circuit court.”
(3)3 cases
Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, 707 N.W.2d 853.
Carlson v. Pepin Cnty., 481 N.W.2d 498 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).“We first address Carlson's argument that sec. 893.16, Stats., tolls his three-year, limitation period because he was disabled.”
Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2004 WI App 206, 689 N.W.2d 636.“*160 § 893.16 (2001-02) [1] was the applicable statute of limitation, thereby finding that Toby Haferman, Jr.”
(5)3 cases
Storm ex rel. Smoler v. Legion Ins., 2003 WI 120, 665 N.W.2d 353.
Scott v. First State Ins., 444 N.W.2d 405 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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