Ariz. Rev. Stat. » Title 31
Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412 (2026)

Criteria for release on parole; release; custody of parolee; definition

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. If a prisoner is certified as eligible for parole pursuant to section 41-1604.09 the board of executive clemency shall authorize the release of the applicant on parole if the applicant has reached the applicant's earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection D and it appears to the board, in its sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the state. The applicant shall thereupon be allowed to go on parole in the legal custody and under the control of the state department of corrections, until the board revokes the parole or grants an absolute discharge from parole or until the prisoner reaches the prisoner's individual earned release credit date pursuant to section 41-1604.10. When the prisoner reaches the prisoner's individual earned release credit date the prisoner's parole shall be terminated and the prisoner shall no longer be under the authority of the board but shall be subject to revocation under section 41-1604.10.

B. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, the director of the state department of corrections may certify as eligible for parole any prisoner, regardless of the classification of the prisoner, who has reached the prisoner's parole eligibility date pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection D, unless an increased term has been imposed pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection F, for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of any other jurisdiction to serve a term of imprisonment imposed by the other jurisdiction or to stand trial on criminal charges in the other jurisdiction or for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of the state department of corrections to serve any consecutive term imposed on the prisoner.  On review of an application for parole pursuant to this subsection the board may authorize parole if, in its discretion, parole appears to be in the best interests of the state.

C. A prisoner who is otherwise eligible for parole, who is not on home arrest or work furlough and who is currently serving a sentence for a conviction of a serious offense or conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit a serious offense shall not be granted parole or absolute discharge from imprisonment except by one of the following votes:

1. A majority affirmative vote if four or more members consider the action.

2. A unanimous affirmative vote if three members consider the action.

3. A unanimous affirmative vote if two members consider the action pursuant to section 31-401, subsection I and the chairman concurs after reviewing the information considered by the two members.

D. The board, as a condition of parole, shall order a prisoner to make any court-ordered restitution.

E. Payment of restitution by the prisoner in accordance with subsection D of this section shall be made through the clerk of the superior court in the county in which the prisoner was sentenced for the offense for which the prisoner has been imprisoned in the same manner as restitution is paid as a condition of probation. The clerk of the superior court, on request, shall make the prisoner's restitution payment history available to the board, victim, victim's attorney and department without cost.

F. The board shall not disclose the address of the victim or the victim's immediate family to any party without the written consent of the victim or the victim's family.

G. For the purposes of this section, "serious offense" includes any of the following:

1. A serious offense as defined in section 13-706, subsection F, paragraph 1, subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j) or (k).

2. A dangerous crime against children as defined in section 13-705. The citation of section 13-705 is not a necessary element for a serious offense designation.

3. A conviction under a prior criminal code for any offense that possesses reasonably equivalent offense elements as the offense elements that are listed under section 13-705, subsection T, paragraph 1 or section 13-706, subsection F, paragraph 1.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 50 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977).
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Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977). · cites it 16× “A.R.S. § 31-412 sets forth the criterion for release on parole: "If it appears to the board of pardons and paroles, from a report by the department of corrections, or upon the application by the prisoner for a release on parole, that there is reasonable probability that the…”
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1986). · cites it 28× “A.R.S. § 31-412. In their complaint, they requested a declaratory judgment, injunction and mandamus.”
State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118 (Ariz. 1990). · cites it 8× “The court of appeals found the statute "invalid" because: (1) it gives the judicial branch power to grant parole and that power rests exclusively with the Board of Pardons and Paroles; (2) it is inconsistent with other sections of the criminal code, specifically, A.R.S. §§…”
Borchers v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 P.2d 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 18× “Sufficiency of Reasons Given for Parole Denial Appellant argues that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for parole denial in violation of A.R.S. § 31-412. The State responds that the reasons given were sufficiently specific and individualized, that the Board has sole…”
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 14× “A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “See A.R.S. § 31-412(A), 31-414 (a defendant can be on parole only before the expiration of the term specified in his sentence, or before absolute discharge).”
State v. Johnson, 827 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “” A.R.S. § 31-412(A). However, the state does not suggest how we should construe “in any correctional or detention facility.”
Stinson v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 725 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. 1986). · cites it 11× “Therefore, Stinson claims, the Board failed to comply with the criteria for determining parole eligibility as set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412(A). The superior court subsequently dismissed Stinson’s complaint.”
State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996). · cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 31-412(A) provides the criterion for release on parole, "if the applicant has reached his earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to § 41-1604.”
Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 2× “'" Grimm , at 265 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-412 ). The court held that this statute implies "that parole may not be authorized if there is no such reasonable probability, and therefore immunity should adhere only for acts within the guidelines.”
State v. Oehlerking, 709 P.2d 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 6× “” Presumably, the trial court ordered the board to determine the amount and time of the payments in reliance upon A.R.S. § 31-412, which provides, in part: C.”
Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). “" Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 31-412(A); see also Cooper v.”
Stewart v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 753 P.2d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 8× “A.R.S. § 31-412, as amended in 1978, is similar to those statutes reviewed in Allen and Greenholtz .”
Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905 (Ariz. 1986). · cites it 2× “Our rejection of absolute immunity in Grimm is significant because, like defendant in the instant case, members of the board of pardons and paroles are executive officials appointed by the governor.”
State v. Nosie, 724 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 8× “At the same time, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 31-412 dealing with the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Pardons and Parole and set forth the criteria for release on parole by adding A.”
Banks v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 629 P.2d 1035 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 31-412 provides in pertinent part: A.”
State v. Vera, 766 P.2d 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “In the sentencing order, the court ordered the amount to be paid within two years following release from custody or as ordered by the Board of Pardons and Paroles pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412, whichever date first occurs.”
Cawley v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 701 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “The rule implements and enlarges on A.R.S. § 31-412(B), which states, in part: [A]ny prisoner [not otherwise ineligible for parole] may be certified by the director as eligible for parole for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of any other jurisdiction to serve a term of…”
State v. Tietjens, 729 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1986). · cites it 6× “The trial judge said he was acting pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412, which states that ‘‘[t]he board shall as a condition of parole order a prisoner to make any court-ordered restitution.”
Mileham v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 520 P.2d 840 (Ariz. 1974). · cites it 4× “§ 31-412, as amended, sets forth the principles for testing whether a prisoner may be released on parole: “If it appears to the board of pardons and paroles, from a report by the department of corrections, or upon the application by the prisoner for a release on parole, that…”
Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. State, 16 P.3d 757 (Ariz. 2001). “section 31-412 provided support for awarding partial immunity.”
State v. Currie, 721 P.2d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “Section 31-412, whichever date first occurs.”
State v. Newman, 688 P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1984). · cites it 2× “01 (A) (an inmate on work furlough from the Department of Corrections is in the "legal custody" of the department); A.R.”
State v. Stevens, 744 P.2d 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412(B), we held: When an offender is paroled to the Department of Corrections or to another jurisdiction to begin serving a consecutive sentence, such parole time must run concurrently with the running of the subsequent sentence.”
State v. LaBarre, 610 P.2d 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 2× “Among the legislative enactments was A.R.S. § 31-412(B) (1978 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch.”
Fox v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “On July 9, 1980, pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412(B), the appellee was paroled on the five year sentence and began to serve the consecutive two and one-half year sentence.”
Arnold v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 805 P.2d 388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 31-412. A prisoner denied parole must be given a written statement specifying the reasons for the denial.”
Saunders v. Goldsmith, 819 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 8× “Section 31-412 provides, in pertinent part: A.”
State v. Moore, 717 P.2d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). “00 as ordered by the Board of Pardons and Paroles pursuant to A.R.S. 31-412 or six months following release from custody, whichever date occurs first.”
Application of Webb, 723 P.2d 642 (Ariz. 1986). · cites it 2× “Whether or not a prisoner is eligible for release on parole or absolute discharge pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412 is not for courts to decide; it is within the control of the board of pardons and paroles or the department of corrections.”
State Ex Rel. Ariz. St. Bd. of P. & P. v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cnty., 467 P.2d 917 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). “It is well to mention here that the Respondent Judd urges that the Board did not observe the statutory criteria.”
Sykes v. Grantham, 567 So. 2d 200 (Miss. 1990). “" A.R.S. § 31-412. If such is the case and all the information before the Board negates the probability of lawful conduct while on parole, the Board cannot ignore such evidence.”
Benavidez v. Az Bd. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 22× “” A.R.S. § 31-412 (1989) (emphasis added). We first consider the scope of the Board’s discretion and then the factors applied in Benavidez’s case.”
Foggy v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 501 P.2d 942 (Ariz. 1972). “§ 31-412 A.R.S. State v. Howland, 103 Ariz.”
Kelly K. Hamilton v. Christopher Moody, Attorney Gen. of the State of Arizona (D. Ariz. 2026). · cites it 20× “1986), quoting 5 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-412 (A). The post-1986 version of § 31-412(A) provides that 6 parole shall be granted unless “it appears to the board, in its sole discretion, that there is a 7 substantial probability that the applicant will not remain at liberty…”
Foggy v. Eyman, 516 P.2d 321 (Ariz. 1973). “See also § 31-412 A.R.S.; State v. Howland, 103 Ariz.”
Saunders v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 847 P.2d 1124 (Ariz. 1993). · cites it 18× “DISCUSSION Arizona’s parole statute, A.R.S. § 31-412, provides in part: A. If a prisoner is certified [by the director] as eligible for parole .”
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 7× “Appellants, inmates of the State Correctional Institution at Florence, filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court, claiming that the Board failed to consider the statutory criterion set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412 in denying their parole applications.”
Clouse v. State, 11 P.3d 1012 (Ariz. 2000). “section 31-412 provided support for awarding partial .”
Hamilton v. Az Bd of Clemency (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 14× “]” The Board contended these written denials 1 At the time of Hamilton’s 1982 offense, § 31-412 provided that the Board shall authorize the release of the eligible parole applicant “unless it appears to the board, in their sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability…”
Berger v. Abec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 4×
Viramontes 146961 v. Shinn (D. Ariz. 2021). · cites it 4×
Ingersoll v. Abec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3×
Hamilton v. Az Boec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2×
Freeman v. Ducey (D. Ariz. 2021). · cites it 2×
Borchers v. Arizona Dep't of Corr. (D. Ariz. 2021). · cites it 2×
Borchers v. Arizona Dep't of Corr. (D. Ariz. 2022). · cites it 2×
Shinn v. abec/berry (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Eddy (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
Hayward v. Marshall (9th Cir. 2010).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(A) — 23 cases
State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118 (Ariz. 1990). “The court of appeals found the statute "invalid" because: (1) it gives the judicial branch power to grant parole and that power rests exclusively with the Board of Pardons and Paroles; (2) it is inconsistent with other sections of the criminal code, specifically, A.R.S. §§…”
Borchers v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 P.2d 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “Sufficiency of Reasons Given for Parole Denial Appellant argues that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for parole denial in violation of A.R.S. § 31-412. The State responds that the reasons given were sufficiently specific and individualized, that the Board has sole…”
State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). “See A.R.S. § 31-412(A), 31-414 (a defendant can be on parole only before the expiration of the term specified in his sentence, or before absolute discharge).”
Stinson v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 725 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. 1986). “Therefore, Stinson claims, the Board failed to comply with the criteria for determining parole eligibility as set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412(A). The superior court subsequently dismissed Stinson’s complaint.”
State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996). “A.R.S. § 31-412(A) provides the criterion for release on parole, "if the applicant has reached his earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to § 41-1604.”
State v. Johnson, 827 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “” A.R.S. § 31-412(A). However, the state does not suggest how we should construe “in any correctional or detention facility.”
Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). “" Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 31-412(A); see also Cooper v.”
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1986). “A.R.S. § 31-412. In their complaint, they requested a declaratory judgment, injunction and mandamus.”
Stewart v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 753 P.2d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). “A.R.S. § 31-412, as amended in 1978, is similar to those statutes reviewed in Allen and Greenholtz .”
State v. Newman, 688 P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1984). “01 (A) (an inmate on work furlough from the Department of Corrections is in the "legal custody" of the department); A.R.”
Benavidez v. Az Bd. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). “” A.R.S. § 31-412 (1989) (emphasis added). We first consider the scope of the Board’s discretion and then the factors applied in Benavidez’s case.”
Kelly K. Hamilton v. Christopher Moody, Attorney Gen. of the State of Arizona (D. Ariz. 2026). “1986), quoting 5 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-412 (A). The post-1986 version of § 31-412(A) provides that 6 parole shall be granted unless “it appears to the board, in its sole discretion, that there is a 7 substantial probability that the applicant will not remain at liberty…”
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). “Appellants, inmates of the State Correctional Institution at Florence, filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court, claiming that the Board failed to consider the statutory criterion set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412 in denying their parole applications.”
Hamilton v. Az Bd of Clemency (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024). “]” The Board contended these written denials 1 At the time of Hamilton’s 1982 offense, § 31-412 provided that the Board shall authorize the release of the eligible parole applicant “unless it appears to the board, in their sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability…”
Viramontes 146961 v. Shinn (D. Ariz. 2021).
Saunders v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 847 P.2d 1124 (Ariz. 1993). “DISCUSSION Arizona’s parole statute, A.R.S. § 31-412, provides in part: A. If a prisoner is certified [by the director] as eligible for parole .”
Berger v. Abec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
Hamilton v. Az Boec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
Ingersoll v. Abec (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
Borchers v. Arizona Dep't of Corr. (D. Ariz. 2021).
Borchers v. Arizona Dep't of Corr. (D. Ariz. 2022).
Shinn v. abec/berry (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Eddy (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(B) — 8 cases
Cawley v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 701 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). “The rule implements and enlarges on A.R.S. § 31-412(B), which states, in part: [A]ny prisoner [not otherwise ineligible for parole] may be certified by the director as eligible for parole for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of any other jurisdiction to serve a term of…”
State v. Johnson, 827 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “” A.R.S. § 31-412(A). However, the state does not suggest how we should construe “in any correctional or detention facility.”
State v. Stevens, 744 P.2d 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “Pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412(B), we held: When an offender is paroled to the Department of Corrections or to another jurisdiction to begin serving a consecutive sentence, such parole time must run concurrently with the running of the subsequent sentence.”
State v. LaBarre, 610 P.2d 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). “Among the legislative enactments was A.R.S. § 31-412(B) (1978 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch.”
Fox v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 717 P.2d 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). “On July 9, 1980, pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412(B), the appellee was paroled on the five year sentence and began to serve the consecutive two and one-half year sentence.”
Saunders v. Goldsmith, 819 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). “Section 31-412 provides, in pertinent part: A.”
Saunders v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 847 P.2d 1124 (Ariz. 1993). “DISCUSSION Arizona’s parole statute, A.R.S. § 31-412, provides in part: A. If a prisoner is certified [by the director] as eligible for parole .”
Freeman v. Ducey (D. Ariz. 2021).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(C) — 4 cases
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). “A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
State v. Nosie, 724 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). “At the same time, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 31-412 dealing with the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Pardons and Parole and set forth the criteria for release on parole by adding A.”
State v. Currie, 721 P.2d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). “Section 31-412, whichever date first occurs.”
State v. Tietjens, 729 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1986). “The trial judge said he was acting pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412, which states that ‘‘[t]he board shall as a condition of parole order a prisoner to make any court-ordered restitution.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(C)(2) — 1 case
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). “A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(D) — 1 case
State v. Tietjens, 729 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1986). “The trial judge said he was acting pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412, which states that ‘‘[t]he board shall as a condition of parole order a prisoner to make any court-ordered restitution.”
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