Ariz. Rev. Stat. » Title 14
Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-2517 (2026)

Penalty clause for contest; restriction

✓ current as of May 2026
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A provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings or actions relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for the contest, proceedings or actions.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1999–2024 · leading case: Stewart v. Stewart, 286 P.3d 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
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Stewart v. Stewart, 286 P.3d 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 18× “Validity of in terrorem clauses ¶ 13 Appellants next argue the superior court erred by ruling the in terrorem clauses violated both A.R.S. § 14-2517 (West 2012) 3 and public policy.”
Est. of Shumway v. Gavette, 9 P.3d 1062 (Ariz. 2000). · cites it 8× “Per A.R.S. § 14-2517, the penalty clause is unenforceable if probable cause existed to contest the will.”
In Re the Shaheen Trust, 341 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 7× “¶ 4 Shaheen contends that, because A.R.S. § 14-2517 refers only to wills, and not to trusts, no-eontest provisions in trusts are valid and enforceable regardless of whether probable cause existed to bring a challenge.”
Mullin v. Brown, 115 P.3d 139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “They argue we should ignore the import of the language as mere dictum because the only issue on review was the statutory question of whether probable cause had existed to challenge the will pursuant to § 14-2517. ¶ 13 In contrast, Andrew contends Shum-way signals a shift in the…”
Jenifer Duncan v. Olga Rawls, 812 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “8 7 The language of the in terrorem provision in the August 2013 trust document is very broad and applies even to challenges brought “in good faith and with probable cause[.”
In Re Est. of Shumway, 3 P.3d 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “In Arizona, forfeiture clauses are not per se invalid, although Arizona, like most states, [5] views such clauses with disfavor: "A provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is…”
Rodriguez v. Gavette, 3 P.3d 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 6× “” 6 A.R.S. § 14-2517 (1995). ¶25 This statute has not yet been interpreted in a published opinion, nor has probable cause, as it is used in this section, been defined.”
Wulf v. Barrow, 418 P.3d 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 11× “Because A.R.S. § 14-2517 requires only that the beneficiaries’ claim—and not each of the underlying factual allegations—be supported by probable cause, we affirm.”
Lewison v. Bogle (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 14-2517. Probable cause is “the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be…”
Andrew Mullin v. Brown Chapa Fields Linden (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “They argue we should ignore the import of the language as mere dictum because the only issue on review was the statutory question of whether probable cause had existed to challenge the will pursuant to § 14-2517. ¶13 In contrast, Andrew contends Shumway signals a shift in the…”
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