A. A licensee is not liable in damages to any consumer or purchaser of spirituous liquor over the legal drinking age who is injured or whose property is damaged, or to survivors of such a person, if the injury or damage is alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by reason of the sale, furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor to that person. A licensee is not liable in damages to any other adult person who is injured or whose property is damaged, or to the survivors of such a person, who was present with the person who consumed the spirituous liquor at the time the spirituous liquor was consumed and who knew of the impaired condition of the person, if the injury or damage is alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by reason of the sale, furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor.
B. Subject to the provisions of subsection A of this section and except as provided in section 4-311, a person, firm, corporation or licensee is not liable in damages to any person who is injured, or to the survivors of any person killed, or for damage to property which is alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by reason of the sale, furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
22
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1988–2023 · leading case:
Schwab v. Matley, 793 P.2d 1088 (Ariz. 1990).
Schwab v. Matley, 793 P.2d 1088 (Ariz. 1990).
· cites it 40× “Disagreeing, the trial court granted Matley's motion to dismiss.”
Est. of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. 1994).
· cites it 28× “This holding obviates the need to determine the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 4-312 under Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 6 or other issues such as severability, de facto licensee, and retroactivity.”
Young Through Young v. Dfw Corp., 908 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 15× “Young, along with her parents (collectively ‘Young”), sued Keegan’s through its corporate owner, DFW Corporation (hereafter “Keegan’s”), alleging that the negligence of Keegan’s in serving alcohol to Jacobi while she was intoxicated was a proximate cause of the accident.”
Est. of Hernandez v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 838 P.2d 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 73× “However, we cannot ignore the fact that the same Thirty-seventh Legislature that enacted § 4-301 in 1985 also enacted § 4-312 the very next year. By its express language, § 4-312(B) provides immunity to anyone who furnishes alcohol to another, regardless of age, who subsequently…”
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Fair & Rodeo Ass'n, 866 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. 1994).
· cites it 13× “Although we note the seemingly narrower wording of § 4-311 when compared with § 4-312, we do not now decide whether it is possible to make a distinction between the applicability of these two statutes.”
Cotterhill v. Bafile, 865 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 5× “A.R.S. § 4-312(A) read as follows: A licensee is not liable in damages to any consumer or purchaser of spirituous liquor over the legal drinking age who is injured or whose property is damaged, or to survivors of such a person, if the injury or damage is alleged to have been…”
Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, Inc., 793 P.2d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 6× “Subsequent to Salvadore’s death, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 4-312 which bars claims similar to those in the present case where the injured party is the consumer, and not a third party.”
Callender v. Mco Props., 885 P.2d 123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 7× “[Tjhe most plausible interpretation of § 4-312(B) is that the immunity it grants applies solely to hquor hcensees and their associates.”
Schwab v. Matley, 780 P.2d 1387 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 14× “In the meantime, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 4-312, which became effective about one month prior to the filing of the lawsuit.”
Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc. v. Miller, 141 P.3d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “¶ 10 In Schwab , our supreme court invalidated A.R.S. § 4-312(A), which had relieved a liquor licensee from liability for injuries sustained by either a customer or anyone accompanying the customer “who knew of [his or her] impaired condition.”
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Fair & Rodeo Ass'n, 838 P.2d 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 8× “The former makes a licensee liable for damage and injuries or wrongful death if it sells spirituous liquor either to a person who is obviously intoxicated or to a person under the legal drinking age without requesting identification containing proof of age or with knowledge that…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4-312(A) — 8 cases
Schwab v. Matley, 793 P.2d 1088 (Ariz. 1990).
“Disagreeing, the trial court granted Matley's motion to dismiss.”
Est. of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. 1994).
“This holding obviates the need to determine the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 4-312 under Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 6 or other issues such as severability, de facto licensee, and retroactivity.”
Cotterhill v. Bafile, 865 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
“A.R.S. § 4-312(A) read as follows: A licensee is not liable in damages to any consumer or purchaser of spirituous liquor over the legal drinking age who is injured or whose property is damaged, or to survivors of such a person, if the injury or damage is alleged to have been…”
Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc. v. Miller, 141 P.3d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“¶ 10 In Schwab , our supreme court invalidated A.R.S. § 4-312(A), which had relieved a liquor licensee from liability for injuries sustained by either a customer or anyone accompanying the customer “who knew of [his or her] impaired condition.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4-312(B) — 13 cases
Est. of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. 1994).
“This holding obviates the need to determine the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 4-312 under Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 6 or other issues such as severability, de facto licensee, and retroactivity.”
Young Through Young v. Dfw Corp., 908 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
“Young, along with her parents (collectively ‘Young”), sued Keegan’s through its corporate owner, DFW Corporation (hereafter “Keegan’s”), alleging that the negligence of Keegan’s in serving alcohol to Jacobi while she was intoxicated was a proximate cause of the accident.”
Est. of Hernandez v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 838 P.2d 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
“However, we cannot ignore the fact that the same Thirty-seventh Legislature that enacted § 4-301 in 1985 also enacted § 4-312 the very next year. By its express language, § 4-312(B) provides immunity to anyone who furnishes alcohol to another, regardless of age, who subsequently…”
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Fair & Rodeo Ass'n, 866 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. 1994).
“Although we note the seemingly narrower wording of § 4-311 when compared with § 4-312, we do not now decide whether it is possible to make a distinction between the applicability of these two statutes.”
Callender v. Mco Props., 885 P.2d 123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[Tjhe most plausible interpretation of § 4-312(B) is that the immunity it grants applies solely to hquor hcensees and their associates.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.