Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115 (2026)
Defenses to murder
✓ current as of July 2026
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Sec. 11.41.115. Defenses to murder.
(a) In a prosecution under AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) or 11.41.110(a)(1), it is a defense that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion resulted from a serious provocation by the intended victim.
(b) In a prosecution under AS 11.41.110(a)(3), it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
(1) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit or aid in its commission;
(2) was not armed with a dangerous instrument;
(3) had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant, if any, was armed with a dangerous instrument; and
(4) had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant, if any, intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(c) A person may not be convicted of murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(3) if the only underlying crime is burglary, the sole purpose of the burglary is a criminal homicide, and the person killed is the intended victim of the defendant. However, if the defendant causes the death of any other person, the defendant may be convicted of murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(3). Nothing in this subsection precludes a prosecution for or conviction of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(1) or (2) or of any other crime, including manslaughter or burglary.
(d) [Repealed, § 44 ch 102 SLA 1980.]
(e) Nothing in (a) or (b) of this section precludes a prosecution for or conviction of manslaughter or any other crime not specifically precluded.
(f) In this section,
(1) “intended victim” means a person whom the defendant was attempting to kill or to whom the defendant was attempting to cause serious physical injury when the defendant caused the death of the person the defendant is charged with killing;
(2) “serious provocation” means conduct which is sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person in the defendant's situation, other than a person who is intoxicated, under the circumstances as the defendant reasonably believed them to be; insulting words, insulting gestures, or hearsay reports of conduct engaged in by the intended victim do not, alone or in combination with each other, constitute serious provocation.
(a) In a prosecution under AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) or 11.41.110(a)(1), it is a defense that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion resulted from a serious provocation by the intended victim.
(b) In a prosecution under AS 11.41.110(a)(3), it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
(1) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit or aid in its commission;
(2) was not armed with a dangerous instrument;
(3) had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant, if any, was armed with a dangerous instrument; and
(4) had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant, if any, intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(c) A person may not be convicted of murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(3) if the only underlying crime is burglary, the sole purpose of the burglary is a criminal homicide, and the person killed is the intended victim of the defendant. However, if the defendant causes the death of any other person, the defendant may be convicted of murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(3). Nothing in this subsection precludes a prosecution for or conviction of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110(a)(1) or (2) or of any other crime, including manslaughter or burglary.
(d) [Repealed, § 44 ch 102 SLA 1980.]
(e) Nothing in (a) or (b) of this section precludes a prosecution for or conviction of manslaughter or any other crime not specifically precluded.
(f) In this section,
(1) “intended victim” means a person whom the defendant was attempting to kill or to whom the defendant was attempting to cause serious physical injury when the defendant caused the death of the person the defendant is charged with killing;
(2) “serious provocation” means conduct which is sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person in the defendant's situation, other than a person who is intoxicated, under the circumstances as the defendant reasonably believed them to be; insulting words, insulting gestures, or hearsay reports of conduct engaged in by the intended victim do not, alone or in combination with each other, constitute serious provocation.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases, 1979–2020 · leading case: Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “(a) Our prior decisions construing AS 11.41.115 Before Alaska's present criminal code went into effect in January 1980, we had no statutory definition of the heat of passion defense.”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “This doctrine is codified in AS 11.41.115(a): In a prosecution [for first-degree murder] under AS 11.”
Luch v. State, 413 P.3d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “(a) Explanation of the defense of heat of passion under Alaska law The defense of heat of passion is defined in AS 11.41.115. This statute declares that heat of passion is a partial defense to two types of murder: • a homicide charged under AS 11.”
Kirby v. State, 649 P.2d 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.41.115. Even though the state has argued that the instructions as given strengthen its harmless error argument, it has conceded that the judge did not intend to instruct the jury that a heat of passion defense was possible for felony-murder.”
Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979). “Section 11.41.115(d) of the new code provides: In a prosecution under § 100(a)(1) or 110(a)(l) of this chapter, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the homicidal act, the defendant honestly but unreasonably believed that the circumstances were such that, had they…”
Smith v. State, 229 P.3d 221 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). “155(h) declares that, for purposes of applying mitigator (d)(6), sentencing courts are to use the definition of "serious provocation" found in Alaska's heat of passion statute, AS 11.41.115. The heat of passion statute defines "serious provocation" as "conduct .”
Balentine v. State, 707 P.2d 922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “The Alaska Revised Criminal Code, enacted in 1978 and taking effect in January, 1980, originally recognized such a defense, under former AS 11.41.115(d). The legislature repealed this provision, *930 however, the following commentary accompanied the repeal legislation: This…”
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “(g) Voluntary alcohol or other drug intoxication or chronic alcoholism or other drug addiction may not be considered an aggravating or mitigating factor.”
Martin v. State, 664 P.2d 612 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). “” AS 11.41.115 enumerates defenses to murder.”
Gustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). “- *766 100(a)(1) unless the killing is mitigated by heat of passion under AS 11.41.115(a); if so, the crime is manslaughter.”
Todd v. State, 884 P.2d 668 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “This legislative intent is manifested by AS 11.41.115(c) and the legislature’s commentary to that section.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(a) — 18 cases
Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “(a) Our prior decisions construing AS 11.41.115 Before Alaska's present criminal code went into effect in January 1980, we had no statutory definition of the heat of passion defense.”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “This doctrine is codified in AS 11.41.115(a): In a prosecution [for first-degree murder] under AS 11.”
Gustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). “- *766 100(a)(1) unless the killing is mitigated by heat of passion under AS 11.41.115(a); if so, the crime is manslaughter.”
State v. Dague, 143 P.3d 988 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(c) — 4 cases
Kirby v. State, 649 P.2d 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.41.115. Even though the state has argued that the instructions as given strengthen its harmless error argument, it has conceded that the judge did not intend to instruct the jury that a heat of passion defense was possible for felony-murder.”
Todd v. State, 884 P.2d 668 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “This legislative intent is manifested by AS 11.41.115(c) and the legislature’s commentary to that section.”
Todd v. State, 917 P.2d 674 (Alaska 1996).
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(d) — 3 cases
Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979). “Section 11.41.115(d) of the new code provides: In a prosecution under § 100(a)(1) or 110(a)(l) of this chapter, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the homicidal act, the defendant honestly but unreasonably believed that the circumstances were such that, had they…”
Balentine v. State, 707 P.2d 922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “The Alaska Revised Criminal Code, enacted in 1978 and taking effect in January, 1980, originally recognized such a defense, under former AS 11.41.115(d). The legislature repealed this provision, *930 however, the following commentary accompanied the repeal legislation: This…”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(e) — 3 cases
Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “(a) Our prior decisions construing AS 11.41.115 Before Alaska's present criminal code went into effect in January 1980, we had no statutory definition of the heat of passion defense.”
Luch v. State, 413 P.3d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “(a) Explanation of the defense of heat of passion under Alaska law The defense of heat of passion is defined in AS 11.41.115. This statute declares that heat of passion is a partial defense to two types of murder: • a homicide charged under AS 11.”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(f) — 2 cases
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “(g) Voluntary alcohol or other drug intoxication or chronic alcoholism or other drug addiction may not be considered an aggravating or mitigating factor.”
Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “(a) Our prior decisions construing AS 11.41.115 Before Alaska's present criminal code went into effect in January 1980, we had no statutory definition of the heat of passion defense.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(f)(2) — 12 cases
Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “(a) Our prior decisions construing AS 11.41.115 Before Alaska's present criminal code went into effect in January 1980, we had no statutory definition of the heat of passion defense.”
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “This doctrine is codified in AS 11.41.115(a): In a prosecution [for first-degree murder] under AS 11.”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The legislature based the language of AS 11.41.115 on the heat of passion statute recommended to it by the Criminal Code Revision Commission in February 1977.”
Luch v. State, 413 P.3d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “(a) Explanation of the defense of heat of passion under Alaska law The defense of heat of passion is defined in AS 11.41.115. This statute declares that heat of passion is a partial defense to two types of murder: • a homicide charged under AS 11.”
Roark v. State, 758 P.2d 644 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
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