A. If an action is commenced within the time limited for the action, and the action is terminated in any manner other than by abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or a final judgment on the merits, the plaintiff, or a successor or personal representative, may commence a new action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within six months after such termination. If an action timely commenced is terminated by abatement, voluntary dismissal by order of the court or dismissal for lack of prosecution, the court in its discretion may provide a period for commencement of a new action for the same cause, although the time otherwise limited for commencement has expired. Such period shall not exceed six months from the date of termination.
B. The provisions of subsection A apply to judgments on appeal. The date of issuance of the mandate by the appellate court constitutes the date of termination of the action for the purposes of computing the time limited for commencement of the new action.
C. If a new action on the same cause of action is commenced by the plaintiff, his successor or his personal representative, the assertion of any cause of action or defense by the defendant in the new action is timely if it was or could have been timely asserted in the prior action.
D. If an action timely commenced is dismissed because the named plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action, the provisions of this section apply to an action subsequently brought by the proper party, provided that the dismissed action was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claim sought to be asserted.
E. The provisions of this section are applicable to actions terminated by orders of dismissal entered on or after the effective date of this section.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
62
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1967–2026 · leading case:
Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728 (Ariz. 1990).
Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728 (Ariz. 1990).
· cites it 75× “John Flynn's personal injury action was dismissed for lack of prosecution after the trial court denied his motion to continue the case on the court's inactive calendar under Uniform Rule V(e), Ariz.”
Jepson v. New, 772 P.2d 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 126× “On January 6, they amended their motion to seek alternative relief under A.R.S. § 12-504. Plaintiffs' motion was denied by Judge Riddel, to whom the case had been transferred upon Judge Hilliard's self-disqualification, and the denial was embodied in a formal order entered on…”
Passmore v. McCarver, 395 P.3d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 20× “Appellants then sought to refile the action under Arizona’s “savings statute,” A.R.S. § 12-504, but the court found that relief was not available under that statute and dismissed the claims with prejudice.”
Flynn v. Cornoyer-Hedrick Architects & Planners, Inc., 772 P.2d 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 29× “The issues in this appeal are whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to continue this case on the inactive calendar, refusing to permit a refiling of a new complaint pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-504 (Supp.1987), and signing a formal order that differed from…”
Janson v. Christensen, 808 P.2d 1222 (Ariz. 1991).
· cites it 7× “Pursuant to rule 27(a), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona has certified to this court the following question of law: Does A.R.S. § 12-504, commonly referred to as Arizona’s saving statute, apply to the refiling of an…”
Maher v. Urman, 124 P.3d 770 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 9× “2, and A.R.S. § 12-504, Arizona’s savings statute.”
Tilley v. Delci, 204 P.3d 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “¶ 5 On March 8, 2007, Tilley filed three documents: (1) a “Motion to Amend/AJlow Responses to Defendants’ Requests for Admission;” (2) a response to Delci’s statement of facts and a separate statement of facts; and (3) “Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary…”
Roller Vill., Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 328 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 17× “This proceeding involves issues relating to A.R.S. § 12-504, enacted in 1986, and sometimes referred to as the “saving” statute.”
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360 (Ariz. 2011).
· cites it 7× “V ¶ 30 Although the Ninth Circuit did not certify a question relating to Arizona’s savings statute, A.R.S. § 12-504(A) (2003), that court stated that its “phrasing of the questions should not limit [our] consideration of the issues involved.”
Short v. Dewald, 244 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 12× “2 *92 DISCUSSION ¶ 16 The Shorts argue that Judge Chavez had no authority to vacate Judge Gaines’ decision in the prior case granting relief pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-504. They contend that Judge Gaines’ order was a final order that could not be vacated by another superior court…”
Thompson v. Paul, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Ariz. 2009).
· cites it 6× “” A.R.S. § 12-504 (emphasis added). Although Plaintiffs timely appealed the Court’s orders, Plaintiffs raised only the Court’s dismissal of the Section 10(b) claim and denial of the request to certify a question of state law to the Arizona Supreme Court.”
Rogers v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 429 P.2d 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
· cites it 14× “Does A.R.S. § 12-504 toll the funning of the two year statute of limitation for wrongful death actions? 2.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(A) — 38 cases
Passmore v. McCarver, 395 P.3d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“Appellants then sought to refile the action under Arizona’s “savings statute,” A.R.S. § 12-504, but the court found that relief was not available under that statute and dismissed the claims with prejudice.”
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360 (Ariz. 2011).
“V ¶ 30 Although the Ninth Circuit did not certify a question relating to Arizona’s savings statute, A.R.S. § 12-504(A) (2003), that court stated that its “phrasing of the questions should not limit [our] consideration of the issues involved.”
Jepson v. New, 772 P.2d 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
“On January 6, they amended their motion to seek alternative relief under A.R.S. § 12-504. Plaintiffs' motion was denied by Judge Riddel, to whom the case had been transferred upon Judge Hilliard's self-disqualification, and the denial was embodied in a formal order entered on…”
Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728 (Ariz. 1990).
“John Flynn's personal injury action was dismissed for lack of prosecution after the trial court denied his motion to continue the case on the court's inactive calendar under Uniform Rule V(e), Ariz.”
Janson v. Christensen, 808 P.2d 1222 (Ariz. 1991).
“Pursuant to rule 27(a), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona has certified to this court the following question of law: Does A.R.S. § 12-504, commonly referred to as Arizona’s saving statute, apply to the refiling of an…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(B) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(C) — 1 case
Short v. Dewald, 244 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
“2 *92 DISCUSSION ¶ 16 The Shorts argue that Judge Chavez had no authority to vacate Judge Gaines’ decision in the prior case granting relief pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-504. They contend that Judge Gaines’ order was a final order that could not be vacated by another superior court…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(D) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(E) — 1 case
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