A. Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by separate action.
B. If a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants by motion on notice to all parties to the action.
C. If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.
D. If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either:
1. Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to the claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one year after payment.
2. Agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has within one year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution.
E. The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the judgment does not impair a right of contribution.
F. The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death is binding as among the defendants in determining their right to contribution. If the claimant's case is tried, the trier of fact shall apportion and determine the respective degrees of fault of the defendants to the action.
Notes of Decisions
Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., Inc., 701 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. 1985).
· cites it 9× “Their relative degrees of fault are the basis for allocation, (emphasis added) * * * Further, A.R.S. § 12-2503(F.) provides in pertinent part: “F.”
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
· cites it 11× “§ 12-2503. Enforcement .... D. If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has .”
PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995).
· cites it 2× “§ 12-2501 and § 12-2503 would be superfluous. These sections still apply to cases that fall within the § 12-2506(D) exceptions to the abrogation of joint and several liability- 3 .”
Passmore v. McCarver, 395 P.3d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“Plaintiffs objected to the proposed judgment, arguing that the motion to dismiss had not mentioned Rule 41(b), that the court’s order had not mentioned either Rule 41(b) or intentional *291 or -willful conduct, and that § 12-2503(F) required dismissal without prejudice.”
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 842 P.2d 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“For purposes of § 12-2502, § 12-2503, subsection F and § 12-2505 with respect to cases involving assumption of risk, the relative degree of fault of a person strictly liable in tort is the defect causing injury to the claimant.”
Aztlan Lodge No. 1 v. Ruffner, 745 P.2d 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “This precedes the adoption of the comparative negligence statutes, A.R.S. § 12-2503 etseq. (effective August 30, 1984), consequently the parties did not raise and we have not considered any comparative negligence issues.”
Cella Barr Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 868 P.2d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 3× “” It further maintains that, according to subsection B, this right exists when the tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and that subsection D permits a settling tortfeasor’s contribution action against those tortfeasors whose liability has…”
Allied World Assurance Co. v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., et al. (D. Ariz. 2026).
· cites it 6× “The UCATA abolished the 19 prior common law rule prohibiting claims of contribution among joint tortfeasors and 20 made each joint tortfeasor responsible for that tortfeasor’s pro rata share of the entire 21 liability, which was to be allocated according to “relative degrees of…”
Cella Barr Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 868 P.2d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 3× “" It further maintains that, according to subsection B, this right exists when the tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and that subsection D permits a settling tortfeasor's contribution action against those tortfeasors whose liability has…”
State Farm v. Premier Manufactured Sys. (Ariz. 2007).
“§ 12-2503(A) & (B). When a defendant seeks contribution, the finder of fact must apportion liability according to the relative degrees of fault of each tortfeasor.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2503(A) — 3 cases
PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995).
“§ 12-2501 and § 12-2503 would be superfluous. These sections still apply to cases that fall within the § 12-2506(D) exceptions to the abrogation of joint and several liability- 3 .”
State Farm v. Premier Manufactured Sys. (Ariz. 2007).
“§ 12-2503(A) & (B). When a defendant seeks contribution, the finder of fact must apportion liability according to the relative degrees of fault of each tortfeasor.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2503(D) — 3 cases
Allied World Assurance Co. v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., et al. (D. Ariz. 2026).
“The UCATA abolished the 19 prior common law rule prohibiting claims of contribution among joint tortfeasors and 20 made each joint tortfeasor responsible for that tortfeasor’s pro rata share of the entire 21 liability, which was to be allocated according to “relative degrees of…”
Cella Barr Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 868 P.2d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“” It further maintains that, according to subsection B, this right exists when the tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and that subsection D permits a settling tortfeasor’s contribution action against those tortfeasors whose liability has…”
Cella Barr Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 868 P.2d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“" It further maintains that, according to subsection B, this right exists when the tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and that subsection D permits a settling tortfeasor's contribution action against those tortfeasors whose liability has…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2503(D)(1) — 1 case
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
“§ 12-2503. Enforcement .... D. If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2503(F) — 1 case
Passmore v. McCarver, 395 P.3d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“Plaintiffs objected to the proposed judgment, arguing that the motion to dismiss had not mentioned Rule 41(b), that the court’s order had not mentioned either Rule 41(b) or intentional *291 or -willful conduct, and that § 12-2503(F) required dismissal without prejudice.”
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