Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2026)

Bifurcated sentence of imprisonment and extended supervision

✓ current as of July 2026
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973.01973.01Bifurcated sentence of imprisonment and extended supervision.
973.01(1)(1)Bifurcated sentence required. Except as provided in sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a person to imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons for a felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, or a misdemeanor committed on or after February 1, 2003, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under this section.
973.01(2)(2)Structure of bifurcated sentences. A bifurcated sentence is a sentence that consists of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision under s. 302.113. The total length of a bifurcated sentence equals the length of the term of confinement in prison plus the length of the term of extended supervision. An order imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section shall comply with all of the following:
973.01(2)(a)(a) Total length of bifurcated sentence. Except as provided in par. (c), the total length of the bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum period of imprisonment specified in s. 939.50 (3), if the crime is a classified felony, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by statute for the crime, if the crime is not a classified felony, plus additional imprisonment authorized by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes.
973.01(2)(b)(b) Confinement portion of bifurcated sentence. The portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term of confinement in prison may not be less than one year and, except as provided in par. (c), is subject to whichever of the following limits is applicable:
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973.01(2)(b)1.1. For a Class B felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 40 years.
973.01(2)(b)3.3. For a Class C felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 25 years.
973.01(2)(b)4.4. For a Class D felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 15 years.
973.01(2)(b)5.5. For a Class E felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 10 years.
973.01(2)(b)6m.6m. For a Class F felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 7 years and 6 months.
973.01(2)(b)7.7. For a Class G felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 5 years.
973.01(2)(b)8.8. For a Class H felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 3 years.
973.01(2)(b)9.9. For a Class I felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed one year and 6 months.
973.01(2)(b)10.10. For any crime other than one of the following, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 75 percent of the total length of the bifurcated sentence:
973.01(2)(b)10.a.a. A felony specified in subds. 1. to 9.
973.01(2)(b)10.b.b. An attempt to commit a classified felony if the attempt is punishable under s. 939.32 (1) (intro.).
973.01(2)(c)(c) Penalty enhancement.
973.01(2)(c)1.1. Subject to the minimum period of extended supervision required under par. (d), the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable penalty enhancement statute. If the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is increased by the same amount.
973.01(2)(c)2.2. If more than one of the following penalty enhancement statutes apply to a crime, the court shall apply them in the order listed in calculating the maximum term of imprisonment for that crime:
973.01(2)(d)(d) Minimum and maximum term of extended supervision. The term of extended supervision may not be less than 25 percent of the length of the term of confinement in prison imposed under par. (b) and, for a classified felony, is subject to whichever of the following limits is applicable:
973.01(2)(d)1.1. For a Class B felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 20 years.
973.01(2)(d)2.2. For a Class C felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 15 years.
973.01(2)(d)3.3. For a Class D felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 10 years.
973.01(2)(d)4.4. For a Class E, F, or G felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 5 years.
973.01(2)(d)5.5. For a Class H felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 3 years.
973.01(2)(d)6.6. For a Class I felony, the term of extended supervision may not exceed 2 years.
973.01(3)(3)Not applicable to life sentences. If a person is being sentenced for a felony that is punishable by life imprisonment, he or she is not subject to this section but shall be sentenced under s. 973.014 (1g).
973.01(3g)(3g)Earned release program eligibility. When imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section on a person convicted of a crime other than a crime specified in ch. 940 or s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.03, 948.05, 948.051, 948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 948.072, 948.075, 948.08, 948.085, or 948.095, the court shall, as part of the exercise of its sentencing discretion, decide whether the person being sentenced is eligible or ineligible to participate in the earned release program under s. 302.05 (3) during the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence.
973.01(3m)(3m)Challenge incarceration program eligibility. When imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section on a person convicted of a crime other than a crime specified in ch. 940 or s. 941.29 (1g) (a); a crime specified in s. 941.29 (1g) (b), not including s. 951.02, 951.08, 951.09, or 951.095; or a crime under s. 948.02 (3), 948.055, 948.075, or 948.095, the court shall, as part of the exercise of its sentencing discretion, decide whether the person being sentenced is eligible or ineligible for the challenge incarceration program under s. 302.045 during the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence.
973.01(4)(4)No good time; extension or reduction of term of imprisonment. A person sentenced to a bifurcated sentence under sub. (1) shall serve the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence without reduction for good behavior. The term of confinement in prison portion is subject to extension under s. 302.113 (3) and, if applicable, to reduction under s. 302.045 (3m), 302.05 (3) (c) 2. a., 302.113 (9g), 973.195 (1r), or 973.198.
973.01(5)(5)Extended supervision conditions. Whenever the court imposes a bifurcated sentence under sub. (1), the court may impose conditions upon the term of extended supervision.
973.01(6)(6)No parole. A person serving a bifurcated sentence imposed under sub. (1) is not eligible for release on parole under that sentence.
973.01(7)(7)No discharge. The department of corrections may not discharge a person who is serving a bifurcated sentence from custody, control and supervision until the person has served the entire bifurcated sentence.
973.01(8)(8)Explanation of sentence.
973.01(8)(a)(a) When a court imposes a bifurcated sentence under this section it shall explain in writing all of the following to the person being sentenced:
973.01(8)(a)1.1. The total length of the bifurcated sentence.
973.01(8)(a)2.2. The amount of time the person will serve in prison under the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence.
973.01(8)(a)3.3. The amount of time the person will spend on extended supervision, assuming that the person does not commit any act that results in the extension of the term of confinement in prison under s. 302.113 (3).
973.01(8)(a)4.4. That the amount of time the person must actually serve in prison may be extended as provided under s. 302.113 (3) and that because of extensions under s. 302.113 (3) the person could serve the entire bifurcated sentence in prison.
973.01(8)(a)5.5. That the person will be subject to certain conditions while on release to extended supervision, and that violation of any of those conditions may result in the person being returned to prison, as provided under s. 302.113 (9).
973.01(8)(ag)(ag) If the court provides under sub. (3g) that the person is eligible to participate in the earned release program under s. 302.05 (3), the court shall also inform the person of the provisions of s. 302.05 (3) (c).
973.01(8)(am)(am) If the court provides under sub. (3m) that the person is eligible for the challenge incarceration program, the court shall also inform the person of the provisions of s. 302.045 (3m).
973.01(8)(b)(b) The court’s explanation under par. (a) 3. of a person’s potential period of extended supervision does not create a right to a minimum period of extended supervision.
973.01 AnnotationWhile an offender must meet the eligibility requirements of s. 302.045 (2) to participate in the challenge incarceration program, the trial court must, pursuant to sub. (3m), also determine if the offender is eligible for the program, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, 246 Wis. 2d 744, 632 N.W.2d 112, 00-2864.
973.01 AnnotationThe exercise of sentencing discretion requires the court to exercise its discretion to create a sentence within the range provided by the legislature that reflects the circumstances of the situation and the particular characteristics of the offender. The court must consider the gravity of the offense, the offender’s character, and the public’s need for protection. The weight given to any factor is left to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, 246 Wis. 2d 744, 632 N.W.2d 112, 00-2864.
973.01 AnnotationIf a defendant makes a fraudulent representation to the court, which the court accepts and relies upon in granting a sentence, the court may later declare the sentence void, and double jeopardy does not bar a subsequently increased sentence. State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 208, 257 Wis. 2d. 163, 650 N.W.2d 844, 01-2969.
973.01 AnnotationA court may, in specific circumstances, consider credit for time spent in presentence custody as a factor in determining an appropriate sentence. Because the length of the defendant’s presentence custody affected the time the defendant would actually spend in prison and the expected incarceration term impacted the circuit court’s goal that the defendant receive sex offender treatment in an institutional setting while not remaining incarcerated longer than was necessary to receive treatment, presentence credit was appropriately considered. State v. Fenz, 2002 WI App 244, 258 Wis. 2d 281, 653 N.W.2d 280, 01-1434.
973.01 AnnotationEvents subsequent to sentencing and relating to rehabilitation do not constitute a new sentencing factor justifying sentence modification. State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242, 01-1894.
973.01 AnnotationSub. (2) (c) does not authorize a sentencing court to impose any portion of a penalty enhancer as extended supervision. State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24, 01-3342.
973.01 AnnotationDespite the failure to object, a defendant may be entitled to resentencing if the sentence was affected by a trial court’s reliance on an improper factor. State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d 163, 01-3000.
973.01 AnnotationWhen a statutory definition is available that provides a defendant with sufficient notice as to the expected course of conduct and an ascertainable standard for enforcement, the condition of extended supervision is not unconstitutionally vague. The definition of “dating relationship” in s. 813.12 (1) (ag) provided the defendant an objective standard and adequate notice of when a condition applied that required the defendant to introduce any person the defendant was “dating” to the defendant’s supervising agent. State v. Koenig, 2003 WI App 12, 259 Wis. 2d 833, 656 N.W.2d 499, 02-1076.
973.01 AnnotationDiscussing calculation of confinement and extended supervision for the presumptive minimum for unclassified felonies under this section prior to the February 1, 2003, amendments. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700, 02-0681.
973.01 AnnotationResentencing on convictions that remain intact after one or more counts in a multi-count case is vacated is not always required. When the vacated count does not affect the overall dispositional structure of the original sentence, resentencing on the remaining counts is unnecessary. State v. Church, 2003 WI 74, 262 Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 141, 01-3100.
973.01 AnnotationSubs. (2) and (5) prohibit confinement in any facility as a condition of extended supervision. Absent express authority, a trial court cannot order confinement as a condition of extended supervision. State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 235, 268 Wis. 2d 162, 672 N.W.2d 322, 03-0019.
973.01 AnnotationA penalty enhancer under s. 939.62 is not subject to bifurcation, nor is it to be added to the underlying term of imprisonment. State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 N.W.2d 872, 02-0947.
973.01 AnnotationRequisite to a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing the reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed. Circuit courts shall: 1) specify the objectives of the sentence on the record and identify the general objectives of greatest importance; 2) describe the facts relevant to those objectives and explain why the particular component parts of the sentence imposed advance the specified objectives; 3) identify the factors that were considered in arriving at the sentence and indicate how those factors fit the objectives and influence the decision. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, 01-0051.
973.01 AnnotationThe sentence imposed shall call for the minimum amount of custody or confinement consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Probation should be the disposition unless confinement is necessary to protect the public, the offender needs correctional treatment available only in confinement, or it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, 01-0051.
973.01 AnnotationThe good character of a victim killed as the result of a crime is relevant to sentencing, but the court should not attempt to measure the relative value of the victim’s life. Although there may be circumstances in which the court could weigh the positive contributions and worth of the victim in assessing the harm caused by the crime, it does not follow that there is a right to have a court consider that a victim was a terrible burden on society. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, 01-0051.
973.01 AnnotationSub. (3m) allows a sentencing court to determine not only whether a defendant is eligible for the challenge incarceration program, but also to set a date of eligibility within the term of confinement in prison. State v. Lehman, 2004 WI App 59, 270 Wis. 2d 695, 677 N.W.2d 644, 03-1269.
973.01 AnnotationA court, after giving consideration to the relevant sentencing factors, may give disproportionate or controlling weight to a single factor. Balancing the factors is for the trial court. Ordering a lengthy term of supervision in order to enable the defendant to pay a sizeable restitution amount did not violate the right to equal protection. State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, 272 Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 534, 03-0300.
973.01 AnnotationThe defendant’s life expectancy, coupled with a lengthy sentence, while perhaps guaranteeing that the defendant will spend the balance of the defendant’s life in prison, does not have to be taken into consideration by the circuit court. If the circuit court chooses to consider a defendant’s life expectancy, it must explain, on the record, how the defendant’s life expectancy fits into the sentencing objectives. State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI App 181, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20, 03-2974.
973.01 AnnotationConsistent with Lehman, 2004 WI App 59, sub. (3g) allows a sentencing court to determine whether a defendant is eligible for the earned release program and to set a date of eligibility within the term of confinement in prison. State v. White, 2004 WI App 237, 277 Wis. 2d 580, 690 N.W.2d 880, 04-1211.
973.01 AnnotationA defendant’s age is a secondary factor that the trial court may, but is not required to, consider in fashioning an appropriate sentence. The trial court, if it considers age, determines whether it should carry any weight. State v. Davis, 2005 WI App 98, 281 Wis. 2d 118, 698 N.W.2d 823, 04-1163.
973.01 AnnotationA condition of extended supervision and probation that the defendant have no contact with the drug community was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. When the trial court specifically told the defendant not be around any person when, or be in any place where, drugs are being possessed, used, or sold, the condition was clear and gave fair notice of what a drug community was. State v. Trigueros, 2005 WI App 112, 282 Wis. 2d 445, 701 N.W.2d 54, 04-1701.
973.01 AnnotationA condition of extended supervision need not directly relate to the defendant’s criminal conduct in the underlying conviction. Trial courts are granted broad discretion in determining conditions necessary for extended supervision subject only to a standard of reasonableness and appropriateness determined by how well the condition serves the dual goals of supervision: 1) rehabilitation of the defendant; and 2) protection of a state or community interest. A condition of extended supervision that the defendant maintain child support payments was reasonable and appropriate. State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47, 04-1406.
973.01 AnnotationWhen a person is being sentenced after revocation of extended supervision, discretion can exist without an explicit delineation of the McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263 (1971), sentencing factors: 1) the gravity of the offense; 2) the character of the offender; and 3) the need to protect the public. There must be an indication that the court considered those factors. State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 259, 288 Wis. 2d 475, 707 N.W.2d 876, 05-0018.
973.01 AnnotationA defendant who requests resentencing due to the circuit court’s use of inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing must show both that the information was inaccurate and that there was actual reliance, not prejudicial reliance, on the inaccurate information by the court in the sentencing. Once actual reliance on inaccurate information is shown, the burden then shifts to the state to prove the error was harmless. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1, 04-0914.
973.01 AnnotationGallion, 2004 WI 42, does not require that the trial court explain why it imposed three years as opposed to one or two. State v. Klubertanz, 2006 WI App 71, 291 Wis. 2d 751, 713 N.W.2d 116, 05-1256.
973.01 AnnotationThat test of whether the statutory language is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways is adopted for sentence construction disputes. As it looks for legislative intent when faced with an ambiguous statute, the appellate court should look for the trial court’s sentencing intent when faced with an ambiguous oral sentencing pronouncement. The appellate court is required to determine the trial court’s sentencing intent from other parts of the record, including the judgment of conviction. Without more, the bald recital of a consecutive sentence in the judgment of conviction is insufficient to overcome the presumption of a concurrent sentence. State v. Oglesby, 2006 WI App 95, 292 Wis. 2d 716, 715 N.W.2d 727, 05-1565.
973.01 AnnotationSubs. (3g) and (3m) are not applicable to reconfinement under s. 302.113 (9) (am). State v. Hall, 2007 WI App 168, 304 Wis. 2d 504, 737 N.W.2d 13, 06-1439.
973.01 AnnotationSub. (5) does not require a sentencing court to make an ability-to-pay determination when the court orders a contribution payment as a condition of extended supervision. Neither the requirement that an ability-to-pay determination be made when a contribution surcharge is taxed against a defendant under s. 973.06 (1) or when a contribution surcharge is imposed as a condition of probation under former s. 973.09 (1x), 2005 stats., applies to sub. (5). State v. Galvan, 2007 WI App 173, 304 Wis. 2d 466, 736 N.W.2d 890, 06-2052.
973.01 AnnotationA fine that an offender has the ability to pay may satisfy sentencing objectives the trial court has found to be material and relevant to the particular defendant. A trial court is not required to explain the reason for a specific amount of a fine, but some explanation of why the court imposes a fine is required. If the sentencing court intends to impose a fine, the court must determine at the time of sentencing whether a defendant has the ability to pay a fine during the total sentence. The standard for imposing a fine, which is part of the punishment, should require no less consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay than is required as part of an order of restitution. State v. Ramel, 2007 WI App 271, 306 Wis. 2d 654, 743 N.W.2d 502, 07-0355. See also State v. Vesper, 2018 WI App 31, 382 Wis. 2d 207, 912 N.W.2d 418, 17-0173.
973.01 AnnotationA defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. State v. Payette, 2008 WI App 106, 313 Wis. 2d 39, 756 N.W.2d 423, 07-1192.
973.01 AnnotationThe circuit court had the authority to order the defendant to reimburse the defendant’s mother for forfeited bail the defendant’s mother paid, either as restitution or as a condition of extended supervision. State v. Agosto, 2008 WI App 149, 314 Wis. 2d 385, 760 N.W.2d 415, 06-2646.
973.01 AnnotationThis section and ss. 302.113 (4) and 973.15 establish that consecutive periods of extended supervision are to be served consecutively, aggregated into one continuous period, so that revocation of extended supervision at any time allows revocation as to all consecutive sentences. State v. Collins, 2008 WI App 163, 314 Wis. 2d 653, 760 N.W.2d 438, 07-2580.
973.01 AnnotationDue process requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked the defendant’s first conviction play no part in the sentence received after a new trial. When a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for doing so must be free from a retaliatory motive. Because retaliatory motives can be complex and difficult to prove, the U.S. Supreme Court has found it necessary to presume an improper vindictive motive, which also applies when a defendant is resentenced following a successful attack on an invalid sentence. However, the presumption stands only when a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. A new sentence that is longer than the original sentence that implements the original dispositional scheme is not tainted by vindictiveness. State v. Sturdivant, 2009 WI App 5, 316 Wis. 2d 197, 763 N.W.2d 185, 07-2508.
973.01 AnnotationA sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses and facts related to offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted. Sentencing courts are obliged to acquire full knowledge of the character and behavior pattern of the defendant before imposing sentence. State v. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, 316 Wis. 2d 414, 766 N.W.2d 206, 07-1982.
973.01 AnnotationA court may certainly tell a defendant what could happen if the defendant’s extended supervision is revoked. But telling a defendant what will happen imperils the defendant’s due process right to an impartial judge at a reconfinement hearing. State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385, 08-2623.
973.01 AnnotationA defendant has a constitutional due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of race or gender. The defendant has the burden to prove that the circuit court actually relied on race or gender in imposing its sentence. The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. The defendant must provide evidence indicating that it is highly probable or reasonably certain that the circuit court actually relied on race or gender when imposing its sentence. A reasonable observer test is rejected. State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409, 08-0810.
973.01 AnnotationA sentencing court did not violate the 4th amendment or article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While the condition that the circuit court imposed may have impinged on constitutional rights, it did not violate them as the circuit court made an individualized determination, pursuant to the court’s authority under sub. (5), that the condition was necessary based on the facts in this case involving violence, threats, and a firearm. State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 814 N.W.2d 854, 10-1398.
973.01 AnnotationThe suggestion that dismissed charges not be considered in sentencing is not reasonable. It is better practice for the court to acknowledge and discuss dismissed charges, if they are considered by the court, giving them appropriate weight and describing their relationship to a defendant’s character and behavioral pattern, or to the incident that serves as the basis for a plea. The defendant should be given an opportunity to explain or dispute these charges. State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436, 10-2801.
973.01 AnnotationIn the context of interpreting plea bargains under contract law, dismissed charges do not have a static meaning. They are a product of the parties’ negotiations, and they mean what the parties intend them to mean. The one exception is that a plea agreement involving one or more dismissed charges cannot limit what the judge may consider at sentencing. Such agreements are contrary to public policy. The term “dismissed outright” should be discontinued. Instead, plea bargains should pin down whether a district attorney is agreeing not to prosecute a dismissed charge. State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436, 10-2801.
973.01 AnnotationTiepelman, 2006 WI 66, teaches that a defendant is entitled to resentencing if the defendant meets the following two-pronged test: 1) the defendant shows that the information at the original sentencing was inaccurate; and 2) the defendant shows that the court actually relied on the inaccurate information at sentencing. Whether the circuit court actually relied on the incorrect information at sentencing turns on whether the circuit court gave “explicit attention” or “specific consideration” to the inaccurate information, so that the inaccurate information “formed part of the basis for the sentence.” Upon determining that a circuit court actually relied upon inaccurate information at sentencing the reviewing court applies a harmless error analysis. State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491, 11-0685.
973.01 AnnotationThe court’s invocations of a religious deity during sentencing were ill-advised. However, not every “ill-advised word” will create reversible error. The transcript reflects that the court’s offhand religious references addressed proper secular sentencing factors. The judge’s comments did not suggest the defendant required a longer sentence to pay religious penance. State v. Betters, 2013 WI App 85, 349 Wis. 2d 428, 835 N.W.2d 249, 12-1339.
973.01 AnnotationSub. (2) (c) 1. is not applicable to misdemeanors. Whereas for a felony, an enhancement lengthens the otherwise applicable “maximum term of confinement in prison,” for a misdemeanor, an enhancement transforms the misdemeanor sentence into a sentence to the state prisons, which then must be bifurcated. Because no “maximum term of confinement in prison” exists for a misdemeanor until the enhancement is applied, once it is applied, it cannot be applied again. State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26, 353 Wis. 2d 280, 844 N.W.2d 417, 12-2016.
973.01 AnnotationThe limitation under s. 343.30 (5) that no court may suspend or revoke an operating privilege except as authorized by statute precludes not only restrictions on obtaining a physical license document, but also on the privilege to operate a vehicle. A court’s broad authority to fashion appropriate conditions of extended supervision is limited by the provisions of s. 343.30 concerning suspension and revocation of operating privileges by the courts. State v. Hoppe, 2014 WI App 51, 354 Wis. 2d 219, 847 N.W.2d 869, 13-1457.
973.01 AnnotationAlthough a sentencing court may not constitutionally impose a sentence based on national origin, the court may consider a defendant’s relevant illegal conduct related to immigration without denying the defendant due process of law. In this case, the court did not deny the defendant due process in the form of reliance on an improper sentencing factor when the court mentioned the defendant’s immigration status as a minor aspect of the court’s comprehensive evaluation of the defendant’s character. State v. Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459, 13-0646.
973.01 AnnotationA sentencing court may consider a Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) risk assessment at sentencing without violating a defendant’s right to due process if the risk assessment is used properly with an awareness of the limitations and cautions set forth in the opinion. Risk scores may not be used to determine: 1) whether an offender is incarcerated; or 2) the severity of the sentence. Additionally, risk scores may not be used as the determinative factor in deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the community. Any Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) containing a COMPAS risk assessment must contain a written advisement listing those limitations and informing sentencing courts of certain cautions set forth in the opinion. State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749, 15-0157.
973.01 AnnotationSentencing courts have wide discretion and may impose any conditions of probation or supervision that appear to be reasonable and appropriate. The sentencing court was entitled to err on the side of caution—for the sake of the defendant and the community—and rely upon the investigating officers’ representation that the defendant had a substance abuse history over the representation of the defendant’s counsel that the defendant did not have a substance abuse problem because the defendant had some “clean drug screens” while on supervision and because counsel personally was not aware of a substance abuse problem. State v. Davis, 2017 WI App 55, 377 Wis. 2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488, 16-1416.
973.01 AnnotationIn addition to the three main factors a circuit court must consider in determining a defendant’s sentence, the circuit court also may consider secondary factors, including: 1) past record of criminal offense; 2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; 3) defendant’s personality, character, and social traits; 4) result of presentence investigation; 5) vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; 6) degree of defendant’s culpability; 7) defendant’s demeanor at trial; 8) defendant’s age, educational background, and employment record; 9) defendant’s remorse, repentance, and cooperativeness; 10) defendant’s need for close rehabilitative control; 11) the rights of the public; and 12) the length of pretrial detention. State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373, 16-0883.
973.01 AnnotationA defendant’s failure to express remorse can be used at sentencing only if it is one among other factors and if it receives no undue consideration. State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95, 15-1799.
973.01 AnnotationUnder Birchfield, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), it is impermissible to impose criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw. A lengthier jail sentence is a criminal penalty. Therefore, the circuit court in this case violated Birchfield by explicitly subjecting the defendant to a more severe criminal penalty because the defendant refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant. State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120, 16-2483.
973.01 AnnotationA circuit court erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it actually relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors. Accordingly, a defendant challenging the defendant’s sentence must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the challenged factor is irrelevant or improper; and 2) the circuit court actually relied on that factor. Under the improper-factor prong, sentencing factors are proper when they inform valid sentencing objectives including the protection of the community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. A circuit court may properly entertain a general predisposition, based upon the court’s criminal sentencing experience, so long as that predisposition is not so specific or rigid that it ignores the particular circumstances of the individual offender. Under the actual-reliance prong, the appeals court reviews the sentencing transcript as a whole and assesses any allegedly improper comments within that context. A defendant will fall short of proving actual reliance if the transcript lacks clear and convincing evidence that the factor was the sole cause of a harsher sentence. A defendant will also fail to show actual reliance if a reference to a challenged factor bears a reasonable nexus to a relevant, proper factor. State v. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 969 N.W.2d 225, 18-1476.
973.01 AnnotationA circuit court erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it actually relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors. To prove actual reliance on an improper factor, a defendant must show that the circuit court imposed a harsher sentence solely because of the improper factor. To be the sole cause of a harsher sentence, an improper factor must stand alone as an independent factor. If a circuit court’s reference to a challenged factor bears a reasonable nexus to a proper sentencing factor, then the circuit court has not imposed sentence based “solely” on the improper factor. State v. Whitaker, 2022 WI 54, 402 Wis. 2d 735, 976 N.W.2d 304, 20-0029.
973.01 AnnotationWisconsin law empowers circuit courts to impose conditions of extended supervision and probation and to modify those conditions through a formal statutory process. However, actual administration of the sentence and conditions is entrusted to the Department of Corrections. In this case, the circuit court likely stepped over the line when the court imposed a condition that the defendant could not live with any women or unrelated children without the permission of the court, and the court intended to administer that condition through case-by-case oversight. State v. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49, 408 Wis. 2d 1, 991 N.W.2d 373, 21-0809.
973.01 AnnotationThe use of the word “or” in sub. (2) (c) 2. c. contrasts with the use of the word “and” in sub. (2) (c) 2. a. The use of the word “or” indicates that only one of the penalty enhancers found in ss. 939.62 (1) and 961.48 can apply, but not both. State v. Hailes, 2023 WI App 29, 408 Wis. 2d 465, 992 N.W.2d 835, 21-1339.
973.01 AnnotationTruth-In-Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin. Brennan & Latorraca. Wis. Law. May 2000.
973.01 AnnotationFully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing. Brennan, Hammer, & Latorraca. Wis. Law. Nov. 2002.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 162 cases (56 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004).
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). · cites it 386× “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59 (Wis. 2003). · cites it 83× “Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 , a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the sentence include a term of extended…”
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63 (Wis. 2016). · cites it 22× “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1), (2). "Imprisonment;" "Confinement in Prison;" "Extended Supervision.”
State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2013 WI 34 (Wis. 2013). · cites it 20× “15 Indeed it is often difficult to follow the majority opinion's discussion of what the defendant knew as the opinion continually shifts, not always precisely or correctly, between referring to "imprisonment" (which encompasses confinement and extended supervision) and "prison"…”
State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 24× “We hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(c) does not authorize a sentencing court to impose any portion of a penalty enhancer as extended supervision.”
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42 (Wis. 2004). · cites it 8× “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (2)(ad), (ag), (ak), and (b) [11] These factors include: "(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's personality, character and social traits; (4) result of presentence investigation; (5) vicious or…”
State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 235 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 35× “Larson argues that Wisconsin's Truth In Sentencing law, Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2001-02), 1 does not authorize a circuit court to order periodic jail confinement as a condition of extended supervision.”
State v. Lamont L. Travis, 2013 WI 38 (Wis. 2013). · cites it 12× “50 (3)(b), with a bifurcated sentence consisting of a maximum period of initial confinement of forty years, Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b), and a maximum period of extended supervision of twenty years, Wis.”
State Ex Rel. Singh v. Kemper, 2016 WI 67 (Wis. 2016). · cites it 14× “" Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1). 22 The record is not clear as to why the Waukesha sentence was amended, but it is clear that Singh is in a better position now because he no longer has any extended supervision in that case, he could not be returned to prison on that sentence, and he…”
State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 912 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 2018). · cites it 6× “See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 , 973.03, 973.05, 973.”
State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45 (Wis. 2005). · cites it 18× “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) and (2). The use of indeterminate sentencing, prior to TIS-I, guaranteed that a convicted defendant would serve for a stated number of years, but that the parole board would determine how much of that sentence was served in prison.”
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78 (Wis. 2004). · cites it 10× “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6) (2001-02); 4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.”
State v. Galvan, 2007 WI App 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 24× “The court denied the motion, ruling that the surcharge was imposed as a condition of Galvan's extended supervision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5) and (8), which do not expressly require an ability-to-pay determination.”
State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60 (Wis. 2012). · cites it 9× “The supervision condition imposed in this case does not violate Rowan's constitutional rights because the circuit court made an individualized determination, pursuant to the circuit court's authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5), that the condition was necessary based on the…”
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33 (Wis. 2011). · cites it 7× “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1), (2)(b) (1997-98); see also Brennan, TIS.”
State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 24× “Bifurcation and Enhancement of Felony Sentences Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 ¶ 5. With very few exceptions, 5 whenever a court sentences a person to "imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons" for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence — which is…”
State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 11× “Steele filed a motion for postconviction relief; he argued that the finding of ineligibility for the challenge incarceration program constituted error by the trial court. The trial court denied this postconviction motion on April 6, 2000.”
State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2022 WI 8 (Wis. 2022). · cites it 5× “49 (1)(b); Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b)8. Had Yakich not been found NGI, he could have received a sentence of at least nine years of confinement.”
State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46 (Wis. 2005). · cites it 12× “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1999-2000). Thus, subsection (1r) of the sentence adjustment statute supports a conclusion that it applies to TIS-I offenders.”
State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58 (Wis. 2016). · cites it 4× “" Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b)4. (2009-10). 10 No.”
State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71 (Wis. 2005). · cites it 5× “Furthermore, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§973.01 (4) and (6) (1999-2000), TIS-I established that "those serving a bifurcated sentence were not eligible for parole," and eliminated the possibility for a reduction in confinement time for good behavior.”
State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 924 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 2019). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) & (6), 973.014. However, a person sentenced to life in prison after December 31, 1999 may, in the discretion of the sentencing court, become eligible for release to extended supervision after serving a minimum of 20 years.”
Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske, 926 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) - (2). And the term of confinement allowed for Class F and G felonies is lower than the total maximum sentence-seven years and six months for a Class F felony and five years for a Class G felony.”
State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64 (Wis. 2014). · cites it 6× “does not require a court to impose a 2 "A bifurcated sentence is a sentence that consists of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision under s.”
State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “For the first seven counts, release eligibility is computed as 25% of the sentence imposed, see WIS.”
State v. Lehman, 2004 WI App 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 30× “The court, as required under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (3m), also found that Lehman was eligible for the CIE but imposed a four-year waiting period on Lehman's eligibility.”
State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 5× “48, and was sentenced on November 20, 2001, to a bifurcated term of fifteen months in the Wisconsin State Prisons and twenty-seven months of extended supervision, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01 . When sentenced, he formally indicated that he did not intend to seek postconviction relief.”
State v. William F. Bokenyi, 2014 WI 61 (Wis. 2014). · cites it 12× “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (8). 25 No. 2012AP2557-CR the plea agreement, and seemingly consistent with the victim's wishes.”
State v. Hatem M. Shata, 2015 WI 74 (Wis. 2015). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b)7. ¶13 After confirming that the State accurately described the plea agreement, Attorney Toran told the court that he had informed Shata "that there's a potential he could be deported.”
State v. Peter J. King, Jr., 2020 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 4× “§ 973.01(5).2 The circuit court granted an exception to those conditions in that King was permitted “[i]nternet access at a job center” or at a “place of business [at] which [King] wishes to work” to apply for employment, but only with permission of his DOC agent.”
State v. Harris, 2011 WI App 130 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 9× “Thus, Harris's sentences fall under *225 the purview of Wis. Stat. § 973.01 and Harris is consequently prohibited from earning sentence credit for his convictions because they are violent offenses.”
State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “" Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6). 5 With limited exceptions, § 973.”
State v. Kleven, 2005 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 9× “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b)4. Finally, Wis.”
State v. Silva, 2003 WI App 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 8× “§ 973.01. Thus, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND.”
State v. Speer, 501 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1993). · cites it 4× “Section 973.01(1)(c), Stats. Thus, the sentencing guidelines serve several important functions .”
State Ex Rel. Rupinski v. Smith, 2007 WI App 4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 6× “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2), (7). Wisconsin Stat.”
State v. Stewart, 2006 WI App 67 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “From this, the trial court reasoned that the maximum term of probation for a felony bail jumping conviction, a Class H felony, is six years: the maximum term of confinement is three years and the maximum term of extended supervision is three years.”
State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 6× “This is true because, under those statutes, armed robbery is a Class B felony and the specified maximum initial confinement for a Class B felony is 40 years. Application of the attempt statute, Wis.”
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66 (Wis. 2015). · cites it 6× “2d 769 (stating Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1) was a main feature of TIS); § 973.”
State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “Miller maintains that the condition of his extended supervision ordering him to fulfill his child support obligations from the 1991 paternity action was not authorized under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5), which allows courts imposing a bifurcated sentence to "impose conditions upon…”
State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2021 WI 60 (Wis. 2021). · cites it 2×
State v. Owens, 2006 WI App 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4×
State v. X.S., 2022 WI 49 (Wis. 2022). · cites it 2×
State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53 (Wis. 2015). · cites it 3×
State Ex Rel. Griffin v. Litscher, 2003 WI App 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 5×
State v. Hall, 2007 WI App 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “3 Thus, by imposing what he considers a bifurcated sentence at his recon-finement hearing, Hall argues that the reconfinement court is obligated by § 973.01(3g) and (3m) to decide whether a defendant is eligible for CIP or ERE Concluding, Hall proffers: "Nothing in the statute…”
State v. Sutton, 2006 WI App 118 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 3×
State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 33× “The original sentencing court in Hall apparently did not consider whether Hall was eligible for the Earned Release Program, authorized by § 973.01(3g). Hall, 2007 WI App 168, ¶ 2 , 304 Wis.”
David Minnick v. Dan Winkleski, 15 F.4th 460 (7th Cir. 2021). “See Wis. Stat. 973.01(2); Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to Truth‐in‐ Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 FED.”
State v. Vaughn, 2012 WI App 129 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4×
State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81 (Wis. 2007). · cites it 2×
State v. Corey T. Rector, 2023 WI 41 (Wis. 2023). · cites it 2×
State v. White, 2004 WI App 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 19×
State v. Johnson, 730 N.W.2d 661 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “As noted in ¶ 6 above, § 973.01(3g) was also created in 2003 Wis.”
State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 912 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 2018). · cites it 2×
State ex rel. Baade v. Hayes, 2015 WI App 71 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 7×
State Ex Rel. Olson v. Litscher, 2000 WI App 61 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2×
State v. Quarzenski, 2007 WI App 212 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2×
State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 10×
State v. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 5× “§ 973.01(8), including an explanation of the impact of a CIP eligibility determination on the length of the sentence, id.”
State v. Lichty, 2012 WI App 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 6× “, and the maximum term of extended supervision is five years, § 973.01(d)4. ¶ 13. By the time of the sentencing hearing in January, the mistake had been discovered, and the State therefore adjusted its recommendation to comply with the law by reducing the recommended extended…”
State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 13 (Wis. 2007). · cites it 3×
State v. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2×
State v. Williams, 2013 WI App 74 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 7×
State v. John R. Brott, 2023 WI App 45 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2×
United States v. Roosevelt Spencer, 739 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2014). · cites it 3×
State v. Westley D. Whitaker, 2022 WI 54 (Wis. 2022). · cites it 2×
State v. Smet, 519 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2×
State v. Walker, 2007 WI App 142 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 3×
State v. Mendez, 2014 WI App 57 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2×
State v. Koenig, 2003 WI App 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “Koenig on notice that if she begins dating, seeing someone socially of the opposite sex, she must immediately introduce that person to her supervising agent." ¶ 6. Koenig appeals.”
State v. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 3×
State v. Pote, 2003 WI App 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2×
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Schwarz, 2007 WI 57 (Wis. 2007). · cites it 8×
State ex rel. Markovic v. Litscher, 916 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2×
State v. Lynch, 2006 WI App 231 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “§ 973.01(3g) provides: (3g) EaRned release program eligibility.”
State v. Thums, 2006 WI App 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2×
State v. Armstrong, 2014 WI App 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2×
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). · cites it 6× “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
State v. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2×
State v. Harris, 2012 WI App 79 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2×
State v. Scott W. Forrett, 2022 WI 37 (Wis. 2022). · cites it 2×
State v. Alan S. Johnson, 2020 WI App 73 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2×
State v. Collins, 2008 WI App 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 7×
State v. Sturdivant, 2009 WI App 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 11×
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). · cites it 6× “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
Spannuth v. State, 234 N.W.2d 79 (Wis. 1975).
State v. Anderson, 2015 WI App 92 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 32× “See § 973.01(4). ¶ 30. Moreover, while the differences we discuss in ¶ 26 show why it is reasonable to authorize sentence adjustment for enhanced misdemeanants sentenced to prison, but not misdemeanants sentenced to jail, the similarities we describe in ¶ 29 show why it makes…”
State v. Tracy Laver Hailes (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 14× “§ 973.01(2)(c) states that either WIS. STAT.”
State v. Dillard, 2013 WI App 108 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2×
State v. Scott W. Forrett, 2022 WI 37 (Wis. 2022). · cites it 2×
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 11× “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
Simpson v. Walker, 527 F. App'x 561 (7th Cir. 2013).
Christopher P. Kawleski v. State (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 9× “See § 973.01(2)(a), (8)(a) (1999- 2000). “Confinement” refers to the period of time that is imposed by the circuit court as the initial confinement part of the bifurcated sentence and which is served by the defendant in prison following imposition of the defendant’s sentence,…”
State v. James A. Culver (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 8× “§ 973.01(2), maximum terms of extended supervision are determined differently for unclassified and classified felonies.”
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Terrence Jeff Cloyd, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 6×
State v. Firebaugh, 2011 WI App 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2×
State v. Hoppe, 2014 WI App 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2×
State v. Jesse T. Adams (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4×
State v. Les Paul Henderson (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 4× “§ 973.01(3m), which addresses eligibility for the challenge incarceration program, provides: “When imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section on a person convicted of a crime other than a crime specified in [WIS.”
Love v. United States (E.D. Wis. 2022). · cites it 4×
State v. Lamont L. Travis (Wis. 2013). · cites it 6×
State v. Bostick, 927 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3×
Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske (7th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2×
Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske (7th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2×
State v. Kyles, 923 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2×
State v. Fitzgerald, 927 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2×
State v. Staten, 927 N.W.2d 934 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2×
State v. Christopher W. Yakich (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2×
State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2×
State v. Edward W. Hatfield (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2×
State v. James J. Socha (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2×
State v. James J. Socha (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2×
Blizzard v. Thoreson (E.D. Wis. 2019). · cites it 2×
Williams v. Litscher (E.D. Wis. 2020). · cites it 2×
Walberts v. Abele (E.D. Wis. 2020). · cites it 2×
Austin v. Novak (E.D. Wis. 2021). · cites it 2×
Mitchell v. Div. of Adult Institutions (E.D. Wis. 2024). · cites it 2×
Barbuto v. Ronquillo-Horton (E.D. Wis. 2024). · cites it 2×
Heredia, Victoriano v. Blythe, Christopher (W.D. Wis. 2022). · cites it 2×
Turner v. United States (W.D. Wis. 2023). · cites it 2×
State v. Alexander Velazquez-Perez (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2×
Sorensen, Steven v. Jensen, Casey (W.D. Wis. 2025). · cites it 2×
State Ex Rel. Frederick Lee Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 13 (Wis. 2007). · cites it 3×
State v. Langham, 2006 WI App 149 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2×
State v. Anderson, 918 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Thomas F. Ball, II (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Marcus Lorenzo Jew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Desmond Myers LaPean (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. William Francis Kuehn (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Sherri L. Blackshear (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Frederick A. Ziesmer (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Joshua D. Goldsmith (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Westley D. Whitaker (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Bennie L. Jones (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “§§ 973.01(2)(b)(1); 939.63(1)(b). Turning to the record, we find no obvious basis for the circuit court to reasonably conclude that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive.”
State v. Jeffrey J. Wickman (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Peter G. Hamilton (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Kimberly A. Howell (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Brandon S. Grady (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Leroy Rice, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. John H. Thillemann (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Romero M. Watson (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Paul S. Schraven (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Calvin Dean Fish (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
Gravelle v. Wiersma (E.D. Wis. 2023).
State v. Jermaine J. Funches (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “§ 973.01(8). Funches does not dispute receiving a written explanation.”
State v. Deborah A. Turner (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Benny E. Burgos (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Drew J. Chacon (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Clinton L. Werlein II (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Ryan B. S. Tate, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “The successful completion of the program allows the conversion of the defendant’s remaining initial confinement time to extended supervision time.”
State v. Sean C. Jordan (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Obed David Lopez (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. P. M. V. (Wis. Ct. App. 2026).
State v. Cindy L. Cooper (Wis. Ct. App. 2026).
State v. Simmons, 927 N.W.2d 921 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Alliet, 690 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1) — 17 cases
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59 (Wis. 2003). “Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 , a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the sentence include a term of extended…”
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78 (Wis. 2004). “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6) (2001-02); 4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.”
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45 (Wis. 2005). “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) and (2). The use of indeterminate sentencing, prior to TIS-I, guaranteed that a convicted defendant would serve for a stated number of years, but that the parole board would determine how much of that sentence was served in prison.”
State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71 (Wis. 2005). “Furthermore, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§973.01 (4) and (6) (1999-2000), TIS-I established that "those serving a bifurcated sentence were not eligible for parole," and eliminated the possibility for a reduction in confinement time for good behavior.”
State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “48, and was sentenced on November 20, 2001, to a bifurcated term of fifteen months in the Wisconsin State Prisons and twenty-seven months of extended supervision, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01 . When sentenced, he formally indicated that he did not intend to seek postconviction relief.”
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66 (Wis. 2015). “2d 769 (stating Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1) was a main feature of TIS); § 973.”
State ex rel. Markovic v. Litscher, 916 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “The original sentencing court in Hall apparently did not consider whether Hall was eligible for the Earned Release Program, authorized by § 973.01(3g). Hall, 2007 WI App 168, ¶ 2 , 304 Wis.”
State v. Alan S. Johnson, 2020 WI App 73 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
Christopher P. Kawleski v. State (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “See § 973.01(2)(a), (8)(a) (1999- 2000). “Confinement” refers to the period of time that is imposed by the circuit court as the initial confinement part of the bifurcated sentence and which is served by the defendant in prison following imposition of the defendant’s sentence,…”
State v. Bostick, 927 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. James A. Culver (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). “§ 973.01(2), maximum terms of extended supervision are determined differently for unclassified and classified felonies.”
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
State v. Alliet, 690 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1)(c) — 1 case
State v. Speer, 501 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1993). “Section 973.01(1)(c), Stats. Thus, the sentencing guidelines serve several important functions .”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2) — 15 cases
State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 235 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). “Larson argues that Wisconsin's Truth In Sentencing law, Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2001-02), 1 does not authorize a circuit court to order periodic jail confinement as a condition of extended supervision.”
David Minnick v. Dan Winkleski, 15 F.4th 460 (7th Cir. 2021). “See Wis. Stat. 973.01(2); Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to Truth‐in‐ Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 FED.”
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Galvan, 2007 WI App 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “The court denied the motion, ruling that the surcharge was imposed as a condition of Galvan's extended supervision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5) and (8), which do not expressly require an ability-to-pay determination.”
State v. James A. Culver (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). “§ 973.01(2), maximum terms of extended supervision are determined differently for unclassified and classified felonies.”
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
State v. Jesse T. Adams (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Anderson, 918 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Joshua D. Goldsmith (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Jeffrey J. Wickman (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Peter G. Hamilton (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
Love v. United States (E.D. Wis. 2022).
Christopher P. Kawleski v. State (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “See § 973.01(2)(a), (8)(a) (1999- 2000). “Confinement” refers to the period of time that is imposed by the circuit court as the initial confinement part of the bifurcated sentence and which is served by the defendant in prison following imposition of the defendant’s sentence,…”
State v. Anderson, 2015 WI App 92 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015). “See § 973.01(4). ¶ 30. Moreover, while the differences we discuss in ¶ 26 show why it is reasonable to authorize sentence adjustment for enhanced misdemeanants sentenced to prison, but not misdemeanants sentenced to jail, the similarities we describe in ¶ 29 show why it makes…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
Christopher P. Kawleski v. State (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “See § 973.01(2)(a), (8)(a) (1999- 2000). “Confinement” refers to the period of time that is imposed by the circuit court as the initial confinement part of the bifurcated sentence and which is served by the defendant in prison following imposition of the defendant’s sentence,…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) — 26 cases
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59 (Wis. 2003). “Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 , a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the sentence include a term of extended…”
State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 912 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 2018). “See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 , 973.03, 973.05, 973.”
State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64 (Wis. 2014). “does not require a court to impose a 2 "A bifurcated sentence is a sentence that consists of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision under s.”
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78 (Wis. 2004). “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6) (2001-02); 4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.”
State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “This is true because, under those statutes, armed robbery is a Class B felony and the specified maximum initial confinement for a Class B felony is 40 years. Application of the attempt statute, Wis.”
State v. Sutton, 2006 WI App 118 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Kleven, 2005 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(b)4. Finally, Wis.”
State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “Bifurcation and Enhancement of Felony Sentences Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 ¶ 5. With very few exceptions, 5 whenever a court sentences a person to "imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons" for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence — which is…”
State v. Williams, 2013 WI App 74 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Lichty, 2012 WI App 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). “, and the maximum term of extended supervision is five years, § 973.01(d)4. ¶ 13. By the time of the sentencing hearing in January, the mistake had been discovered, and the State therefore adjusted its recommendation to comply with the law by reducing the recommended extended…”
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
State v. Christopher W. Yakich (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. James J. Socha (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. James J. Socha (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Bostick, 927 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Tracy Laver Hailes (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 973.01(2)(c) states that either WIS. STAT.”
State v. John H. Thillemann (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Paul S. Schraven (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Alexander Velazquez-Perez (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Drew J. Chacon (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Clinton L. Werlein II (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. P. M. V. (Wis. Ct. App. 2026).
State v. Cindy L. Cooper (Wis. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)(1) — 1 case
State v. Bennie L. Jones (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “§§ 973.01(2)(b)(1); 939.63(1)(b). Turning to the record, we find no obvious basis for the circuit court to reasonably conclude that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) — 9 cases
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59 (Wis. 2003). “Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 , a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the sentence include a term of extended…”
State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “We hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(c) does not authorize a sentencing court to impose any portion of a penalty enhancer as extended supervision.”
State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “Bifurcation and Enhancement of Felony Sentences Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 ¶ 5. With very few exceptions, 5 whenever a court sentences a person to "imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons" for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence — which is…”
State v. Tracy Laver Hailes (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 973.01(2)(c) states that either WIS. STAT.”
State v. Terrence Jeff Cloyd, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
State v. Bostick, 927 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Thomas F. Ball, II (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d) — 14 cases
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29 (Wis. 2004). “However, we also determine that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2)(d), the statute specifying that the *117 extended supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.”
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63 (Wis. 2016). “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1), (2). "Imprisonment;" "Confinement in Prison;" "Extended Supervision.”
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59 (Wis. 2003). “Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 , a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the sentence include a term of extended…”
State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “For the first seven counts, release eligibility is computed as 25% of the sentence imposed, see WIS.”
State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “Bifurcation and Enhancement of Felony Sentences Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 ¶ 5. With very few exceptions, 5 whenever a court sentences a person to "imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons" for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence — which is…”
State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. James A. Culver (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). “§ 973.01(2), maximum terms of extended supervision are determined differently for unclassified and classified felonies.”
State v. Sturdivant, 2009 WI App 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Jesse T. Adams (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Marcus Lorenzo Jew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Tory J. Agnew (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(2)(a) and (2)(c)1. Any penalty enhancer is limited to extending the period of initial confinement; the penalty enhancer cannot be divided between initial confinement and extended supervision.”
State v. Westley D. Whitaker (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Sean C. Jordan (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3d)(b) — 1 case
State Ex Rel. Singh v. Kemper, 2016 WI 67 (Wis. 2016). “" Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1). 22 The record is not clear as to why the Waukesha sentence was amended, but it is clear that Singh is in a better position now because he no longer has any extended supervision in that case, he could not be returned to prison on that sentence, and he…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3g) — 11 cases
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63 (Wis. 2016). “See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1), (2). "Imprisonment;" "Confinement in Prison;" "Extended Supervision.”
State v. Lynch, 2006 WI App 231 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “§ 973.01(3g) provides: (3g) EaRned release program eligibility.”
State v. Johnson, 730 N.W.2d 661 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “As noted in ¶ 6 above, § 973.01(3g) was also created in 2003 Wis.”
State v. Hall, 2007 WI App 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “3 Thus, by imposing what he considers a bifurcated sentence at his recon-finement hearing, Hall argues that the reconfinement court is obligated by § 973.01(3g) and (3m) to decide whether a defendant is eligible for CIP or ERE Concluding, Hall proffers: "Nothing in the statute…”
State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “The original sentencing court in Hall apparently did not consider whether Hall was eligible for the Earned Release Program, authorized by § 973.01(3g). Hall, 2007 WI App 168, ¶ 2 , 304 Wis.”
State v. Les Paul Henderson (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). “§ 973.01(3m), which addresses eligibility for the challenge incarceration program, provides: “When imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section on a person convicted of a crime other than a crime specified in [WIS.”
State v. Sherri L. Blackshear (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Leroy Rice, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Edward W. Hatfield (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Romero M. Watson (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Deborah A. Turner (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3m) — 6 cases
State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). “Steele filed a motion for postconviction relief; he argued that the finding of ineligibility for the challenge incarceration program constituted error by the trial court. The trial court denied this postconviction motion on April 6, 2000.”
State v. Lehman, 2004 WI App 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “The court, as required under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (3m), also found that Lehman was eligible for the CIE but imposed a four-year waiting period on Lehman's eligibility.”
State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “The original sentencing court in Hall apparently did not consider whether Hall was eligible for the Earned Release Program, authorized by § 973.01(3g). Hall, 2007 WI App 168, ¶ 2 , 304 Wis.”
State v. Edward W. Hatfield (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Les Paul Henderson (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). “§ 973.01(3m), which addresses eligibility for the challenge incarceration program, provides: “When imposing a bifurcated sentence under this section on a person convicted of a crime other than a crime specified in [WIS.”
State v. Ryan B. S. Tate, Jr. (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “The successful completion of the program allows the conversion of the defendant’s remaining initial confinement time to extended supervision time.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(4) — 4 cases
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78 (Wis. 2004). “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6) (2001-02); 4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.”
State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45 (Wis. 2005). “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) and (2). The use of indeterminate sentencing, prior to TIS-I, guaranteed that a convicted defendant would serve for a stated number of years, but that the parole board would determine how much of that sentence was served in prison.”
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33 (Wis. 2011). “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1), (2)(b) (1997-98); see also Brennan, TIS.”
State v. Anderson, 2015 WI App 92 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015). “See § 973.01(4). ¶ 30. Moreover, while the differences we discuss in ¶ 26 show why it is reasonable to authorize sentence adjustment for enhanced misdemeanants sentenced to prison, but not misdemeanants sentenced to jail, the similarities we describe in ¶ 29 show why it makes…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5) — 14 cases
State v. Peter J. King, Jr., 2020 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 973.01(5).2 The circuit court granted an exception to those conditions in that King was permitted “[i]nternet access at a job center” or at a “place of business [at] which [King] wishes to work” to apply for employment, but only with permission of his DOC agent.”
State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 235 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). “Larson argues that Wisconsin's Truth In Sentencing law, Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2001-02), 1 does not authorize a circuit court to order periodic jail confinement as a condition of extended supervision.”
State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60 (Wis. 2012). “The supervision condition imposed in this case does not violate Rowan's constitutional rights because the circuit court made an individualized determination, pursuant to the circuit court's authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5), that the condition was necessary based on the…”
State v. Galvan, 2007 WI App 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “The court denied the motion, ruling that the surcharge was imposed as a condition of Galvan's extended supervision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (5) and (8), which do not expressly require an ability-to-pay determination.”
State v. Koenig, 2003 WI App 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “Koenig on notice that if she begins dating, seeing someone socially of the opposite sex, she must immediately introduce that person to her supervising agent." ¶ 6. Koenig appeals.”
State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “The original sentencing court in Hall apparently did not consider whether Hall was eligible for the Earned Release Program, authorized by § 973.01(3g). Hall, 2007 WI App 168, ¶ 2 , 304 Wis.”
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
State v. William Francis Kuehn (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Frederick A. Ziesmer (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Kimberly A. Howell (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Calvin Dean Fish (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Simmons, 927 N.W.2d 921 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(6) — 2 cases
State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45 (Wis. 2005). “Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 (1) and (2). The use of indeterminate sentencing, prior to TIS-I, guaranteed that a convicted defendant would serve for a stated number of years, but that the parole board would determine how much of that sentence was served in prison.”
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78 (Wis. 2004). “Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (4) and (6) (2001-02); 4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(7) — 3 cases
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, 2023 WI 49 (Wis. 2023). “" § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC.”
Christopher P. Kawleski v. State (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “See § 973.01(2)(a), (8)(a) (1999- 2000). “Confinement” refers to the period of time that is imposed by the circuit court as the initial confinement part of the bifurcated sentence and which is served by the defendant in prison following imposition of the defendant’s sentence,…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8) — 3 cases
State v. Silva, 2003 WI App 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 973.01. Thus, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND.”
State v. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “§ 973.01(8), including an explanation of the impact of a CIP eligibility determination on the length of the sentence, id.”
State v. Jermaine J. Funches (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “§ 973.01(8). Funches does not dispute receiving a written explanation.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8)(a) — 1 case
State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 235 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). “Larson argues that Wisconsin's Truth In Sentencing law, Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (2001-02), 1 does not authorize a circuit court to order periodic jail confinement as a condition of extended supervision.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(d) — 1 case
State v. Lichty, 2012 WI App 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). “, and the maximum term of extended supervision is five years, § 973.01(d)4. ¶ 13. By the time of the sentencing hearing in January, the mistake had been discovered, and the State therefore adjusted its recommendation to comply with the law by reducing the recommended extended…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.01(l)(c) — 1 case
State v. Speer, 501 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1993). “Section 973.01(1)(c), Stats. Thus, the sentencing guidelines serve several important functions .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.