Code of Alabama

Ala. Code § 7-1-201 (2026)

General Definitions.

✓ official Alabama Legislature (ALISON) text, current July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaAla. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) [Reserved].

(b) Subject to definitions contained in other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code that apply to particular articles or parts thereof:

(1) “Action,” in the sense of a judicial proceeding, includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity, and any other proceeding in which rights are determined.

(2) “Aggrieved party” means a party entitled to pursue a remedy.

(3) “Agreement,” as distinguished from “contract,” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 7-1-303.

(4) “Bank” means a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company.

(5) “Bearer” means a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title or a person in possession of a negotiable instrument, negotiable tangible document of title, or certificated security that is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.

(6) “Bill of lading” means a document of title evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods. The term does not include a warehouse receipt.

(7) “Branch” includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a bank.

(8) “Burden of establishing” a fact means the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

(9) “Buyer in ordinary course of business” means a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller’s own usual or customary practices. A person that sells oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or mine is a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale. Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under Article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. “Buyer in ordinary course of business” does not include a person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.

(10) “Conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for the court as a matter of law.

(11) “Consumer” means an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(12) “Contract,” as distinguished from “agreement,” means the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as determined by this title as supplemented by any other applicable laws.

(13) “Creditor” includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor, and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity, and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor’s or assignor’s estate.

(14) “Defendant” includes a person in the position of defendant in a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.

(15) “Delivery,” with respect to an electronic document of title, means voluntary transfer of control and, with respect to an instrument, a tangible document of title, or an authoritative tangible copy of record evidencing chattel paper, means voluntary transfer of possession.

(16) “Document of title” means a record (i) that in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers and (ii) that purports to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and to cover goods in the bailee’s possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identifiable mass. The term includes bill of lading, transport documents, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for the delivery of goods. An electronic document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information stored in an electronic medium. A tangible document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.

(16A) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.

(17) “Fault” means a default, breach, or wrongful act or omission.

(18) “Fungible goods” means:

(A) Goods of which any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit; or

(B) Goods that by agreement are treated as equivalent.

(19) “Genuine” means free of forgery or counterfeiting.

(20) “Good faith” means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.

(21) “Holder” means:

(A) the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession; or

(B) the person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession; or

(C) the person in control, other than pursuant to Section 7-7-106(g), of a negotiable electronic document of title.

(22) “Insolvency proceeding” includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceeding intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved.

(23) “Insolvent” means:

(A) Having generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other than as a result of bona fide dispute;

(B) Being unable to pay debts as they become due; or

(C) Being insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law.

(24) “Money” means a medium of exchange that is currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and is not in an electronic form. The term includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or pursuant to an agreement between two or more countries.

(25) “Organization” means a person other than an individual.

(26) “Party,” as distinguished from “third party,” means a person that has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement subject to this title.

(27) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. The term includes a series or a protected series, however denominated, of any entity if the series or protected series is established under law other than the Uniform Commercial Code that limits, or limits if conditions specified under the law are satisfied, the ability of a creditor of the entity or of any other series or protected series of the entity to satisfy a claim from assets of the series or protected series.

(28) “Present value” means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain by use of either an interest rate specified by the parties if that rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into or, if an interest rate is not so specified, a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.

(29) “Purchase” means taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.

(30) “Purchaser” means a person that takes by purchase.

(31) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(32) “Remedy” means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.

(33) “Representative” means a person empowered to act for another, including an agent, an officer of a corporation or association, and a trustee, executor, or administrator of an estate.

(34) “Right” includes remedy.

(35) “Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. “Security interest” includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9A. “Security interest” does not include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale under Section 7-2-401, but a buyer may also acquire a “security interest” by complying with Article 9A. Except as otherwise provided in Section 7-2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a “security interest,” but a seller or lessor may also acquire a “security interest” by complying with Article 9A. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 7-2-401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a “security interest.” Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a “security interest” is determined pursuant to Section 7-1-203.

(36) “Send,” in connection with a record or notification, means:

(A) to deposit in the mail, or deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication, with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or

(B) to cause the record or notification to be received within the time it would have been received if properly sent under subparagraph (A).

(37) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record, to:

(A) execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or

(B) attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.

“Signed,” “signing,” and “signature” have corresponding meanings.

(38) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(39) “Surety” includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.

(40) “Term” means a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter.

(41) “Unauthorized signature” means a signature made without actual, implied, or apparent authority. The term includes a forgery.

(42) “Warehouse receipt” means a receipt issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.

(43) “Writing” includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form. “Written” has a corresponding meaning.

(Prior version of this section added by Acts 1965, No. 549, p. 811; amended by Acts 1981, No. 81-312, p. 399; Acts 1991, No. 91-654, p. 1232, §1; Acts 1992, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 92-700, p. 92, §602; Acts 1995, No. 95-668, p. 1381, §4; Acts 1996, No. 96-742, p. 1241, §4; Act 2001-481, p. 647, §2; Act 2004-315, p. 464, §2; repealed by Act 2004-524, p. 1070, §§1, 3; current section added by Act 2004-524, p. 1070, §1; Act 2023-492, §1.)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 65 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1981–2022 · leading case: Rent-A-Ctr. v. Shelby (In Re Shelby), 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991).
Rent-A-Ctr. v. Shelby (In Re Shelby), 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991). · cites it 30× “” Documents filed by the creditor did not refer to Ala. Code § 7-1-201 (37) which defines “security interest” for secured credit transactions under Alabama’s Uniform Commercial Code.”
Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Amsouth Bank, 825 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 2002). · cites it 2× “" As support for this contention, ALIC cites Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(43), which provides that an "`unauthorized' signature or indorsement means one made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery.”
Cagle's Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2001). · cites it 9× “Cagle points out that the Eleventh Circuit, applying the definition of good faith in Alabama Code § 7-1-201(19), stated that Alabama “has embraced a test that is composed of both a subjective component and an objective component.”
In Re Burton, 128 B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). · cites it 5× “No repeal of Section 7-1-201(37) of the UCC. The Court further notes the existence and directive of Section 7-1-104 (UCC-1-104) which states: Construction against implicit repeal This title being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter, no part of it…”
Atl. Nat. Trust, LLC v. McNamee, 984 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 2007). · cites it 2× “Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(b)(15). If an instrument is lost, destroyed, or stolen, it is no longer "possessed" by its owner and, as a result, cannot be "delivered" as required to effect a transfer of the instrument under § 7-3-203.”
Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 116 So. 3d 226 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(21). If a negotiable instrument has been indorsed in blank, as the Thomases’ note had been, the instrument “becomes payable to ‘bearer’ and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
Morgan Bldg. & Spas, Inc. v. Gillett, 762 So. 2d 366 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “" § 7-1-201(10), Ala.Code 1975. That section states that language in a form contract is considered conspicuous when the print is larger or is in a contrasting type or color than that contained in the rest of the document, and that whether a clause is conspicuous is a question to…”
KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2001). · cites it 2× “2000)) (citing Ala. Code § 7-1-201 (19) (1975) and Richard E.”
In re Jones, 544 B.R. 692 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016). “CODE § 7-1-201(35) (emphasis added). “Title to goods *698 cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification to the contract, and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their identification a special property as limited by this title.”
Summerlin v. Shellpoint Mortg. Servs., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Ala. 2016). · cites it 2× “(citing Ala. Code § 7-1-201 (21)). If a note has been indorsed in blank, it “becomes payable to ‘bearer’ and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
Am. Stand. Credit, Inc. v. Nat'l Cement Co., Programming & Sys., Inc., Int'l Comput. Corp., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981). “” The statutory predicate for such a holding, although not cited by the court, is in sections 1-201(37) and 9-102(l)(a) of the 1962 version of the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in Alabama, Ala. Code §§ 7-1-201 (37) and 7-9-102(l)(a) (1975).”
Hughes Developers, Inc. v. Montgomery, 903 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2004). · cites it 4× “Under the foregoing definitions in § 7-1-201, Montgomery is considered a purchaser for value under Alabama's version of the UCC.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(10) — 3 cases
Morgan Bldg. & Spas, Inc. v. Gillett, 762 So. 2d 366 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). “" § 7-1-201(10), Ala.Code 1975. That section states that language in a form contract is considered conspicuous when the print is larger or is in a contrasting type or color than that contained in the rest of the document, and that whether a clause is conspicuous is a question to…”
Moorer v. Hartz Seed Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(14) — 2 cases
Wilson v. Sides, 537 So. 2d 480 (Ala. 1989).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(15) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(19) — 4 cases
Cagle's Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2001). “Cagle points out that the Eleventh Circuit, applying the definition of good faith in Alabama Code § 7-1-201(19), stated that Alabama “has embraced a test that is composed of both a subjective component and an objective component.”
Shutter Shop, Inc. v. Amersham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Humble, 532 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(20) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(21) — 1 case
Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 116 So. 3d 226 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). “Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(21). If a negotiable instrument has been indorsed in blank, as the Thomases’ note had been, the instrument “becomes payable to ‘bearer’ and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(25) — 3 cases
Strickland v. Kafko Mfg., Inc., 512 So. 2d 714 (Ala. 1987).
Jones v. First Nat. Bank of Pulaski, 505 So. 2d 352 (Ala. 1987).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(26) — 3 cases
S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 2000).
Jones v. First Nat. Bank of Pulaski, 505 So. 2d 352 (Ala. 1987).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(27) — 1 case
Ryder Int'l Corp. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 749 F. Supp. 1569 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(29) — 1 case
Citizens Bank & Trust v. Piggly Wiggly Alabama Distrib. Co., 228 So. 3d 469 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(3) — 2 cases
Moseley v. Washington Cnty. State Bank, 491 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1986).
Financeamerica Private Brands, Inc. v. Bishop (In Re Bishop), 52 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(32) — 1 case
Hughes Developers, Inc. v. Montgomery, 903 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2004). “Under the foregoing definitions in § 7-1-201, Montgomery is considered a purchaser for value under Alabama's version of the UCC.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(33) — 1 case
Hughes Developers, Inc. v. Montgomery, 903 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2004). “Under the foregoing definitions in § 7-1-201, Montgomery is considered a purchaser for value under Alabama's version of the UCC.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(35) — 6 cases
In re Jones, 544 B.R. 692 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016). “CODE § 7-1-201(35) (emphasis added). “Title to goods *698 cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification to the contract, and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their identification a special property as limited by this title.”
State v. Pressley, 100 So. 3d 1058 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).
Levia Womack (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2020).
Jackson v. State, 953 So. 2d 1286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
Bobby R Golemon (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2022).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(37) — 16 cases
Rent-A-Ctr. v. Shelby (In Re Shelby), 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991). “” Documents filed by the creditor did not refer to Ala. Code § 7-1-201 (37) which defines “security interest” for secured credit transactions under Alabama’s Uniform Commercial Code.”
In Re Burton, 128 B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). “No repeal of Section 7-1-201(37) of the UCC. The Court further notes the existence and directive of Section 7-1-104 (UCC-1-104) which states: Construction against implicit repeal This title being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter, no part of it…”
Mattheiss v. Title Loan Express (In Re Mattheiss), 214 B.R. 20 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997).
In Re Brown, 128 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(37)(b) — 1 case
In Re Winston, 181 B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(38) — 2 cases
McGrady v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
Underwood v. Coffee Cnty. Bank, 668 So. 2d 10 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(43) — 1 case
Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Amsouth Bank, 825 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 2002). “" As support for this contention, ALIC cites Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(43), which provides that an "`unauthorized' signature or indorsement means one made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(44) — 2 cases
Hughes Developers, Inc. v. Montgomery, 903 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2004). “Under the foregoing definitions in § 7-1-201, Montgomery is considered a purchaser for value under Alabama's version of the UCC.”
First Maryland Leasecorp. v. M/V Golden Egret, 764 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1985).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(44)(b) — 2 cases
Hoc, Inc. v. McAllister, 211 B.R. 976 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
In Re McAllister, 211 B.R. 976 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(46) — 1 case
Mcmillan, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Eng., 512 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1987).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(9) — 4 cases
Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Humble, 532 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
Wyatt Oil Co., Inc. v. Madden Coal Co., Inc., 455 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1984).
Mancil v. Jeffrey Steel Co., Inc., 565 So. 2d 88 (Ala. 1990).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(b)(15) — 1 case
Atl. Nat. Trust, LLC v. McNamee, 984 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 2007). “Ala.Code 1975, § 7-1-201(b)(15). If an instrument is lost, destroyed, or stolen, it is no longer "possessed" by its owner and, as a result, cannot be "delivered" as required to effect a transfer of the instrument under § 7-3-203.”
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(b)(21) — 1 case
Nelson v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2019).
— Ala. Code § 7-1-201(b)(21)(A) — 1 case
Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 218 So. 3d 816 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.