Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567 (2026)

Civil fertility fraud; liability; statute of limitations; definitions

✓ current as of May 2026

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12-567. Civil fertility fraud; liability; statute of limitations; definitions

A. A woman who gives birth to a child after being treated for infertility by a physician, the spouse of the woman, the surviving spouse of the woman or the child born as a result of the actions of a physician described in this section may bring an action against a licensed health care provider who knowingly or intentionally treated the woman for infertility by using the licensed health care provider's own spermatozoon or ovum without the patient's informed written consent to treatment using that spermatozoon or ovum.

B. A donor of human reproductive material may bring an action against a licensed health care provider who treats a patient for infertility by using human reproductive material donated by the donor and who knows or reasonably should have known that the donor's human reproductive material was used either:

1. Without the donor's consent.

2. In a manner or to an extent other than that to which the donor consented.

C. A plaintiff who prevails in an action under this section is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, the costs of the fertility treatment if the action is brought under subsection A of this section, and either:

1. Compensatory and punitive damages.

2. Liquidated damages of $10,000.

D. A person who brings an action under subsection A of this section has a separate cause of action for each child born as the result of the fraudulent fertility treatment. A person who brings an action under subsection B of this section has a separate cause of action for each individual who received fertility treatment with the donor's human reproductive material.

E. Notwithstanding any other law and except as provided in subsection F of this section, an action for civil fertility fraud must be commenced not later than:

1. Ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the child.

2. If paragraph 1 of this subsection does not apply, twenty years after the procedure was performed.

F. An action for civil fertility fraud that would otherwise be barred under subsection E of this section may be commenced not later than five years after the earliest of the date that:

1. The person first discovers evidence sufficient to bring an action against the defendant through DNA analysis.

2. The person first becomes aware of the existence of a recording that provides evidence sufficient to bring an action against the defendant.

3. The defendant confesses to the offense.

G. For the purposes of this section:

1. "Human reproductive material" means a human spermatozoon or ovum or a human organism at any stage of development from fertilized ovum to embryo.

2. "Physician" means a person who is licensed pursuant to title 32, chapter 13 or 17.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 30 cases, 1977–2004 · leading case: Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977).

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Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977). · cites it 39× “We accepted jurisdiction of this petition for special action to consider the constitutionality of the medical liability review panels as provided by A.R.S. §§ 12-567, et seq. In addition to the constitutionality of the statute, we must also consider whether the trial judge was…”

Daou v. Harris, 678 P.2d 934 (Ariz. 1984). · cites it 18× “Four issues confront us: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment without referring the cause to a medical liability review panel pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567(A), whether Harris' failure to answer was excusable under Ariz.”

Campbell v. Arnold, 590 P.2d 909 (Ariz. 1979). · cites it 34× “We need decide only one question on appeal: May parties dissatisfied with a decision of a medical review panel made pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567, bypass the Superior Court and seek direct relief in the Court of Appeals? The petitioner, a medical doctor licensed to practice…”

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 28× “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

Barrett v. Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 735 P.2d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 16× “The plaintiffs claims were initially presented before a medical liability review panel, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567. The panel included a physician practicing in pediatrics.”

St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 793 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 26× “2123 does not expressly provide for retroactive repeal of former A.R.S. § 12-567 and because the right to a review panel is substantive, we hold that A.”

Gurr v. Willcutt, 707 P.2d 979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 16× “A.R.S. § 12-567(A). The presiding judge appoints the members of the panel, which is comprised of one superior court judge, one attorney and one health care provider who engages in the same area of practice as that involved in the case.”

Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984). · cites it 4× “2d 744 (1977), found a portion of the Medical Malpractice Act requiring a bond, A.R.S. § 12-567(K), to be unconstitutional because it placed a heavy burden on access to the courts and violated the privilege and immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution.”

Shotwell v. Donahoe, 85 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. 2004). · cites it 6× “289, § 1 (repealing A.R.S. § 12-567). Thus, we are not persuaded that employers are encouraged to participate in EEOC investigations or to settle cases by reason of the per se admission at trial of the EEOC determination.”

Johnson v. Univ. Hosp., 712 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 12× “4 The matter was referred to a medical liability review panel as required by A.R.S. § 12-567. Following a hearing, the panel found in favor of plaintiff as to three of her claims of malpractice.”

DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 695 P.2d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 12× “O'Brien and HSRI were presented to a Medical Liability Review Panel, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567, which found in favor of the defendants.”

Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 727 P.2d 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 6× “Borja argues that that panel’s conclusion should not have been admitted into evidence at trial because the panel review provision, A.R.S. 12-567, is unconstitutional. That provision, as originally enacted, has already been upheld by this state’s Supreme Court in Eastin v.”

Show all 30 citing cases →

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(1) — 4 cases

Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977). “We accepted jurisdiction of this petition for special action to consider the constitutionality of the medical liability review panels as provided by A.R.S. §§ 12-567, et seq. In addition to the constitutionality of the statute, we must also consider whether the trial judge was…”

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 727 P.2d 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). “Borja argues that that panel’s conclusion should not have been admitted into evidence at trial because the panel review provision, A.R.S. 12-567, is unconstitutional. That provision, as originally enacted, has already been upheld by this state’s Supreme Court in Eastin v.”

New v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 618 P.2d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(A) — 12 cases

Daou v. Harris, 678 P.2d 934 (Ariz. 1984). “Four issues confront us: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment without referring the cause to a medical liability review panel pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567(A), whether Harris' failure to answer was excusable under Ariz.”

St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 793 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). “2123 does not expressly provide for retroactive repeal of former A.R.S. § 12-567 and because the right to a review panel is substantive, we hold that A.”

Campbell v. Arnold, 590 P.2d 909 (Ariz. 1979). “We need decide only one question on appeal: May parties dissatisfied with a decision of a medical review panel made pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567, bypass the Superior Court and seek direct relief in the Court of Appeals? The petitioner, a medical doctor licensed to practice…”

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(B) — 1 case

Gurr v. Willcutt, 707 P.2d 979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). “A.R.S. § 12-567(A). The presiding judge appoints the members of the panel, which is comprised of one superior court judge, one attorney and one health care provider who engages in the same area of practice as that involved in the case.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(B)(5) — 1 case

McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(D) — 2 cases

Biliack v. Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1372 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(F) — 8 cases

Barrett v. Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 735 P.2d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “The plaintiffs claims were initially presented before a medical liability review panel, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567. The panel included a physician practicing in pediatrics.”

Shotwell v. Donahoe, 85 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. 2004). “289, § 1 (repealing A.R.S. § 12-567). Thus, we are not persuaded that employers are encouraged to participate in EEOC investigations or to settle cases by reason of the per se admission at trial of the EEOC determination.”

West Valley Camelback Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 793 P.2d 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(G) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(H) — 7 cases

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

State Ex Rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for Child. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979).

Johnson v. Univ. Hosp., 712 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). “4 The matter was referred to a medical liability review panel as required by A.R.S. § 12-567. Following a hearing, the panel found in favor of plaintiff as to three of her claims of malpractice.”

Phoenix Gen. Hosp. v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa, 675 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. 1984).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(I) — 2 cases

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

New v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 618 P.2d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(J) — 4 cases

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(K) — 8 cases

Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984). “2d 744 (1977), found a portion of the Medical Malpractice Act requiring a bond, A.R.S. § 12-567(K), to be unconstitutional because it placed a heavy burden on access to the courts and violated the privilege and immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution.”

DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 695 P.2d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). “O'Brien and HSRI were presented to a Medical Liability Review Panel, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567, which found in favor of the defendants.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(L) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(M) — 4 cases

Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “See A.R.S. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976-77) (repealed by Laws 1989, ch.”

Musa v. C. K. Adrian, M.D., 636 P.2d 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567(d) — 2 cases

Phoenix Gen. Hosp. v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa, 675 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. 1984).

Phoenix Gen. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 675 P.2d 1323 (Ariz. 1984).

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