In this chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(1) ABUSE. An act committed against a victim, which is any of the following:
a. Arson. Arson as defined under Sections 13A-7-40 to 13A-7-43, inclusive.
b. Assault. Assault as defined under Sections 13A-6-20 to 13A-6-22, inclusive.
c. Attempt. Attempt as defined under Section 13A-4-2.
d. Child Abuse. Torture or willful abuse of a child, aggravated child abuse, or chemical endangerment of a child as provided in Chapter 15, commencing with Section 26-15-1, of Title 26, known as the Alabama Child Abuse Act.
e. Criminal Coercion. Criminal coercion as defined under Section 13A-6-25.
f. Criminal Trespass. Criminal trespass as defined under Sections 13A-7-2 to 13A-7-4.1, inclusive.
g. Harassment. Harassment as defined under Section 13A-11-8.
h. Kidnapping. Kidnapping as defined under Sections 13A-6-43 and 13A-6-44.
i. Menacing. Menacing as defined under Section 13A-6-23.
j. Other Conduct. Any other conduct directed toward a plaintiff covered by this chapter that could be punished as a criminal act under the laws of this state.
k. Reckless Endangerment. Reckless endangerment as defined under Section 13A-6-24.
l. Sexual Abuse. Any sexual offenses included in Article 4, commencing with Section 13A-6-60, of Chapter 6 of Title 13A.
m. Stalking. Stalking as defined under Sections 13A-6-90 to 13A-6-94, inclusive.
n. Theft. Theft as defined under Sections 13A-8-1 to 13A-8-5, inclusive.
o. Unlawful Imprisonment. Unlawful imprisonment as defined under Sections 13A-6-41 and 13A-6-42.
(2) COURT. A circuit court judge, a district court judge appointed as a special circuit court judge pursuant to law or a district court judge designated by a written standing order from the presiding circuit court judge to handle protection from abuse cases.
(3) DATING RELATIONSHIP. A relationship or former relationship of a romantic or intimate nature characterized by the expectation of affectionate or sexual involvement by either party.
a. A dating relationship includes the period of engagement to be married.
b. A dating relationship does not include a casual or business relationship or a relationship that ended more than 12 months prior to the filing of the petition for a protection order.
(4) PLAINTIFF. An individual who has standing to file a petition under Section 30-5-5.
(5) PROTECTION ORDER. Any order of protection from abuse issued under this chapter for the purpose of preventing acts of abuse as defined in this chapter.
(6) THREAT. Any word or action, expressed or implied, made to cause the plaintiff to fear for his or her safety or for the safety of another person.
(7) VICTIM. An individual who is related in any of the following ways to the person who commits an act of abuse:
a. Has a current or former marriage, including common law marriage, with the defendant.
b. Has a child in common with the defendant regardless of whether the victim and defendant have ever been married and regardless of whether they are currently residing or have in the past resided together in the same household.
c. Has or had a dating relationship with the defendant. A dating relationship does not include a casual or business relationship or a relationship that ended more than 12 months prior to the filing of the petition for a protection order.
d. Is a current or former household member. For purposes of this chapter, a “household member” excludes non-romantic or non-intimate co-residents.
e. A relative of a current or former household member as defined in paragraph d. who also lived with the defendant.
f. An individual who is a parent, stepparent, child, or stepchild.
g. An individual who is a grandparent, step-grandparent, grandchild, or step-grandchild.
(Acts 1981, No. 81-476, p. 826, §2; Acts 1995, No. 95-542, p. 1126, §1; Act 2010-538, p. 919, §1; Act 2015-493, p. 1679, §2; Act 2019-252, §1; Act 2023-494, §1.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
19
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case:
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
· cites it 13× “Although Boyd repeatedly asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, his argument, and the pertinent legal authority he cites in support of his argument, is actually to the effect that no cause of action existed against him under § 30-5-2. . In Haraway v.…”
Placey v. Placey, 51 So. 3d 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “Because this case involves no issues of juvenile law, and because the PFAA requires that a PFA action be handled in either a circuit court or a district court, but not a juvenile court, Ala.Code 1975, § 30-5-2(a)(3), this court has concluded that the time for taking the appeal…”
L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So. 2d 178 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
“§ 30-5-2 (2)(e) (1998) (same); Va.Code § 20-124.”
E.H.G. v. E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634 (Ala. 2011).
“§ 30-5-2 (2)(e) (1998) (same); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.”
Thomas K. Wu v. Mi Cah Wu, 37 So. 3d 792 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
“” § 30-5-2(a)(3). Section 30-5-3(a) provides that “[t]he courts, as provided in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this chapter.”
Horton v. Devan, 829 So. 2d 756 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Because we conclude that the evidence presented by the sister does not support a finding of any of the acts of abuse set out in § 30-5-2, we reverse the trial court’s judgment imposing a protection-from-abuse order as to the mother.”
Batey v. Dare, 742 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
· cites it 3× “See § 30-5-2(1) (as adopted by Act No. 81-476, Ala.”
Robinson v. Arnold, 241 So. 3d 33 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “In Robinson's postjudgment motion, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the protection-from-abuse judgment, that the trial court had violated his constitutional rights to confront the accuser and to present evidence, and that there was no evidence of abuse…”
Judge Linda F. Coats v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
· cites it 2× “" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
Jordan Ray Henshaw v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
· cites it 2× “" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
K.K. v. J.K. (Ala. Civ. App. 2026).
· cites it 2× “We recognize that, under a similar act, the Protection from Abuse Act, § 30-5-2 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, we have considered "harassing communications" as a type of "abuse" that could support the entry of a protection-from-abuse order.”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(1) — 4 cases
Batey v. Dare, 742 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
“See § 30-5-2(1) (as adopted by Act No. 81-476, Ala.”
K.K. v. J.K. (Ala. Civ. App. 2026).
“We recognize that, under a similar act, the Protection from Abuse Act, § 30-5-2 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, we have considered "harassing communications" as a type of "abuse" that could support the entry of a protection-from-abuse order.”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(2) — 2 cases
Judge Linda F. Coats v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
“" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
Jordan Ray Henshaw v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
“" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(5) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(7) — 2 cases
Judge Linda F. Coats v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
“" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
Jordan Ray Henshaw v. State of Alabama (Ala. 2026).
“" § 30-5-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. As we noted in the rendition of facts, even though Judge Coats is a Madison County district-court judge, she had been appointed as a special circuit-court judge pursuant to law, and it was in that capacity that she entertained Williams's PFA…”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(a)(3) — 2 cases
Placey v. Placey, 51 So. 3d 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
“Because this case involves no issues of juvenile law, and because the PFAA requires that a PFA action be handled in either a circuit court or a district court, but not a juvenile court, Ala.Code 1975, § 30-5-2(a)(3), this court has concluded that the time for taking the appeal…”
Thomas K. Wu v. Mi Cah Wu, 37 So. 3d 792 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
“” § 30-5-2(a)(3). Section 30-5-3(a) provides that “[t]he courts, as provided in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this chapter.”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(a)(4) — 1 case
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
“Although Boyd repeatedly asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, his argument, and the pertinent legal authority he cites in support of his argument, is actually to the effect that no cause of action existed against him under § 30-5-2. . In Haraway v.…”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(a)(6) — 1 case
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
“Although Boyd repeatedly asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, his argument, and the pertinent legal authority he cites in support of his argument, is actually to the effect that no cause of action existed against him under § 30-5-2. . In Haraway v.…”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(a)(l) — 3 cases
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
“Although Boyd repeatedly asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, his argument, and the pertinent legal authority he cites in support of his argument, is actually to the effect that no cause of action existed against him under § 30-5-2. . In Haraway v.…”
Batey v. Dare, 742 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
“See § 30-5-2(1) (as adopted by Act No. 81-476, Ala.”
— Ala. Code § 30-5-2(b) — 1 case
Boyd v. Ottman, 961 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
“Although Boyd repeatedly asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, his argument, and the pertinent legal authority he cites in support of his argument, is actually to the effect that no cause of action existed against him under § 30-5-2. . In Haraway v.…”
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