Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (2026)

Reckless injury

✓ current as of July 2026
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940.23940.23Reckless injury.
940.23(1)(1)First-degree reckless injury.
940.23(1)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23(1)(b)(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23(2)(2)Second-degree reckless injury.
940.23(2)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being is guilty of a Class F felony.
940.23(2)(b)(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child is guilty of a Class F felony.
940.23 HistoryHistory: 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.
940.23 NoteJudicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) is analogous to the prior offense of injury by conduct regardless of life.
940.23 NoteSub. (2) is new. It creates the crime of injury by criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24. [Bill 191-S]
940.23 AnnotationFirst-degree reckless injury, sub. (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman, 185 Wis. 2d 405, 518 N.W.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.23 AnnotationSub. (1) (a) cannot be applied against a mother for actions taken against a fetus while pregnant as the applicable definition of human being under s. 939.22 (16) is limited to one who is born alive. Sub. (1) (b) does not apply because s. 939.75 (2) (b) excludes actions by a pregnant woman from its application. State v. Deborah J.Z., 228 Wis. 2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1999), 96-2797.
940.23 AnnotationUtter disregard for human life is not a subpart of the intent element and need not be proven subjectively. It can be proven by evidence relating to the defendant’s state of mind or by evidence of heightened risk or obvious potentially lethal danger. However proven, utter disregard is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person would have known. State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170, 98-3175.
940.23 AnnotationUtter disregard requires more than a high degree of negligence or recklessness. To evince utter disregard, the mind must not only disregard the safety of another but be devoid of regard for the life of another. A person acting with utter disregard must possess a state of mind that has no regard for the moral or social duties of a human being. State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, 07-1052.
940.23 AnnotationIn evaluating whether there is sufficient proof of utter disregard for human life, factors to be considered include the type of act, its nature, why the perpetrator acted as he/she did, the extent of the victim’s injuries, and the degree of force that was required to cause those injuries. Also considered are the type of victim and the victim’s age, vulnerability, fragility, and relationship to the perpetrator, as well as whether the totality of the circumstances showed any regard for the victim’s life. State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, 07-1052.
940.23 AnnotationPointing a loaded gun at another is not conduct evincing utter disregard if it is otherwise defensible, even if it is not privileged. When conduct was to protect the defendant and the defendant’s friends, although not found to be self defense, the conduct is inconsistent with conduct evincing utter disregard. State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, 07-1052.
940.23 AnnotationJensen, 2000 WI 84, does not create a rule assigning less weight to a defendant’s after-the-fact conduct. When evaluating whether a defendant’s conduct reflects utter disregard for human life, the fact-finder should examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime, considering all relevant conduct before, during, and after a crime, giving each the weight it deems appropriate under the circumstances. State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 797 N.W.2d 430, 09-0956.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 90 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1969–2026 · leading case: State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 33× “¶ 18 Following a Machner [4] hearing on the ineffective assistance claims, the trial court granted Miller's motion, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because the evidence did not prove that Miller's conduct…”
State v. Dale R. Neumann, 2013 WI 58 (Wis. 2013). · cites it 16× “, ¶50, which would include the unmentioned, overlapping Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (2)(a), and, second, by hinting that the immunity in Wis.”
State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32 (Wis. 2011). · cites it 21× “Burris was subsequently convicted of first-degree reckless injury while armed contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (l)(a) and § 939.63 (2007-08) 2 and being a felon in possession of a firearm contrary to Wis.”
State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86 (Wis. 2009). · cites it 8× “2d 378 , reversing Tony Payano's (Payano) convictions for one count of second-degree reckless injury while using a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23 (2)(a) and 939.63 (2007-08), [1] and two counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety while using a…”
State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101 (Wis. 2006). · cites it 8× “[1] The circuit court denied Rachel Kelty's postconviction, post-sentencing motion to withdraw her plea to two counts of first-degree reckless injury in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (1)(a) (1999-00). [2] In her motion, Kelty challenged the validity of her conviction to the…”
State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75 (Wis. 2007). · cites it 8× “Howell's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the plea colloquy, complaint, and sentencing sufficiently demonstrated that Howell understood that he was aiding and abetting his cousin Joseph Sharp in first degree reckless injury, Wis. Stat. § 940.23…”
State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84 (Wis. 2000). · cites it 15× “Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (1) (1993-94). 1 ¶ 2.”
State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88 (Wis. 2014). · cites it 7× “05, a Class C felony; and one count of First Degree Reckless Injury While Armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23 (1)(a), 939.50(3)(d), and 939.”
United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010). · cites it 5× “The district court held that McDonald’s two prior Wisconsin convictions — one for first-degree reckless injury, Wis. Stat. § 940.23 , and another for second-degree sexual assault of a child, id.”
State v. Jimothy A. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59 (Wis. 2014). · cites it 3× “§§ 940.23 (1)(a), 939.05, and 939.63; and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to Wis.”
Hagenkord v. State, 302 N.W.2d 421 (Wis. 1981). · cites it 4× “In his Court of Appeals brief, the defendant Hagen-kord made the following statement, which the Court of Appeals appropriately accepted as establishing the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of injury regardless of life, in violation of sec. 940.23, Stats. In…”
Randolph v. State, 266 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 1978). · cites it 5× “The principle issue in this case is whether the offense of injury by conduct regardless of life, sec. 940.23, Stats., is a lesser included offense of the crime of attempted first-degree murder, sec.”
— Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1) — 8 cases
State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 18 Following a Machner [4] hearing on the ineffective assistance claims, the trial court granted Miller's motion, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because the evidence did not prove that Miller's conduct…”
State v. Eastman, 518 N.W.2d 257 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115 (Wis. 2005).
State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Benton, 2001 WI App 81 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) — 9 cases
State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 18 Following a Machner [4] hearing on the ineffective assistance claims, the trial court granted Miller's motion, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because the evidence did not prove that Miller's conduct…”
State v. X.S., 2022 WI 49 (Wis. 2022).
State v. Kloss, 925 N.W.2d 563 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Brown, 923 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Tommy A. Crawford (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
— Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2) — 2 cases
State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Willie G. Allison (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a) — 8 cases
State v. Dale R. Neumann, 2013 WI 58 (Wis. 2013). “, ¶50, which would include the unmentioned, overlapping Wis. Stat. § 940.23 (2)(a), and, second, by hinting that the immunity in Wis.”
State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 18 Following a Machner [4] hearing on the ineffective assistance claims, the trial court granted Miller's motion, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because the evidence did not prove that Miller's conduct…”
State v. David G. Dudas (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wis. Stat. § 940.23(l)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Block, 587 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
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