Ariz. Rev. Stat. » Title 38
Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-101 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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In this title, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. "Office", "board" or "commission" means any office, board or commission of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, the salary or compensation of the incumbent or members of which is paid from a fund raised by taxation or by public revenue.

2. "Public institution" means any institution maintained and paid for from a fund raised by taxation or by public revenue.

3. "Officer" or "public officer" means the incumbent of any office, member of any board or commission, or his deputy or assistant exercising the powers and duties of the officer, other than clerks or mere employees of the officer.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1962–2013 · leading case: Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointments, 309 P.3d 1289 (Ariz. 2013).
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Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointments, 309 P.3d 1289 (Ariz. 2013). · cites it 2× “”); see also A.R.S. § 38-101(3) (defining “public officer” to include a “member of any board or commission”).”
Patton v. Cnty. of Mohave, 741 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “” The position of deputy county sheriff satisfies these requirements. Arizona Revised Statutes § 11-401(A)(1) (Supp.”
Adams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments, 254 P.3d 367 (Ariz. 2011). · cites it 2× “AR.S. § 38-101(1) (defining “office” to mean “any office .”
Adams v. Com'n on Appellate Ct. Appointments, 254 P.3d 367 (Ariz. 2011). · cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 38-101(1) (defining "office" to mean "any office.”
State Ex Rel. Pickrell v. Senner, 375 P.2d 728 (Ariz. 1962). · cites it 4× “§ 38-296 is qualified by A.R.S. § 38-101 (Definitions) which reads: “In this title, unless the context otherwise requires: “1.”
Shirley v. Superior Court in & for Cnty. of Apache, 513 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1973). · cites it 4× “” The term “elective office,” however, is limited by the definitions found in A.R.S. § 38-101 which provides: “In this title, unless the context otherwise requires: “1.”
L.G. Lefler, Inc. v. Tucson Airport Auth., Inc., 684 P.2d 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “It relies upon the definition of board or commission found in A.R.S. § 38-101: “In this title, unless the context otherwise requires: 1.”
State v. Salazar, 412 P.2d 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). · cites it 2× “Tucson City Charter, Chapter V, § 2, Chapter XII, § 3; Tucson Code (1953 Code, Chapter VIII, § 8-2); A.R.S., § 38-101(3). However, our research has failed to disclose any authority providing for a seal of the City Court either in the Tucson Code, the Tucson Charter or in the…”
Klein v. Pima Cnty. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 579 P.2d 573 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 2× “Since appellants were deputy sheriffs they were “public officers” as defined by A.R.S. § 38-101. If a reappointment by Sheriff Burr was necessary after his reelection in 1968, appellants were still de jure deputy sheriffs and thus “ .”
Steiger v. Woods, 32 P.3d 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 38-101(3) (1996). Romley testified that Carey was the subject of the investigation; therefore, Carey was a “party” in the “proceeding.”
State v. Jones, 587 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 38-101. All of the crimes charged arose entirely out of acts involving his position as executive director, his control of the books and records, and his misuse of his office.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-101(1) — 2 cases
Adams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments, 254 P.3d 367 (Ariz. 2011). “AR.S. § 38-101(1) (defining “office” to mean “any office .”
Adams v. Com'n on Appellate Ct. Appointments, 254 P.3d 367 (Ariz. 2011). “A.R.S. § 38-101(1) (defining "office" to mean "any office.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-101(3) — 4 cases
Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointments, 309 P.3d 1289 (Ariz. 2013). “”); see also A.R.S. § 38-101(3) (defining “public officer” to include a “member of any board or commission”).”
Patton v. Cnty. of Mohave, 741 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “” The position of deputy county sheriff satisfies these requirements. Arizona Revised Statutes § 11-401(A)(1) (Supp.”
State v. Salazar, 412 P.2d 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). “Tucson City Charter, Chapter V, § 2, Chapter XII, § 3; Tucson Code (1953 Code, Chapter VIII, § 8-2); A.R.S., § 38-101(3). However, our research has failed to disclose any authority providing for a seal of the City Court either in the Tucson Code, the Tucson Charter or in the…”
Steiger v. Woods, 32 P.3d 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). “” A.R.S. § 38-101(3) (1996). Romley testified that Carey was the subject of the investigation; therefore, Carey was a “party” in the “proceeding.”
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