The following definitions are applicable to this article:
(1) BUILDING. Any structure which may be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging, or the storage of goods, and includes any vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft used for the lodging of persons or carrying on business therein. Each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately occupied or secured is a separate building.
(2) CONDUCT PERFORMED WITHIN A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY. Governmental conduct by a law enforcement officer performing a legitimate job-related function or pursuing a job-related goal through means that were within the law enforcement officer’s plausible power to utilize. In determining whether governmental conduct was performed within a law enforcement officer’s discretionary authority, a court must temporarily put aside that the conduct may have been committed for an improper or unconstitutional purpose, in an improper or unconstitutional manner, to an improper unconstitutional extent, or under improper or constitutionally inappropriate circumstances. The court must determine whether, if done for a proper purpose, the conduct was within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of a law enforcement officer’s governmental discretion in performing his or her official duties.
(3) DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE. Force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(4) DETENTION FACILITY OFFICER. Any guard or detention or jail officer who, in the exercise of his or her discretionary authority, is authorized to use physical force against persons and who is employed in a facility used for the confinement, pursuant to law, of any of the following persons:
a. Someone charged with or convicted of an offense.
b. Someone charged with being or adjudicated a youthful offender, a neglected minor, or juvenile delinquent.
c. Someone held for extradition.
d. Someone otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court.
(5) DWELLING. A building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, or a building of any kind, including any attached balcony, whether the building is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.
(6) FORCE. Physical action or threat against another, including confinement.
(7) LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER. Any peace officer or detention facility officer.
(8) PREMISES. The term includes any building, as defined in this section, and any real property.
(9) RESIDENCE. A dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.
(10) VEHICLE. A motorized conveyance which is designed to transport people or property.
(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, §670; Act 2006-303, p. 638, §1; Act 2025-423, §3.)
Notes of Decisions
Darryl Pruitt v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama, 771 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1985).
“2d 219 (1977); Ala.Code § 13A-3-20(2) (1982) *1480 (“Force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury”).”
Sanders v. State, 145 So. 3d 92 (Ala. 2013).
· cites it 2× ““3We note that the legislature has provided substantially the same definition of ‘building’ in two other criminal statutory provisions: § 13A-3-20(l), Ala.Code 1975 (applicable to justification and excuse), and § 13A-7-40(l), Ala.”
Malone v. State, 221 So. 3d 1153 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016).
“” At the outset, we note that the parties assume that the force at issue in this case—Malone’s stabbing of Nelson—meets the definition of “deadly physical force” in § 13A-3-20, Ala.Code 1975, as ‘‘[floree which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of…”
Nikolic v. City of Montgomery, 441 So. 2d 997 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
“” They rely largely upon Alabama Criminal Code, § 13A-3-25(a) as follows: “A person in lawful possession or control of premises, as defined in section 13A-3-20, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon, may use physical force upon another person when and to the…”
Sanders v. State, 145 So. 3d 88 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “We note that the legislature has provided substantially the same definition of "building” in two other criminal statutory provisions: § 13A-3-20(l), Ala.Code 1975 (applicable to justification and excuse), and § 13A-7-40(l), Ala.”
Morris v. Town of Lexington, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
“Even so, Alabama Code § 13A-3-25(a) provides that a person in lawful possession or control of premises, as defined in Section 13A-3-20, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon, may use physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably…”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-20(2) — 1 case
Darryl Pruitt v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama, 771 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1985).
“2d 219 (1977); Ala.Code § 13A-3-20(2) (1982) *1480 (“Force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury”).”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-20(l) — 2 cases
Sanders v. State, 145 So. 3d 92 (Ala. 2013).
““3We note that the legislature has provided substantially the same definition of ‘building’ in two other criminal statutory provisions: § 13A-3-20(l), Ala.Code 1975 (applicable to justification and excuse), and § 13A-7-40(l), Ala.”
Sanders v. State, 145 So. 3d 88 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
“We note that the legislature has provided substantially the same definition of "building” in two other criminal statutory provisions: § 13A-3-20(l), Ala.Code 1975 (applicable to justification and excuse), and § 13A-7-40(l), Ala.”
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