A. At any time after judgment is entered, or pending an appeal from the judgment to the supreme court, when plaintiff has paid into court for defendant or defendants the full amount of the judgment, and such other amounts as required by the court as a fund to pay further damages and costs which may be recovered in the proceedings, as well as all damages that may be sustained by defendant or defendants if for any cause the property is not finally taken for public use, the superior court in which the action was tried may, upon notice of not less than ten days, authorize plaintiff, if already in possession, to continue therein, or if not, then to take possession of and use the property until final conclusion of the litigation, and may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceedings against plaintiff on account thereof.
B. The defendant or defendants who are entitled to the money paid into court upon any judgment may demand and receive the money at any time thereafter upon an order of the court. The court shall, upon application, order the money so paid into court delivered to the party entitled thereto upon his filing either a satisfaction of the judgment or a receipt for the money, and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding except as to the amount of damages to which he may be entitled if a new trial is granted. Such payment shall be deemed an abandonment of all defenses, except the party's claim for greater compensation.
C. The money paid into court on final judgment may be placed by order of court in the custody of the clerk or state treasurer to be held or disbursed upon order of court, and plaintiff and such officers shall be subject to the same responsibility, liabilities and restrictions with respect thereto as provided in this article when money is paid into court by plaintiff upon application for possession before trial.
D. When a new trial is granted upon application of a defendant, and he fails upon the trial to obtain greater compensation than was allowed upon the first trial, the costs of the new trial shall be taxed against him.
Notes of Decisions
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 204 P.3d 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 34× “In this opinion, we address only the issue of whether the automatic stay provision of Rule 62(g) governs over A.R.S. § 12-1127 as to payment of a condemnation judgment.”
Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. v. Hing, 709 P.2d 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 20× “Defendants assert that A.R.S. § 12-1127(B) is a violation of equal protection and due process rights under the United States and Arizona Constitutions.”
Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “2d at 1238 , reasoning that the remedies provided for in Chapter 8 extend beyond the trial court, as exemplified by A.R.S. §§ 12-1127 and 12-1160. Based upon the provisions of our other attorneys’ fees statutes regarding fees on appeal and the existence of remedies in Chapter 8…”
Pima Cty. v. McCarville Ex Rel. Pinal Cty., 231 P.3d 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 11× “Thus, we held in Johnson , “Rule 62(g) is not enforceable when it impinges on the light to immediate payment under AR.S. § 12-1127.” Id. ¶ 9 Here, in contrast to Johnson , no similar conflict exists with Rule 62(g) because this was an inverse-condemnation action and therefore…”
State Ex Rel. Herman v. Jacobs, 440 P.2d 32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
· cites it 7× “The State contends that under the provisions of A.R.S. §§ 12-1127, subsec. A and 12-1127, subsec.”
Maricopa Cnty. v. Barkley, 812 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 2× “In response, Barkley and Estes point out that the county already has possession of the land and argue that they are entitled to immediate payment under A.R.S. § 12-1127. This statute requires the county to pay the judgment if it retains possession, they argue.”
City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 4× “Thus, A.R.S. § 12-1127(A) (1956) provides in part: "At any time after judgment is entered .”
Arizona Podiatry Ass'n v. Dir. of Ins., 422 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1966).
· cites it 2× “Eminent Domain § 12-1127 41. Military Court Martial § 26-210 The foregoing list is not exhaustive, and is merely intended to illustrate the number of statutes where an appeal may be taken to this Court.”
Pima Cnty. v. Hogan, 3 P.3d 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “[3] Section 12-1127, A.R.S., which provides for an award of costs if a landowner applies for and receives a new trial, but fails to obtain greater compensation, imposes a sanction similar to Rule 68, but, again, in a different context.”
Mariposa Dev. Co. v. Stoddard, 711 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 2× “See A.R.S. §§ 12-1127 and 12-1160. Be that as it may, we also believe the holding has outlived whatever vitality it once had.”
Romley v. Superior Court, 604 P.2d 15 (Ariz. 1979).
· cites it 4× “The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to set a supersedeas bond by order dated November 2, 1979, finding that A.R.S. § 12-1127 controlled in eminent domain actions and that supersedeas was not a remedy provided under said section.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1127(A) — 4 cases
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 204 P.3d 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“In this opinion, we address only the issue of whether the automatic stay provision of Rule 62(g) governs over A.R.S. § 12-1127 as to payment of a condemnation judgment.”
City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
“Thus, A.R.S. § 12-1127(A) (1956) provides in part: "At any time after judgment is entered .”
Pima Cty. v. McCarville Ex Rel. Pinal Cty., 231 P.3d 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
“Thus, we held in Johnson , “Rule 62(g) is not enforceable when it impinges on the light to immediate payment under AR.S. § 12-1127.” Id. ¶ 9 Here, in contrast to Johnson , no similar conflict exists with Rule 62(g) because this was an inverse-condemnation action and therefore…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1127(B) — 4 cases
Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. v. Hing, 709 P.2d 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
“Defendants assert that A.R.S. § 12-1127(B) is a violation of equal protection and due process rights under the United States and Arizona Constitutions.”
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 204 P.3d 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“In this opinion, we address only the issue of whether the automatic stay provision of Rule 62(g) governs over A.R.S. § 12-1127 as to payment of a condemnation judgment.”
Pima Cty. v. McCarville Ex Rel. Pinal Cty., 231 P.3d 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
“Thus, we held in Johnson , “Rule 62(g) is not enforceable when it impinges on the light to immediate payment under AR.S. § 12-1127.” Id. ¶ 9 Here, in contrast to Johnson , no similar conflict exists with Rule 62(g) because this was an inverse-condemnation action and therefore…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.