A. In any criminal prosecution brought by the state, a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
B. The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including but not limited to the following:
1. The time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment.
2. Whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession.
3. Whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him.
4. Whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel.
5. Whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the factors indicated in paragraphs 1 through 5 of this subsection which are taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
C. Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention. As used in this section, the term "confession" means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.
Notes of Decisions
State v. Hyde, 921 P.2d 655 (Ariz. 1996).
· cites it 4× “We emphasize that Mr. Varbel agreed to begin trial as scheduled and that he did not enter this case on a cold record.”
State v. Brooks, 618 P.2d 624 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 14× “2 A.R.S. § 13-3988 provides in part as follows: A.”
State v. Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 3× “section 13-3988(B) (1989). This statute requires a judge to consider “[w]hether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession.”
State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 1981).
· cites it 4× “Defendant does not contend that these statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda 2 rights but asserts the statements were involuntary under A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(1) and (2). 3 Relying on the statute, defendant claims his statements were involuntary because 1) they were…”
State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1995).
· cites it 3× “Walden claims that Spring is inapplicable because A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(2) requires the court to consider a defendant’s knowledge of the charges he is facing when determining whether a waiver was voluntary.”
State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994).
· cites it 2× “AR.S. § 13-3988(B); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz.”
State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “[8] Given the trial judge's findings, all of which find support in the record, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial judge committed clear and manifest error in ruling that the state proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's confessions during the…”
State v. Tapia, 767 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1988).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 13-3988. Absent a showing of clear and manifest error, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling.”
State v. Conde, 846 P.2d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 3× “Nothing said in the first interrogation was used to obtain the second statement. The first interrogation simply had no impact on the second.”
State v. Piatt, 644 P.2d 881 (Ariz. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Knapp, supra; see also A.R.S. § 13-3988. In the instant case, we believe that the State made a prima facie case of voluntariness and it was up to the defendant to go forward with the evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case.”
State v. Pettit, 979 P.2d 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “1992); see also A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(3) & (4) (1989). Although a failure to give Miranda warnings is not determinative of voluntariness, the lack of warnings gives “added weight” to other circumstances that make a confession involuntary.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(A) — 14 cases
State v. Brooks, 618 P.2d 624 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
“2 A.R.S. § 13-3988 provides in part as follows: A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(A)(B)(C) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(B) — 4 cases
State v. Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
“section 13-3988(B) (1989). This statute requires a judge to consider “[w]hether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession.”
State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994).
“AR.S. § 13-3988(B); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz.”
State v. Brooks, 618 P.2d 624 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
“2 A.R.S. § 13-3988 provides in part as follows: A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(B)(1) — 1 case
State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 1981).
“Defendant does not contend that these statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda 2 rights but asserts the statements were involuntary under A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(1) and (2). 3 Relying on the statute, defendant claims his statements were involuntary because 1) they were…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(B)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1995).
“Walden claims that Spring is inapplicable because A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(2) requires the court to consider a defendant’s knowledge of the charges he is facing when determining whether a waiver was voluntary.”
State v. Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
“section 13-3988(B) (1989). This statute requires a judge to consider “[w]hether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(B)(3) — 1 case
State v. Pettit, 979 P.2d 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
“1992); see also A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(3) & (4) (1989). Although a failure to give Miranda warnings is not determinative of voluntariness, the lack of warnings gives “added weight” to other circumstances that make a confession involuntary.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(B)(5) — 1 case
State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1995).
“Walden claims that Spring is inapplicable because A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(2) requires the court to consider a defendant’s knowledge of the charges he is facing when determining whether a waiver was voluntary.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3988(C) — 4 cases
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