Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702 (2026)

First time felony offenders; sentencing; definition

✓ current as of May 2026
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13-702. First time felony offenders; sentencing; definition

A. Unless a specific sentence is otherwise provided, the term of imprisonment for a first felony offense shall be the presumptive sentence determined pursuant to subsection D of this section.  Except for those felonies involving a dangerous offense or if a specific sentence is otherwise provided, the court may increase or reduce the presumptive sentence within the ranges set by subsection D of this section.  Any reduction or increase shall be based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in section 13-701, subsections D and E and shall be within the ranges prescribed in subsection D of this section.

B. If a person is convicted of a felony without having previously been convicted of any felony and if at least two of the aggravating factors listed in section 13-701, subsection D apply, the court may increase the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise authorized for that offense to an aggravated term.  If a person is convicted of a felony without having previously been convicted of any felony and if the court finds at least two mitigating factors listed in section 13-701, subsection E apply, the court may decrease the minimum term of imprisonment otherwise authorized for that offense to a mitigated term.

C. The aggravated or mitigated term imposed pursuant to subsection D of this section may be imposed only if at least two of the aggravating circumstances are found beyond a reasonable doubt to be true by the trier of fact or are admitted by the defendant, except that an aggravating circumstance under section 13-701, subsection D, paragraph 11 shall be found to be true by the court, or in mitigation of the crime are found to be true by the court, on any evidence or information introduced or submitted to the court or the trier of fact before sentencing or any evidence presented at trial, and factual findings and reasons in support of these findings are set forth on the record at the time of sentencing.

D. The term of imprisonment for a presumptive, minimum, maximum, mitigated or aggravated sentence shall be within the range prescribed under this subsection.  The terms are as follows:

Felony  Mitigated     Minimum Presumptive      Maximum Aggravated

Class 2     3 years     4 years     5 years     10 years    12.5 years

Class 3     2 years     2.5 years   3.5 years   7 years     8.75 years

Class 4     1 year      1.5 years   2.5 years   3 years     3.75 years

Class 5     .5 years    .75 years   1.5 years   2 years     2.5 years  

Class 6     .33 years   .5 years    1 year      1.5 years   2 years

E. The court shall inform all of the parties before sentencing occurs of its intent to increase or decrease a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated sentence pursuant this section.  If the court fails to inform the parties, a party waives its right to be informed unless the party timely objects at the time of sentencing.

F. For the purposes of this section, "trier of fact" means a jury, unless the defendant and the state waive a jury in which case the trier of fact means the court.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 492 cases (54 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 61× “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Price, 171 P.3d 1223 (Ariz. 2007). · cites it 54× “¶ 15 If there is one Apprendi -compliant aggravating factor, "a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under section 13-702." Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 ¶ 21, 115 P.”
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). · cites it 19× “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State v. Timmons, 103 P.3d 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 40× “Arizona's noncapital sentencing statute, § 13-702, similarly requires that, before a defendant is eligible for an aggravated term, a trial court must conclude, after weighing all factors, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”
State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 486 (Ariz. 1999). · cites it 42× “¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that a trial judge's alleged failure to comply with A.R.S. § 13-702 is subject to harmless error analysis.”
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). · cites it 23× “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State v. Alvarez, 67 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 25× “1986), “Bly permitted the use of a deadly weapon to be used as an aggravating factor despite the fact that it is a necessary element of the crime of armed robbery, only because of the legislative mandate in A.R.S. § 13-702( [C] )(2).” True to this observation, virtually all of…”
State v. Lara, 830 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1992). · cites it 38× “However, the court held that reckless conduct beyond that "which is merely sufficient to constitute an element of reckless manslaughter" could be considered under section 13-702's "catch all" provision, section 13-702(D)(13).”
State v. Pena, 104 P.3d 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 15× “2004) (death or life imprisonment) sentence, but that statute adopts all of the aggravating and mitigating factors of § 13-702 and the case therefore applies. See A.”
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 38× “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618 (Ariz. 2005). · cites it 14× “¶ 5 The court of appeals held that if a jury finds, or a defendant admits, at least one aggravating factor, the defendant becomes eligible to receive an aggravated sentence under A.R.S. § 13-702, and the trial judge may consider additional facts not found by the jury in…”
State v. Garcia, 193 P.3d 798 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 24× “A.R.S. § 13-702(G). But the legislature expressly excluded any class 6 felony from eligibility for designation as a misdemeanor if the offense was one “involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury or the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(0) — 3 cases
State v. Poling, 606 P.2d 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
State v. Bly, 621 P.2d 279 (Ariz. 1980).
State v. Brown, 70 P.3d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(A) — 40 cases
State v. Henderson, 100 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Ortega, 206 P.3d 769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996).
State v. Pena, 104 P.3d 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “2004) (death or life imprisonment) sentence, but that statute adopts all of the aggravating and mitigating factors of § 13-702 and the case therefore applies. See A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(A)(1) — 2 cases
State v. Gomez, 123 P.3d 1131 (Ariz. 2005).
State v. Nguyen, 912 P.2d 1380 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(A)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Alvarez, 67 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “1986), “Bly permitted the use of a deadly weapon to be used as an aggravating factor despite the fact that it is a necessary element of the crime of armed robbery, only because of the legislative mandate in A.R.S. § 13-702( [C] )(2).” True to this observation, virtually all of…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(A)(4) — 2 cases
State v. Alvarez, 67 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “1986), “Bly permitted the use of a deadly weapon to be used as an aggravating factor despite the fact that it is a necessary element of the crime of armed robbery, only because of the legislative mandate in A.R.S. § 13-702( [C] )(2).” True to this observation, virtually all of…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(A)(5) — 1 case
State v. Leon, 3 P.3d 968 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(B) — 46 cases
State v. Timmons, 103 P.3d 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Arizona's noncapital sentencing statute, § 13-702, similarly requires that, before a defendant is eligible for an aggravated term, a trial court must conclude, after weighing all factors, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”
State Ex Rel. Smith v. Conn, 98 P.3d 881 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 486 (Ariz. 1999). “¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that a trial judge's alleged failure to comply with A.R.S. § 13-702 is subject to harmless error analysis.”
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Martinez, 100 P.3d 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(B)(2) — 1 case
State of Arizona v. Mark Noriki Kasic, 265 P.3d 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C) — 90 cases
State v. Pena, 104 P.3d 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “2004) (death or life imprisonment) sentence, but that statute adopts all of the aggravating and mitigating factors of § 13-702 and the case therefore applies. See A.”
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Timmons, 103 P.3d 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Arizona's noncapital sentencing statute, § 13-702, similarly requires that, before a defendant is eligible for an aggravated term, a trial court must conclude, after weighing all factors, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(1) — 7 cases
State v. Gomez, 123 P.3d 1131 (Ariz. 2005).
State v. Cleere, 138 P.3d 1181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Molina, 118 P.3d 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Cleere, 109 P.3d 107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State of Arizona v. Fredric B. Cleere (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(11) — 13 cases
State v. Price, 171 P.3d 1223 (Ariz. 2007). “¶ 15 If there is one Apprendi -compliant aggravating factor, "a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under section 13-702." Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 ¶ 21, 115 P.”
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Joyner, 158 P.3d 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Smith, 194 P.3d 399 (Ariz. 2008).
State v. Christian, 47 P.3d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(13) — 5 cases
State v. Henderson, 100 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State v. Martinez, 100 P.3d 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(14) — 1 case
State v. Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(15) — 3 cases
State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 486 (Ariz. 1999). “¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that a trial judge's alleged failure to comply with A.R.S. § 13-702 is subject to harmless error analysis.”
State v. Harvey, 974 P.2d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(16) — 1 case
State v. Anderson, 116 P.3d 1219 (Ariz. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(17) — 3 cases
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State of Arizona v. Jonathan Mcmullen (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(18) — 3 cases
State v. Price, 171 P.3d 1223 (Ariz. 2007). “¶ 15 If there is one Apprendi -compliant aggravating factor, "a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under section 13-702." Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 ¶ 21, 115 P.”
State v. Gomez, 123 P.3d 1131 (Ariz. 2005).
P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(19) — 4 cases
State v. Alvarez, 67 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “1986), “Bly permitted the use of a deadly weapon to be used as an aggravating factor despite the fact that it is a necessary element of the crime of armed robbery, only because of the legislative mandate in A.R.S. § 13-702( [C] )(2).” True to this observation, virtually all of…”
State of Arizona v. Brian K. Hancock, 379 P.3d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Lopez (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(2) — 11 cases
State v. Munninger, 142 P.3d 701 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State v. Gatliff, 102 P.3d 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Gomez, 123 P.3d 1131 (Ariz. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(20) — 4 cases
State v. Timmons, 103 P.3d 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Arizona's noncapital sentencing statute, § 13-702, similarly requires that, before a defendant is eligible for an aggravated term, a trial court must conclude, after weighing all factors, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”
State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Monaco, 83 P.3d 553 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(21) — 7 cases
State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). “Rather, the “multiple victims” aggravating factor for non-capital offenses is a court-created factor that has been held to fall within the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-702(0(17) (“Any other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.”
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Aleman, 109 P.3d 571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Perrin, 214 P.3d 1016 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(24) — 2 cases
State v. Price, 171 P.3d 1223 (Ariz. 2007). “¶ 15 If there is one Apprendi -compliant aggravating factor, "a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under section 13-702." Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 ¶ 21, 115 P.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(4) — 7 cases
State v. Ruggiero, 120 P.3d 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Brown, 129 P.3d 947 (Ariz. 2006).
State v. Price, 171 P.3d 1223 (Ariz. 2007). “¶ 15 If there is one Apprendi -compliant aggravating factor, "a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available under section 13-702." Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 ¶ 21, 115 P.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(5) — 4 cases
State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Barraza, 170 P.3d 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Munninger, 104 P.3d 204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Estrada, 18 P.3d 1253 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(6) — 1 case
State v. Anderson, 116 P.3d 1219 (Ariz. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(9) — 8 cases
State of Arizona v. Matthew Erich Manzanedo, 110 P.3d 1026 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004). “The superior court subsequently entered a second order declaring A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and -702.01 “unconstitutional on their face, and as applied to this case.”
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Dairman, 95 P.3d 548 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Brown, 129 P.3d 947 (Ariz. 2006).
State v. Ponsart, 233 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D) — 119 cases
State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. 1989).
State v. Molina, 118 P.3d 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
State v. Davolt, 84 P.3d 456 (Ariz. 2004).
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(1) — 18 cases
State v. Lara, 830 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1992). “However, the court held that reckless conduct beyond that "which is merely sufficient to constitute an element of reckless manslaughter" could be considered under section 13-702's "catch all" provision, section 13-702(D)(13).”
State v. Long, 83 P.3d 618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Cazares, 72 P.3d 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Germain, 723 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(10) — 3 cases
Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty., 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985).
Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(11) — 9 cases
State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
State v. Song, 860 P.2d 482 (Ariz. 1993).
State v. Pitts, 874 P.2d 962 (Ariz. 1994).
State v. Calderon, 827 P.2d 473 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
State v. Everhart, 819 P.2d 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(12) — 1 case
State v. Stuck, 739 P.2d 1333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(13) — 19 cases
State v. Pitts, 874 P.2d 962 (Ariz. 1994).
State v. Suniga, 701 P.2d 1197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Germain, 723 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Webb, 793 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
State of Arizona v. Austin James Bonfiglio, 295 P.3d 948 (Ariz. 2013).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(2) — 14 cases
State v. Lara, 830 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1992). “However, the court held that reckless conduct beyond that "which is merely sufficient to constitute an element of reckless manslaughter" could be considered under section 13-702's "catch all" provision, section 13-702(D)(13).”
State v. Germain, 723 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1982).
State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1998).
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(3) — 2 cases
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Wideman, 798 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(4) — 1 case
State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1982).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(5) — 14 cases
State v. Long, 83 P.3d 618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “Once a jury finds an aggravating factor, Blakely is satisfied, and A.”
State v. Just, 675 P.2d 1353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Monaco, 83 P.3d 553 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(6) — 2 cases
State v. Conde, 846 P.2d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Fagnant, 839 P.2d 430 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(7) — 1 case
State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1982).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(8) — 1 case
State v. Elliget, 864 P.2d 1064 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D)(9) — 12 cases
State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Webb, 793 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Just, 675 P.2d 1353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(DX1) — 2 cases
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Gutierrez, 634 P.2d 960 (Ariz. 1981).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(DX5) — 1 case
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(DX6) — 1 case
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(E) — 20 cases
State v. Thurlow, 712 P.2d 929 (Ariz. 1986).
State v. Meador, 645 P.2d 1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “The defendant reasons that “the same intentional infliction of serious physical injuries which is an element of Second Degree Murder and which makes the offense a dangerous offense should not also be considered as an aggravating circumstance under A.”
State v. Gillies, 691 P.2d 655 (Ariz. 1984).
State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1982).
Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2013).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(E)(1) — 4 cases
State v. Valencia, 370 P.3d 124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1982).
State v. Passarelli, 636 P.2d 138 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(E)(2) — 3 cases
State v. Suniga, 701 P.2d 1197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Bilke, 781 P.2d 28 (Ariz. 1989).
State v. Just, 675 P.2d 1353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(E)(5) — 10 cases
State v. Pena, 104 P.3d 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). “2004) (death or life imprisonment) sentence, but that statute adopts all of the aggravating and mitigating factors of § 13-702 and the case therefore applies. See A.”
State v. Thurlow, 712 P.2d 929 (Ariz. 1986).
State v. Suniga, 701 P.2d 1197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987).
State v. Lamb, 690 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1984).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(F) — 11 cases
State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991).
State v. Hinchey, 799 P.2d 352 (Ariz. 1990).
State v. Beaty, 762 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1988).
State v. Viramontes, 64 P.3d 188 (Ariz. 2003).
State v. De Nistor, 694 P.2d 237 (Ariz. 1985).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(F)(2) — 5 cases
State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214 (Ariz. 1996).
State v. Spencer, 859 P.2d 146 (Ariz. 1993).
State v. Romanosky, 782 P.2d 693 (Ariz. 1989).
State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1998).
State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1998).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(G) — 36 cases
State v. Garcia, 193 P.3d 798 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “A.R.S. § 13-702(G). But the legislature expressly excluded any class 6 felony from eligibility for designation as a misdemeanor if the offense was one “involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury or the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a…”
State v. Moreno, 655 P.2d 23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
State of Arizona v. Patrick James Soriano, 176 P.3d 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
Matter of Beren, 874 P.2d 320 (Ariz. 1994).
State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(G)(2) — 1 case
Stoudamire v. State of Arizona, 141 P.3d 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(H) — 32 cases
State v. Winton, 736 P.2d 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
State v. Sweet, 693 P.2d 921 (Ariz. 1985).
State v. Fallon, 726 P.2d 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Diaz, 842 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1992).
State v. Arana, 843 P.2d 652 (Ariz. 1992).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(a) — 1 case
State v. Pinto, 880 P.2d 1139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(c)(1) — 1 case
State of Arizona v. Jonathan Mcmullen (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(c)(13) — 1 case
Tarray v. State, 979 A.2d 729 (Md. 2009).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(c)(l) — 1 case
State v. Brown, 115 P.3d 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(h) — 1 case
State v. Pinto, 880 P.2d 1139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.