A. If a person is subject to an examination under this article, each party may select a competent professional to perform simultaneous evaluations of the person. The parties may stipulate to an evaluation by only one competent professional.
B. If the person is indigent, the court shall assist the person in retaining a competent professional to conduct the examination or to participate in the trial on the person's behalf.
C. Each competent professional shall be given reasonable access to the person in order to conduct the examination and shall share access to all relevant medical and psychological records, test data, test results and reports.
D. A competent professional who is retained by a party or who is appointed by the court is not permitted to give testimony unless the competent professional exchanges information as required by this section and, at least ten days before trial, submits to the court and all of the parties a written report of the competent professional's evaluation of the person.
E. At any proceeding under this chapter, a competent professional who is retained by a party or who is appointed by the court is not subject to a court order for the sequestration of witnesses.
F. The court shall approve a reasonable amount to be paid by the county for the services of a competent professional appointed by the court. In approving the amount to be paid the court shall consider the time expended, services rendered, expenses incurred and compensation received in the same case or for the same services from any other source.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 2000–2022 · leading case:
Walter v. Wilkinson, 10 P.3d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
Walter v. Wilkinson, 10 P.3d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 13× “¶ 8 Moreover, the State’s argument appears to misread the syntax of the statute. The word “may” precedes and thus arguably modifies only the word “select.”
In Re Leon G., 59 P.3d 779 (Ariz. 2002).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 36-3703. ¶ 14 The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person meets the statutory definition of an SVP.”
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“§ 36-3703(A). ¶ 8 A sexually violent person is defined as follows: “Sexually violent person” means a person to whom both of the following apply: (a) Has ever been convicted of or found guilty but insane of a sexually violent offense or was charged with a sexually violent offense…”
State of Arizona v. Hon. Ehrlich/eric Walker, 59 P.3d 779 (Ariz. 2002).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 36-3703. ¶ 14 The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person meets the statutory definition of an SVP.”
In Re Wilputte S., 100 P.3d 929 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “argues that the language of A.R.S. § 36-3702(B)(9)(a) is clear and unambiguous, and that interpreting § 36-3702(B)(9)(a) in light of A.”
In Re Leon G., 18 P.3d 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“section 36-3705, petitioned the court to order Leon’s detention as a sexually violent person pending a trial on the issue.”
State v. Ehrlich, 26 P.3d 481 (Ariz. 2001).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 36-3703. ¶26 The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person meets the statutory definition.”
In Re Leon G., 26 P.3d 481 (Ariz. 2001).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 36-3703. ¶ 26 The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person meets the statutory definition.”
In Re: Ms2020-000001 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 36-3703 (providing guidelines for the selection of competent professionals); A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3703(A) — 3 cases
Walter v. Wilkinson, 10 P.3d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“¶ 8 Moreover, the State’s argument appears to misread the syntax of the statute. The word “may” precedes and thus arguably modifies only the word “select.”
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“§ 36-3703(A). ¶ 8 A sexually violent person is defined as follows: “Sexually violent person” means a person to whom both of the following apply: (a) Has ever been convicted of or found guilty but insane of a sexually violent offense or was charged with a sexually violent offense…”
In Re Wilputte S., 100 P.3d 929 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“argues that the language of A.R.S. § 36-3702(B)(9)(a) is clear and unambiguous, and that interpreting § 36-3702(B)(9)(a) in light of A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3703(C) — 1 case
Walter v. Wilkinson, 10 P.3d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“¶ 8 Moreover, the State’s argument appears to misread the syntax of the statute. The word “may” precedes and thus arguably modifies only the word “select.”
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