State v. Moore, 717 P.2d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
Search
State v. Moore, 717 P.2d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Arizona v. Kalill Stubblefield
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Kalill Stubblefield
unknown court · 2025 · confidence medium
It also explained that its decision was consistent with a prior opinion from this court, which had concluded that Section 13-901(E) did not allow courts to terminate a probation early as “unsuccessfully completed.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13 (citing State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 (App. 1986)). ¶20 This case law does not affect our analysis.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lewis
Ariz. · 2011 · confidence medium
If the superior court finds that, notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to complete all terms of probation successfully, he has nonetheless rehabilitated himself and no good purpose will be served by further probation, § 13-901(E) provides the judge with the discretion to terminate the probation. ¶ 12 Citing State v. Moore, the State argues that § 13-901(E) does not grant authority to terminate probation that is “unsuccessfully completed.” 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lewis (6×) also: Cited "see"
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In State v. Moore , this Court stated, "[t]he statute clearly implies that the only way that probation can be terminated is if the defendant's conduct is such as to indicate rehabilitation." 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Holguin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
State v. Scroggins, 168 Ariz. 8, 9 , 810 P.2d 631, 632 (App.1991); see State v. Moore, 149 Ariz; 176, 177, 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App. 1986) (restitution cannot be imposed independently of sentencing); State v. Cummings, 120 Ariz. 69, 71 , 583 P.2d 1389, 1391 (App. 1978) (restitution is part of sentencing process).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gatlin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Buonafede
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Rehabilitation is the purpose of probation.” State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986), citing State v. Hennessy, 13 Ariz.App. 546, 547, 479 P.2d 194, 195 (1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lucero
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Patel
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
A.R.S. § 13-901(E) specifically authorizes the trial court to terminate probation and discharge a probationer “if in the court’s opinion the ends of justice will be served thereby and if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” See also Rule 27.3 (trial court, after notice to prosecutor, may terminate probation and discharge probationer early); State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 , 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986) (probation may be terminated early if defendant’s conduct indicates rehabilitation).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Jeffrey Lee MOORE, Appellant
1 CA-CR 9257.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Apr 1, 1986.
717 P.2d 480
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div. and Greg A. McCarthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee., Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.
Shelley, Eubank, Haire.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
SHELLEY, Judge.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s order requiring the payment of restitution of $500.00, as ordered by the Board of Pardons and Parole, six months following his release from custody.

Appellant pled guilty to attempted burglary on January 11, 1985. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was placed on four years probation, with one of the terms being that he pay restitution in the sum of $500.00, at the rate of $25.00 per month. Later, a petition to revoke probation was filed on the grounds that appellant had committed an assault, a felony. Thereafter appellant was found guilty of assault. He was sentenced to 2.25 years in prison, flat time, on the assault charge and the trial court, in an order entered on July 18, 1985, stated that “it is ordered revoking the probation previously granted to defendant on February 22,1985 and terminating same as unsuccessfully completed.” The court also ordered that:

Defendant pay restitution through the Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County in the amount $500.00 as ordered by the Board of Pardons and Paroles pursuant to A.R.S. 31-412 or six months following release from custody, whichever date occurs first. Any order entered by the Board pursuant to 31-412 shall be transmitted to the Clerk of Superior Court, Maricopa County.

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay restitution as ordered by the Board of Pardons and Parole because he would be serving flat time and when released from prison would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Parole and that, in any event, the trial court violated the holding of this court in State v. Oehlerking, 147 Ariz. 266, 709 P.2d 900 (App.1985). Appellant also argues that remanding the case is unnecessary because an order of restitution cannot be enforced and the court, therefore, “will have no power over him.”

Both parties overlook a fundamental problem. When the court revoked appellant’s probation, that action revoked all of the terms and conditions of the probation, including restitution. There is no statutory authority allowing the imposition of restitution independent of any other sentencing provision, be it imprisonment, suspension of the imposition of sentence, or a fine. Restitution by itself cannot stand alone but must be part of a sentence, and the court never entered a sentence after the revocation of probation. Rule 27.-7(c)(2), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The trial court does not have authority to terminate a probation as unsuccessfully completed. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) as amended reads:

The court on its own initiative or upon application of the probationer may terminate the period of probation and discharge the defendant at a time earlier than that originally imposed if in the court’s opinion the ends of justice will be served thereby and if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it. (emphasis added)

The statute clearly implies that the only way that probation can be terminated is if the defendant’s conduct is such as to indicate rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is the purpose of probation. State v. Hen [*178] nessy, 13 Ariz.App. 546, 547, 479 P.2d 194, 195 (1971).

We therefore hold that the trial’s court order with respect to restitution is void and the same is hereby vacated.

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the other issues presented on appeal. This case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing, at which time the trial court may either sentence the defendant or suspend the time for imposition of sentence under such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper.

EUBANK, P.J., and HAIRE, J., concur.