Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised by the state, a county, city, town, village, or political subdivision, or by a person, for the following uses:
1. All public uses authorized by the government of the United States.
2. Buildings and grounds for any public use of the state and all other public uses authorized by the legislature.
3. Buildings and grounds for the use of a county, city, town or school district.
4. Canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches or pipes, for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants or for drainage of a county, city, town or village.
5. Raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, or widening, deepening or straightening their channels.
6. Roads, streets and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of a county, city, town or village, or the inhabitants thereof, which is authorized by the legislature. The method of apportioning and collecting the costs of the improvements authorized by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be as provided in the law by which they are authorized.
7. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads and highways.
8. Steam, horse, mule, electric and cable railroads or railways.
9. Telegraph and telephone lines and conduits for public communication.
10. Electric light and power transmission lines, pipe lines used for supplying gas, and all transportation, transmission and intercommunication facilities of public service agencies.
11. Aviation fields.
12. Reservoirs, canals, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes, for the use of a county, city, town or village, or its inhabitants, or for public transportation for supplying mines and other industrial enterprises, farms and farm neighborhoods with water for irrigation, domestic and other needful purposes, and for generating electricity.
13. Draining and reclaiming lands, and for floating logs and lumber on nonnavigable streams.
14. Roads, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping places for working mines, and outlets, natural or otherwise, for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter from mines, and an occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter from their several mines.
15. Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
16. Private canals, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for conducting water from natural water courses or bodies or from public sources where the lands to be irrigated are not directly reached by such natural water course or public sources.
17. Pipe lines to carry petroleum, petroleum products or any other liquid.
18. Rights of way, station grounds, pits, yards, sidetracks and other necessary facilities for railways.
Notes of Decisions
City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 407 P.2d 91 (Ariz. 1965).
· cites it 22× “, are: (1) whether A.R.S. § 12-1111, subsec. 3 (1956) grants cities the power of eminent domain to acquire property for parking areas to be used in conjunction with city buildings; and (2), whether a condemnation complaint alleging the land condemned ultimately will be used for…”
City of Tempe v. Fleming, 815 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 12× “The purposes for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised are set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1111. The City claims statutory authority to condemn Fleming’s property pursuant to A.”
City of Mesa v. Smith Co. of Arizona, Inc., 816 P.2d 939 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 20× “The City relies on A.R.S. § 12-1111 and its city charter as authority for its claim that the legislature has delegated the necessary authority.”
Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 790 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1990).
· cites it 4× “The appeal was transferred to this court to consider whether either the Enabling Act or the Arizona Constitution allowed a school district to condemn trust land.”
City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 10× “What the Donofrio case acutally held was that A.R.S. § 12-1111 (1956) did not specifically authorize the taking of property by eminent domain for off-street parking.”
Orsett/Columbia Ltd. P'ship v. Superior Court, 83 P.3d 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Our legislature has delegated to counties, as political subdivisions of the State, the right to exercise that power for the limited purposes enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-1111 (2003). 3 Hence, a county may not exercise the power of eminent domain for purposes other than those…”
City of Scottsdale v. CGP-Aberdeen, L.L.C., 177 P.3d 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3 Scottsdale is a municipal corporation authorized to acquire property in accordance with Arizona’s direct condemnation statutes, A.R.S. §§ 12-1111 through -1129 (2003). Scottsdale condemned CGP’s undeveloped parcel for inclusion in its McDowell…”
Spencer D. Stewart, Et Ux. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983).
· cites it 2× “The fair valuation of the public utility shall be the equivalent of the compensation to be paid for the taking of private property for public use as provided by [Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12-1111 et seq.], and the amount shall be determined by one of the following methods: 1.”
City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 150 P.3d 245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 12-1111(2) (2003). The City has also been granted power to preserve “open spaces” by expending or advancing public funds.”
Calmat of Arizona v. State Ex Rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. 1993).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. §§ 12-1111, et seq. The legislature, however, has not specifically addressed inverse condemnation actions by property owners; that authority stems directly from Ariz.”
City of Yuma v. Lattie, 572 P.2d 108 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 4× “, which provides, in part, that “no private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made, .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1111(10) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1111(17) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1111(2) — 1 case
City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 150 P.3d 245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“” A.R.S. § 12-1111(2) (2003). The City has also been granted power to preserve “open spaces” by expending or advancing public funds.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1111(3) — 2 cases
Orsett/Columbia Ltd. P'ship v. Superior Court, 83 P.3d 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“Our legislature has delegated to counties, as political subdivisions of the State, the right to exercise that power for the limited purposes enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-1111 (2003). 3 Hence, a county may not exercise the power of eminent domain for purposes other than those…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1111(6) — 4 cases
City of Tempe v. Fleming, 815 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
“The purposes for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised are set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1111. The City claims statutory authority to condemn Fleming’s property pursuant to A.”
City of Yuma v. Lattie, 572 P.2d 108 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
“, which provides, in part, that “no private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made, .”
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