A. A public or private owner, easement holder, lessee, tenant, manager or occupant of premises is not liable to a recreational user or educational user except on a showing that the owner, easement holder, lessee, tenant, manager or occupant was guilty of wilful, malicious or grossly negligent conduct that was a direct cause of the injury to the recreational user or educational user. A recreational user or educational user accepts the risks created by the user's activities and shall exercise reasonable care in those activities.
B. A landowner, easement holder, lessee, tenant manager or occupant of private or public land is not liable for damages in any civil action for unknown conditions on the land. Installing a sign or other form of warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity, or any modification made for the purpose of improving the safety of others, or failing to maintain or keep in place any sign, other form of warning or any modification made to improve safety does not create liability on the part of an owner, easement holder, lessee, tenant manager or occupant of land if there is no other basis for that liability.
C. This section is applicable to the duties and liability of any governmental entity, nongovernmental organization or person that provides monies, that reasonably performs maintenance, that reasonably makes or supports improvements or that takes similar reasonable action regarding land made available to the public for recreational or educational purposes.
D. This section does not create a duty of care or basis of liability for injury to persons or property. This section does not relieve any person using the land of another for recreational or educational purposes from any obligation that the person may have in the absence of this section to exercise care in the person's use of that land and in the activities on the land or from legal consequences for failing to employ such care.
E. Any person that uses the land of another for recreational or educational purposes with or without permission is liable for any damage to the land, property, livestock or crops that the person may cause while on that land.
F. This section does not limit the liability that otherwise exists for maintaining an attractive nuisance, except with respect to dams, channels, canals and lateral ditches used for flood control, agricultural, industrial, metallurgical or municipal purposes.
G. For the purposes of this section:
1. "Educational user" means a person to whom permission has been granted or implied without the payment of an admission fee or any other consideration to enter premises to participate in an educational program, including the viewing of historical, natural, archaeological or scientific sites. A nominal fee that is charged by a public entity or a nonprofit corporation to offset the cost of providing the educational or recreational premises and associated services does not constitute an admission fee or any other consideration as prescribed by this section.
2. "Grossly negligent" means a knowing or reckless indifference to the health and safety of others.
3. "Park" includes outdoor school grounds that are open to recreational users, excluding swimming pools and other aquatic features.
4. "Premises" means agricultural, range, open space, park, flood control, mining, forest, water delivery, water drainage or railroad lands, and any other similar lands, wherever located, that are available to a recreational user or educational user, including paved or unpaved multiuse trails and special purpose roads or trails not open to automotive use by the public and any building, improvement, fixture, water conveyance system, body of water, channel, canal or lateral, road, trail or structure on such lands.
5. "Recreational user":
(a) Means a person to whom permission has been granted or implied without the payment of an admission fee or any other consideration to travel across or to enter premises to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, ride, engage in off-highway vehicle, off-road recreational motor vehicle or all-terrain vehicle activity, operate aircraft, exercise, swim or engage in other outdoor recreational pursuits. The purchase of a state hunting, trapping or fishing license, an off-highway vehicle user indicia or a state trust land recreational permit or payment by an agency of this state to an owner, easement holder or lessee for public recreational access to the premises is not the payment of an admission fee or any other consideration as provided in this section. A nominal fee that is charged by a public entity or a nonprofit corporation to offset the cost of providing the educational or recreational premises and associated services does not constitute an admission fee or any other consideration as prescribed by this section.
(b) Does not include a student who is registered at a school during designated times that the student is allowed to be on the school grounds as determined by district personnel or who is participating in a school-sanctioned activity.
6. "School" has the same meaning prescribed in section 15-101.
Notes of Decisions
Marcie Normandin v. Encanto Adventures, 441 P.3d 439 (Ariz. 2019).
· cites it 19× “JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We consider whether Arizona's recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, immunizes Encanto Adventures LLC ("Encanto") from liability in a simple negligence action for injuries Marcie Normandin, a recreational user, sustained after falling…”
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1991).
· cites it 44× “Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action.”
Herman v. City of Tucson, 4 P.3d 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 22× “¶ 1 The appeal in this personal injury/premises liability action presents questions of the interpretation and constitutionality of Arizona’s recreational use immunity statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551. We hold that, *432 because plaintiff/appellant Michelle Herman did not come within…”
Dickey Ex Rel. Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 66 P.3d 44 (Ariz. 2003).
· cites it 18× “The Recreational Use Statute ¶ 6 Arizona's recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, limits a landowner's liability to parties injured while on the land for recreational purposes.”
Prince v. City of Apache Junction, 912 P.2d 47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 13× “The issues are whether the city can claim immunity under Arizona’s recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551 (1993), and, if so, whether that statute violates article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution.”
Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 786 P.2d 1057 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 11× “The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly construed A.R.S. § 33-1551, Arizona’s recreational use statute, to limit the defendants’ duty to Walker, thereby precluding her recovery.”
MacKinney v. City of Tucson, 299 P.3d 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 24× “The city argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, asserting that Arizona’s recreational-use immunity statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, barred MaeKinney’s negligence claim as a matter of law.”
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 870 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 22× “Section 33-1551 Codify the Salladay Doctrine and Thus Preclude Special Action Relief? Plaintiffs argue that because of the recent passage of Arizona's amended recreational use statute, A.”
Normandin v. Encanto, 425 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 50× “See A.R.S. § 33-1551. ¶39 The statute is not a special law because it survives the scrutiny of the three-part test enunciated in Gallardo.”
Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 4 P.3d 965 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 29× “¶ 8 The City then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from liability under A.R.S. § 33-1551 because no reasonable jury could find that it engaged in wilful, malicious, or gross negligence that caused William’s injuries.”
Stramka v. Salt River Rec., Inc., 877 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 20× “Because this suit arises from personal injuries suffered in 1988, we must apply the former version of the statute, which provided: A An owner, lessee or occupant of premises does not: 1.”
Smith v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 986 P.2d 247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 14× “” A.R.S. § 33-1551(0(4). With the possible exception of “exercise,” these are all activities done in natural outdoor conditions rather than on a commercial apparatus.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(0) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(A) — 20 cases
Marcie Normandin v. Encanto Adventures, 441 P.3d 439 (Ariz. 2019).
“JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We consider whether Arizona's recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, immunizes Encanto Adventures LLC ("Encanto") from liability in a simple negligence action for injuries Marcie Normandin, a recreational user, sustained after falling…”
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1991).
“Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action.”
Dickey Ex Rel. Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 66 P.3d 44 (Ariz. 2003).
“The Recreational Use Statute ¶ 6 Arizona's recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, limits a landowner's liability to parties injured while on the land for recreational purposes.”
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 870 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
“Section 33-1551 Codify the Salladay Doctrine and Thus Preclude Special Action Relief? Plaintiffs argue that because of the recent passage of Arizona's amended recreational use statute, A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(B) — 5 cases
Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 4 P.3d 965 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“¶ 8 The City then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from liability under A.R.S. § 33-1551 because no reasonable jury could find that it engaged in wilful, malicious, or gross negligence that caused William’s injuries.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(B)(1) — 1 case
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1991).
“Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(B)(2) — 4 cases
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1991).
“Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action.”
Stramka v. Salt River Rec., Inc., 877 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“Because this suit arises from personal injuries suffered in 1988, we must apply the former version of the statute, which provided: A An owner, lessee or occupant of premises does not: 1.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(B)(3) — 5 cases
Prince v. City of Apache Junction, 912 P.2d 47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
“The issues are whether the city can claim immunity under Arizona’s recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551 (1993), and, if so, whether that statute violates article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution.”
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 870 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
“Section 33-1551 Codify the Salladay Doctrine and Thus Preclude Special Action Relief? Plaintiffs argue that because of the recent passage of Arizona's amended recreational use statute, A.”
Normandin v. Encanto, 425 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. § 33-1551. ¶39 The statute is not a special law because it survives the scrutiny of the three-part test enunciated in Gallardo.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(B)(l) — 2 cases
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1991).
“Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C)(1) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C)(2) — 5 cases
Dickey Ex Rel. Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 66 P.3d 44 (Ariz. 2003).
“The Recreational Use Statute ¶ 6 Arizona's recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, limits a landowner's liability to parties injured while on the land for recreational purposes.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C)(3) — 7 cases
MacKinney v. City of Tucson, 299 P.3d 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“The city argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, asserting that Arizona’s recreational-use immunity statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, barred MaeKinney’s negligence claim as a matter of law.”
Smith v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 986 P.2d 247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“” A.R.S. § 33-1551(0(4). With the possible exception of “exercise,” these are all activities done in natural outdoor conditions rather than on a commercial apparatus.”
Normandin v. Encanto, 425 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. § 33-1551. ¶39 The statute is not a special law because it survives the scrutiny of the three-part test enunciated in Gallardo.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C)(4) — 4 cases
Herman v. City of Tucson, 4 P.3d 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“¶ 1 The appeal in this personal injury/premises liability action presents questions of the interpretation and constitutionality of Arizona’s recreational use immunity statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551. We hold that, *432 because plaintiff/appellant Michelle Herman did not come within…”
MacKinney v. City of Tucson, 299 P.3d 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“The city argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, asserting that Arizona’s recreational-use immunity statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, barred MaeKinney’s negligence claim as a matter of law.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(C)(5) — 4 cases
Normandin v. Encanto, 425 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. § 33-1551. ¶39 The statute is not a special law because it survives the scrutiny of the three-part test enunciated in Gallardo.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(G)(5) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(a) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1551(c)(5) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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