(a)(1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to this division, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, or oral fluid for the purpose of determining the content of any impairing substance or substances within a person’s system, if lawfully arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state in violation of Section 32-5A-191.
(2) The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person was in violation of Section 32-5A-191, while driving a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state.
(3) The law enforcement agency that employs the officer shall designate which test or tests shall be administered. The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to a chemical test or tests will result in the suspension of his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a minimum of 90 days. If the person objects to a blood test, the law enforcement agency shall designate that one of the other tests be administered.
(b) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or who is otherwise in a condition rendering him or her incapable of refusal, shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided by subsection (a) and the test or tests may be administered, subject to this division.
(c)(1) If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test or tests designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in subsection (a), none shall be given, unless a court order has been obtained ordering the person to submit to a chemical test or tests.
(2) The Secretary of the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state in violation of Section 32-5A-191 and that the person refused to submit to the test upon the request of the law enforcement officer, shall suspend his or her driving privilege as defined in Section 32-5-191 as provided in Section 32-5A-304.
(3) If the person is acquitted of violating Section 32-5A-191, the secretary, in his or her discretion, may reduce the period of suspension.
(d)(1) Upon suspending the driving privilege, the secretary or his or her duly authorized agent shall immediately notify the person in writing of the suspension and upon a request filed by the person, the secretary shall provide a hearing in the same manner as provided in Section 32-5A-307; except, that the scope of the hearing for the purposes of this section shall determine all of the following:
a. Whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state in violation of Section 32-5A-191.
b. Whether the person was placed under arrest.
c. Whether he or she refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer.
(2) Whether the person was informed that the privilege to drive would be suspended or denied if he or she refused to submit to the test shall not be an issue.
(3) The secretary shall order that the suspension or determination that there should be a denial of issuance either be rescinded or sustained.
(e) If the suspension or determination that there should be a denial of issuance is sustained by the secretary or his or her authorized agent upon the hearing, the person whose driving privilege has been suspended shall have the right to file a petition in the appropriate court to review the final order of suspension or denial by the secretary, or his or her duly authorized agent, in the same manner as provided in Section 32-5A-307.
(f) Upon a determination that a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended, the secretary shall provide, in writing, the action taken by this state to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person’s residence and to any state in which he or she has a license.
(Acts 1969, No. 699, p. 1255, §1; Acts 1983, No. 83-620, p. 959, §1; Act 2021-387, §1; Act 2021-498, §2.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
37
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2023 · leading case:
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979).
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979).
· cites it 5× “[6] Since the time of the decision in Severson , North Dakota has revised its act to adopt a theory of implied consent similar to the Alabama act. However, our research reveals no interpretation of this revision as yet.”
Meininger v. State, 704 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. 1997).
· cites it 9× “Alabama's implied consent statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5-192, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given his consent, subject to the provisions of this division, to a…”
Morgan v. City of Vestavia Hills, 628 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
· cites it 6× “*1049 Where a chemical test to determine blood alcohol level is performed pursuant to the implied consent statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5-192, the test results may be admitted either by “showing] that the test was administered in conformity with [§ 32-5A-194]” or by laying “the…”
Ex Parte Radford, 557 So. 2d 1288 (Ala. 1990).
· cites it 2× “Although the basis of the trial court's ruling is not clear from the record, it is clear that Radford argued that both tests were taken at the behest of the police and that the operation of Alabama's implied consent statute, Code of Alabama 1975, § 32-5-192, as well as general…”
Knighten v. State, 507 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
· cites it 2× “) "Additionally, the State would rely on Code of Alabama 1975, § 32-5-192 to the extent that that statement makes a statutory consent implied for this procedure for any person who operates a motor vehicle on the public highways of the State of Alabama.”
State v. Garner, 608 P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1980).
“The defendant argues the statute grants a right of refusal which is rendered meaningless when the driver is incapable of exercising his right and the evidence is inadmissible.”
Thrower v. State, 539 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
· cites it 4× “I The appellant specifically calls this court’s attention to the provisions of § 32-5-192, Code of Alabama 1975 as amended.”
United States v. Tyson, 829 F. Supp. 368 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
· cites it 4× “First, Tyson objected to the admission of the breath test results because the provisions of § 32-5A-194 and § 32-5-192 of the 1975 Alabama Code were not followed.”
Ex Parte Reed, 492 So. 2d 293 (Ala. 1986).
· cites it 3× “MADDOX, Justice (dissenting): I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that the Monroe County Sheriff's Department had adopted the P.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5-192(a) — 19 cases
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979).
“[6] Since the time of the decision in Severson , North Dakota has revised its act to adopt a theory of implied consent similar to the Alabama act. However, our research reveals no interpretation of this revision as yet.”
Meininger v. State, 704 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. 1997).
“Alabama's implied consent statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5-192, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given his consent, subject to the provisions of this division, to a…”
Morgan v. City of Vestavia Hills, 628 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
“*1049 Where a chemical test to determine blood alcohol level is performed pursuant to the implied consent statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5-192, the test results may be admitted either by “showing] that the test was administered in conformity with [§ 32-5A-194]” or by laying “the…”
United States v. Tyson, 829 F. Supp. 368 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
“First, Tyson objected to the admission of the breath test results because the provisions of § 32-5A-194 and § 32-5-192 of the 1975 Alabama Code were not followed.”
Ex Parte Reed, 492 So. 2d 293 (Ala. 1986).
“MADDOX, Justice (dissenting): I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that the Monroe County Sheriff's Department had adopted the P.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5-192(c) — 4 cases
Thrower v. State, 539 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
“I The appellant specifically calls this court’s attention to the provisions of § 32-5-192, Code of Alabama 1975 as amended.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5-192(d) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.